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Abstract

Economic Evaluation of Air Pollution Reduction of Phase I Power
Plants in West Virginia: An Output Distance Function Approach

Huilan Li
Air pollutants from coal-fired power plants are nonmarket environmental bads. Title IV of the
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) sets the stage for the dirtiest power plants to reduce
emissions of SO2 and NOx in two phases. Title IV allocates plants SO2 allowances as a variation
of “pollution rights” based on averaged historical emission levels and allows free-trade of
allowances. This is the world’s first large scale pollutant trading market. Trading allows for
improved efficiency, flexibility, and reduced pollution.
This study employs the output distance function approach to evaluate the pollution reduction
behavior and efficiency of West Virginia power plants. The output distance function only needs
input and output data of the electricity production process to estimate virtual or shadow values of
outputs including those of nonmarket goods. Sixteen West Virginia power plants were selected
for the study and 1995-1999 input and output data collected for three pollutants, SO2, NOx, and
CO2. Estimates of the shadow values of SO2, NOx, and CO2 reveal inverse relationships between
estimated abatement cost and the emission rate for each pollutant. The evaluation is performed
on the shadow values of SO2 and NOx for each plant for each year and each plant’s five-year
average level against the corresponding estimated shadow value and emission rate.
The cap-and-trade program for SO2 is fully implemented under the designated provisions of Title
IV of the 1990 CAAA. A plant with three units that installed “scrubbers” has the lowest
emission rate of SO2 and the highest estimate of abatement cost of SO2. A plant that didn’t take
control measures has the highest emission rate and lowest abatement cost. The same patterns are
observed in NOx as well. The estimates of CO2 indicated relatively low virtual abatement costs
compared to SO2 and NOx and a relatively high emission rate. Even though there are no current
regulations that effect CO2 emissions in the U.S., these results are indicative of the costs of
marginal reductions. As a group, these estimates represent the total cost estimate if emissions of
all three pollutants were required to be reduced. West Virginia power plants actively
participated in the SO2 allowance trading market during Phase I.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Phase I Performances of Acid Rain Program
The world’s first large scale control of sulfur dioxide ( SO 2 ) and nitrate oxide (NOx)
emissions from U.S. coal-fired power plants using a market approach has accomplished most of
the Phase I (1995-1999) goals outlined in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA). The
1990 CAAA targeted coal-fired power plants to reduce total emissions of SO 2 and NO x during
the 1995 to 2010 time period. The CAAA were implemented in two distinct phases: 1995-1999
(first phase) and 2000-2010 (second phase). Participants in Phase I were the dirtiest power
plants and Phase II participants included all power plants. The aggregate reduction of SO 2
emissions attained during Phase I was lower than that set up in Title IV of the 1990 CAAA and
the abatement costs for the SO 2 emissions reductions achieved are lower than most estimates
made before Phase I implementation (US Environmental Protection Agency 1990; ICF 1990,
1995; and White et al. 1995, 1997). The number of scrubbers installed during Phase I was lower
than expected; investments in scrubbers were delayed. The prices of low-sulfur coal and
scrubbers were lower than predicted. These actual and unexpected Phase I experiences provide a
rich and broad spectrum for the industry, environmental economists, and policy makers to
ponder as they consider future environmental protection and pollution control options.
1.2 Production Externalities in Coal-fired Power Plants
Environmental protection and pollution control are responses to a detrimental externality
from either a production process or human consumption activity. Formally, an externality is
defined as the actions of one agent that directly affect the welfare of another agent (Varian,

-1-

1992)1. A consumption externality occurs when one’s consumption activity causes a change of
other consumers’ utilities. A production externality occurs when a firm’s production activity
generates results that directly affect either another firm’s production activity or a consumer’s
consumption activity or welfare through impacts on the environment. Externalities can be either
good or bad. For most cases of concern, however, the externalities involve negative effects.
These can either cause degradation of environmental quality or directly affect human health.
Externalities in the form of emissions of SO 2 , NO x and CO 2 from coal-fired power plants are
the focus of this study. SO 2 and NO x can cause streams, lakes, and rivers to become acidified;
slow down the growth of trees; injure or cause the death of forests; kill or reduce the population
of fish; erode walls of buildings and materials; reduce visibility; and cause asthma and bronchitis
(EPA, April 2006).
When negative externalities are an inherent output of a production process, the market
has no price mechanism to automatically adjust to reach a socially efficient level in allocating
resources. Therefore, special attention or treatment has to be taken to correct or minimize the
negative effects. A market failure for this kind of externality arises for two primary reasons: the
receptor of the pollution is a common property resource, e.g., air or water, and there are no welldefined property rights for the receptors. Intervention vehicles to correct a market failure of this
sort include command and control methods and transferable (or marketable) pollution permits
which create a right to emit a specified amount of a specific pollutant. The latter approach has
been long advocated by economists. While the U.S. had adopted some experimental market
mechanisms for water and air pollution controls prior to the 1900 CAAA (e.g., a transferable
discharge allowance system for water pollutants on the Fox River in Wisconsin, which was not
1

There are different externality definitions. Tietenberg’s (1998) definition is that the decision-making agent does
not bear all of the consequences of his or her action.
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successful (Tietenberg, 1998; Field and Field, 2002), the 1990 CAAA was the first legislation to
introduce a market permit system for the electricity industry to control air pollution.
1.3 Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
Coal-fired power plants generated 2/3 of the total sulfur dioxide and 1/4 of the total
nitrogen oxide emissions in the U.S. in the 1980s (U.S. EPA). Historically, these emissions have
been regulated under the Clean Air Act first passed in 1963. Amendments to the Clean Air Act
were made in 1965, 1966, 1967, 1969, 1970, and 1990. The Clean Air Act of 1963 set up
emission standards for stationary sources, e.g., power plants. The Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970 set new and demanding emission standards for stationary and mobile sources as well as
ambient air quality standards. The 1990 CAAA addressed five areas due to growing
environmental concerns with air quality. The centerpiece of the 1990 CAAA is Title IV, called
the Acid Rain Program, which specifically aims to reduce the emissions of SO2 and NO x from
electric power plants.
Title IV of the 1990 CAAA adopted a tradable permit approach that had been long
advocated by many economists to achieve SO2 emission reductions. Tradable permits provide a
more flexible alternative along with other approaches, including fuel-switching and scrubber
installation, for electric power plants to lower the cost of pollution control. Title IV also sets out
aggregate annual caps on national SO2 emissions from electric plants. Implementation is carried
out in two distinct phases for the reduction of the emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen
oxides ( NO x ) by coal burning electric utilities. Phase I, which began January 1, 1995 and ended
December 31, 1999, required 263 generating units within 110 of the most polluting plants to
reduce emission levels to 2.5 pounds of SO2 per million Btu (mmBtu) based on 1985-87
production levels. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency allocated free allowances to each
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of the generating units included in Phase I based on average emissions of 1985-87. One
allowance is one ton of SO2 emissions. At the end of each year, every Phase I unit must have
enough allowances in their account to cover the SO2 emissions it released in that year. The plant
has flexible options to meet the emission cap, e.g., switching fuel from high sulfur coal to low
sulfur coal, switching fuel from coal to oil or gas, installing flue gas desulphurization equipment
(scrubbers), purchasing emission allowances (emission permits) from the allowance market,
reducing its utilization rate, or simply shutting down the unit.
The NO x emission reduction program was also implemented in two phases in the 1990
CAAA. The first phase began January 1, 1995 and the second phase began January 1, 2000.
The 1990 CAAA requires NO x emissions reduction of two million tons by coal-fired power
plants based on 1980’s emission levels. The NO x reductions required by Title IV is based on
boiler type in power plants and does not cap NO x emissions as the SO2 program does nor does it
utilize an allowance trading system since the NO x reductions are also required in Title I of the
1990 CAAA.
1.4 Motivation of the Study
Compared to previous studies completed before and during Phase I, there is now a rich
body of evidence from Phase I performance in the allowances market, plants’ compliance
options, and regulatory rules available for analysis. These data allow several questions to be
addressed. What contributed to the unexpected SO2 and NO x reduction levels during Phase I of
the Acid Rain Program: fuel switching from high sulfur to low sulfur coal, the installation of
scrubbers, or trading in the allowances market for SO2 emissions? Why is the trading price
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lower than expected? What is the actual abatement costs attributed to SO2 and NO x reductions,
respectively, by the electric power plants? Four specific factors motivated this study:
1. Phase I is completed and Phase II was initiated in 2000. Information on the allowance
market during Phase I provides practical evidence for examining the factors that led to an
apparently lower cost of SO2 emission reductions and the behavior of electric power
plants that choose different alternatives for SO2 reduction.
2. Better economic insights are needed into the cost of reducing SO2 emissions by coal-fired
power plants and the reasons that costs vary among plants. Most past studies focused on
industry-level cost calculations of marginal and average cost. As Burtraw (2004) pointed
out, an industrial marginal cost does not apply equally well to individual firms since costs
presumably differ among firms. A plant level study by Coggins and Swinton (1996)
developed an estimate of plant abatement cost for Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Illinois
before Phase I was effective (see, also, Swinton 1998, 2002, 2004).
3. Estimates of the actual abatement costs of SO2 and NO x at the plant level for Phase I
performance are needed.
4. No such study has been done in West Virginia.
A study that evaluates the performance of West Virginia’s electric utilities under Phase I
of the 1990 CAAA and provides insight into the possible long-run effects of Phase II provides
economic insight into future direction for policy development and implementation.
1.5 Research Objectives
This study focuses on West Virginia coal-fired power plants and estimates marginal
abatement costs of Phase I at the plant level. In Phase I, 14 units in six coal-fired power plants in
West Virginia were specifically required to reduce their SO2 emissions by Title IV of the 1990
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CAAA. It is appropriate to examine the effectiveness of the Acid Rain Program, especially in
West Virginia.
The research objectives follow from the motivations discussed. They are to:
1. Explore the factors that contributed to the reduction of SO2 emissions from West Virginia
coal-fired power plants during Phase I, including the installation of scrubbers and
switching from high-sulfur to low-sulfur coal.
2. Estimate the shadow price of SO2, i.e., the marginal abatement cost for one additional ton
of SO2 reduction, for individual electric plants in West Virginia. The shadow prices
provide an indication of the true marginal cost to West Virginia utilities for reducing SO2
emissions.
3. Examine the relationships between abatement costs and the demand for allowances for
each plant, considering the abatement activities taken by individual plants. It is assumed
that the marginal abatement cost is high for plants that invested in new abatement
technology while the demand for allowances is low and vice versa (Swinton 1996, 1998).
4. Expand the estimates of abatement costs to NO x , which is also required and monitored
under Title IV of CAAA and traded in the allowance market, and CO2, which is not
monitored under Title IV of CAAA. The study will examine if there is a relationship,
which either increases the efficiency of a firm’s emission reduction approach or increases
the total abatement costs.
5. Consider the implications for future policy development designed to reduce SO2
emissions or similar pollutants from electric power plants.
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1.6 Overview of the Dissertation
The rest of the dissertation is arranged as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the
economic theory of externalities, the design of pollution control policies, and economic modeling
of production including pollutants. It also introduces the primary approach used in this study, a
distance function model. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 present the output distance function approach
in detail. While Chapter 3 gives a general economic model of output production technology and
its dual, the revenue function, Chapter 4 proceeds with the further partitioning of the output
vector into two subvectors, desirable outputs and undesirable outputs. Chapter 4 specifies the
empirical output distance-translog production function. Chapter 5 presents the empirical
estimation of the translog production function using Phase I data from 16 coal-fired power plants
in West Virginia. Based on these results, shadow prices for SO2 and NO x are estimated. This
analysis is followed by an interpretation of the results and an analysis of the policies based on the
estimations and market performances of WV power plants in Phase I. Chapter 6 provides the
summary, conclusions, and recommendations for further research.
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Chapter 2. Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
Dales (1968) asserts: “to live is to pollute.” His assertion has several implications. First,
it points out that environmental pollution is a ubiquitous phenomenon associated with all human
activities, i.e., from production and consumption (Ayres and Kneese 1969; Pearce and Turner
1990). This is because we obtain what we need through production activities from the Earth but
we also use the same planet to dispose of wastes from these production and consumption
activities. Second, pollution has to be dealt with. Although waste disposal has long coexisted
with production and consumption activities, it was not a serious social-economic problem until
after World War II2 (Mishan 1971; Cornes and Sandler 1996; Pearce and Turner 1990). At least
two reasons prompted attention to the pollution problem. First, after World War II,
industrialization and economic development accelerated productivity and simultaneously
generated tremendous wastes. The wastes were, as they had been before, dumped into the
environment, e.g., water, air, and ecological systems, and degraded environmental quality. The
result of this degradation, in turn, adversely affected human health and caused premature deaths
(Field and Field 2002; Freeman 2003). In addition to health problems, water and air pollution
affect beneficial recreation uses. Second, the awareness of improving living standards or quality
of life had raised concerns about environmental deterioration in the developed economies. These
two factors put forward challenges to a wide spectrum of socio-economic systems, e.g., public
policies, economics and related natural sciences, etc., to deal with environmental pollution.
Environmental pollution inevitably challenged conventional economics that is based on a set of
well-defined competitive market conditions to establish its theoretical framework and systematic

2

The discussions of externalities in the economics literature noticeably increased after the end of World War II.
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analyses of resource allocation, production and consumption to achieve a general equilibrium. A
general equilibrium is an ideal allocation of resource such that nobody can be made better off
unless someone else is made worse off by any change in the allocation. This is also called Pareto
optimality. In this economic situation, pollutants generated from the production or consumption
processes are assumed absent. When the problem of pollution cannot be ignored and has to be
taken into account, new economic theories and approaches are needed.
In this literature review the approach is to begin, in Section 2, with theoretical building
blocks, the definition of pollution and theory of externalities. Section 3 is a review of design of
pollution control policies. Since this research is not a pure economic theory study, this literature
review examines the theory but more attention is given to modeling, empirical estimation, and
policy implications. Section 4 covers the literature on modeling joint products. The last section
is a summary of the chapter.
2.2 Economic Theory of Pollution
Economists noticed that omission of the pollutants from economic activities, which
include production and consumption, was misleading and violated the assumptions which
underlie traditional economics and that lead to a general equilibrium. Economic theory on
pollution consists of the definition of externalities and adjusted general equilibrium conditions.
These are the topic of this section.
2.2.1 The Definition of Externality and Its Classification
When economists observed effects that were out of the scope of a firm’s profit
maximizing decision-making process, they gave the effects a very board term, externality
(Meade 1952; Mishan 1971; Cornes and Sandler 1996; Buchana and Stubblebine 1962; Freeman
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2003; Baumol and Oates 1988). For example, the SO2 and NO x from electricity plants pollute
air and adversely cause air borne diseases when regulation of the emissions is absent. This
pollution effect is external to power plants but internal to society. The key factor that determines
an externality is that an agent generates an output or result but does not pay for it. Pollution is a
waste that is discharged into the environment from human based production and consumption
activities and is one form of an externality.
Economists have explored the theoretical definition of an externality from a normative
point of view and have made great efforts to define the term precisely. Some enumerate the
phenomena of externalities (Scitovsky 1954; Mishan 1971); some define it either as the source or
consequence of market failure (Cornes and Sandler 1996; Mishan 1971); some define it by
example (Meade 1952; Tieteenburg 1998); and others define it at a very abstract/purely
theoretical level (Buchana and Stubblebine 1962; Freeman 2003; Baumol and Oates 1988).
These definitions characterize different externalities in different economic systems, e.g.,
competitive and noncompetitive economic systems (Meade 1952; Scitovsky 1954), explore the
different general equilibrium or partial equilibrium contexts and possible results when
externalities are included (Meade 1952; Buchanan and Stubblebine 1962; Hazilla and Kopp
1990), or define externality in policy oriented (Baumol and Oates 1988) or theorem oriented
approaches (Arrow 1970; Cornes and Sandler 1996), etc. Even so, there has been no single
universally accepted definition of externality. In general, the intention has been to define
externality from theoretical concepts to practical purposes at different levels or from different
angles to serve different kinds of issues.
Here, I present a general picture of an externality and pinpoint the definition used for this
study. First, an externality is a spillover effect of economic activity of an individual from a
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consumption activity or a firm from a production process on other individuals, firms, or society
(Buchanan and Stubblebine 1962). Second, an externality can be either good (an external
economy) or bad (an external diseconomy). When economists define externality, they observe
that the externality can be positive or negative (Mishan 1971; Mead 1952; Scitovsky 1954). This
is the root of all externality classifications. Meade (1952) gave two examples of good
externalities, an apple farmer provides food for bees and a forest creates a more productive
climate for the wheat farmer. These are positive externalities. Environmental pollution is one of
the bad examples of externalities in economics. The third and key element is that there is no
compensation for a positive externality, no costs to polluters for a negative externality. The beekeeper gets bee food from an apple farmer but does not pay for it; neither does the wheat farmer
pay the forest owner. This is because the externality, from the point of view of a producer or a
consumer, is a side- or spill-over effect that one production process or consumption activity
generates and which impacts others. The good or positive externality brings benefits to others.
In reality, economists or policy makers do not give much attention to good externalities. The
focus is on the negative externalities, e.g., air pollution, water pollution, toxic waste pollution,
etc., because these obviously cause public health problems or have other harmful effects. Coalburning electricity plants pollute air and may cause global warming. Such detrimental sideeffects might have been generated by any human being’s activities on the earth, but became more
common as economic activities accelerated. These effects were not a major problem for society
for a long time and polluting firms freely used the natural environment. However,
industrialization in western economies was intensive and worsened environmental quality,
especially after World War II. Mostly, the intensified pollution greatly exceeded the assimilative
capacity of nature due to population increases and expansion of economic development.3 Of
3

This is because nature’s intrinsic assimilation capacity largely absorbed the adverse effects before industrialization.
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course, the pollution problem in developing countries is severe and will become worse as these
countries attempt to reduce the economic gap with the developed nations. Scitovsky (1954)
addresses the differences in externalities between developed and undeveloped nations. But this is
beyond the scope of this study. The externalities in this study refer those in industrialized
countries or in competitive economies.
The fourth aspect of the externality definition is the source that generates the externality,
i.e., whether the externality is generated from a production or a consumption activity. Buchanan
and Stubblebine (1962) gave a definition of these. A consumption externality exists when
“external effects exist in consumption whenever the shape or position of a man’s indifference
curve depends on the consumption of other men” (p. 371). The production externality exists
when “External effects are present whenever a firm’s production function depends in some way
on the amounts of the inputs or outputs of another firm” (p. 371). The externality generated from
a production process is different than that from consumption with respect to adverse impacts,
disposal strategies, and control policies. Production externalities are widely discussed in the
economics literature and are the type of externality dealt with in this study.
The fifth aspect of the externality definition is the theoretical model or justified theory of
general equilibrium. Baumol and Oats (1988) gave their definition with two conditions: (1) the
externality as a real variable is presented in an individual utility function or a firm’s production
function; and (2) the factor representing the externality in either function does not incur any cost
for a negative externality or receive any payment for a positive externality. Their classification
includes technologic and pecuniary externalities, public and private externalities, Pareto-related
externalities, and depletable and undepletable externalities. Baumol and Oats gave a relatively

Then the extent of pollution exceeded nature’s assimilation ability and externalities became a problem for society.
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thorough classification for their definition, but did not distinguish between production and
consumption externalities.
The sixth point is that an externality is a market failure or the absence of well-defined
property rights for air, water, or environmental services (Cornes and Sandler 1996; Baumol and
Oates 1988; Pearce and Turner 1990; Tietenberg 1998, 1995; Randall, 1983). This feature has
very important implications for economics and policy design. Consider the third feature of an
externality, there are no economic transactions between a benefit receiver and provider for a
positive externality or pollution victims and polluter for a negative externality. Economists call
the former an economy due to externality and the latter as a diseconomy due to an externality.
These two situations are both due to lack of markets to trade or value the externalities.
Therefore, from a social production perspective a process with a positive externality is under
produced while negative externalities are characterized by overproduction. The economic
consequences are that resource allocations are not efficient compared to a perfect market.
In general, whatever definition of externality is given and whatever the type under which
the externality is classified, it serves one common purpose – that is, the externality cannot be
ignored and solutions must be found for the problem. A detailed and thorough theoretical
discussion of externalities is beyond the scope of this study. I only intend to define the concept
for this specific study. The concept used is the diseconomy of externalities generated in a
production process. The definition for the current study can be properly rephrased as a working
definition. That is, an externality is the effect of a by-product of the production process that is
external to the firm and their profit-making decision process, but internal to society.
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2.2.2 Theories of Externalities
The definitions of an externality discussed above provide the basic building blocks for
the theory of externalities. The theory of externalities follows the same general framework as
conventional economics, but a justification is necessary to construct a new general equilibrium
theory. In conventional economics, a general equilibrium is the core of the economic analysis
(Varian 1992), where all the markets are cleared given that all markets of products and services
are perfectly competitive. For a general equilibrium, there are three conditions that must hold.
That is, the marginal rates of substitution of inputs equal the respective input price ratios for
producers; the marginal rate of substitution for any two consumption goods is equal to their
respective price ratios; and producer’s marginal rates of product transformation between any two
products must equal the consumers’ marginal rates of substitution between the two consumption
goods. If either of the first two conditions holds, the situation is a partial equilibrium.
Theoretically, when all of these three conditions are met, a general equilibrium is achieved. It
also means that the allocation of all resources is efficient in the Pareto sense.
Since social welfare is based on the welfare of individuals, it normally implies Pareto
efficiency: “(1) each individual is the best judge of his own welfare; (2) the welfare of society
depends on the individual welfare of its citizens; and (3) if the welfare of one individual
increases and the welfare of no one decrease the welfare of society increases” (Mäler 1985, p.7).
The assumptions of perfect competition imply that the resulting allocation of resources is Pareto
efficient. That efficiency result may no longer hold if there is a violation of the perfect
competition assumptions such as the existence of externalities. When any externalities exist the
general equilibrium model must be modified to accommodate this change. The common
approach to show this is to point out that when the previously ignored pollutant from either a
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consumption or production process is added to the basket of consumption (consumer) or
production (firm) activities, the additional marginal conditions for pollutants change the
landscape of traditional economics and, thus, general equilibrium.
Economists have attempted to modify general equilibrium and welfare economics to
incorporate externalities (Mäler 1985; Mishan 1961, 1971; Gowdy and O’Hara 1995; and Cornes
and Sandler 1996). There are three modified general equilibrium theories when the externality is
considered in the general equilibrium model: Samuelson conditions for a public good, Nashequilibrium, and Lindahl-equilibrium for nonmarket goods (Cornes and Sandler 1996; Mäler
1985). These theories take public goods into the equilibrium framework and present different
solutions for handling market failure. For simplicity, there is assumed to be one private good,
one pure public good, and two individuals that purchase these two goods. Brief discussions of
the three equilibriums are given in the following paragraphs.
The Samuelson condition, in addition to the aforementioned three conditions for general
equilibrium, adds an optimal condition for a pure public good when an externality is present.
Optimality for a pure public good4 requires that the summation of marginal rates of substitution
between the private good and the pure public good for each individual in the economy equals the
marginal rate of transformation between the private good and the pure public good for the
economy. This condition is derived by maximizing the utility of any individual, subject to the
constancy of the utility levels of the rest of community, the economy’s transformation function,
and the private good’s production-distribution constraint.
If two individuals make decisions on the contribution to the public good independently, a
Nash-equilibrium results (Cornes and Sandler 1996). That is, each individual chooses an
4

A public good, by definition, is available to all in a region or a community when it is made. A public good is
distinguished by the technical nature of the good, not by the type of organization making it available. Therefore,
environmental quality is essentially a public good.
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optimizing level subject to the constraint that his or her counterpart’s choice is at an optimizing
level. Each agent chooses his or her public and private goods allocation, subject to a resource or
budget constraint, while taking the other individual’s public good contribution level as given at a
best-response level, assuming that they are rational players. Since one believes his or her
optimal choice will not influence the other’s choice that holds the best-response level, the free
rider problem exists in a Nash-equilibrium. Strictly speaking a Nash-equilibrium is not Pareto
optimal because neither individual accounts for the well-being of the other or attempts to gain at
the expense of the other. Cornes and Sandler (1996) point out that the free rider is not
completely free for most public goods and easy riding is a more appropriate term.
Assuming one private good and one pure public good and two individuals, the Lindahlequilibrium uses an auctioneer who calls out the tax shares for the public good, and the two
individuals respond with their utility-maximizing public good quantities. Each individual
maximizes his or her utility by taking the tax share as given. The auctioneer will arrange a new
tax share unless the two agree on the same amount of tax share of the public good. When both
opt for the same public good provision level based on a set of tax shares, a Lindahl-equilibrium
has been reached. A Lindahl-equilibrium creates a pseudo market equilibrium by finding a
general equilibrium price vector capable of clearing private markets. When the process succeeds
the Lindahl- equilibrium is a Pareto optimum. A Lindahl-equilibrium is associated with two
fundamental theorems of welfare economics for a pure public good economy. The first theorem
states that a Lindahl-equilibrium is Pareto-optimal (Cones and Sandler 1996; Mäler 1985), and
the second indicates that lump-sum redistributions can sustain a Pareto optimum as a Lindahlequilibrium (Cornes and Sandler 1996). A variant of the Lindahl-equilibrium is Mäler‘s (1985),
where an agency of the government, instead of an auctioneer, determines the tax share. The
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agency is responsible for the provision of public good. It assumes that all individuals are utility
maximizing and all firms are profit maximizing. The government agency is also profit
maximizing. A profit results from selling waste disposal services to individuals and firms or
selling pollution rights on an auction market. These services consist of clean air, water,
increased productivity due to less pollution, increases in recreational amenities due to clean-ups,
etc. The value of these services can be interpreted as a market value if these services are sold on
a competitive basis to individuals and firms. These modified general equilibria are Pareto
optimal and set up the theoretic basis for policy solutions for pollution problems. Of the three
general equilibriums, the Lindahl-equilibrium is the one that is the most closely related to the
U.S. SO2 and NO x cap-and trade market model. Additional detail on the U.S. SO2 and NO x
cap-and-trade market model is given in the following section and in Chapter 5.
2.3 Pollution Control Policies
The previous section discussed the theoretical framework of a general equilibrium when
externalities are included. Especially in Lindahl-equilibrium, it is necessary that a government
agency be directly involved to determine environmental services and control pollution. Several
of the areas that need government provisions and intervention noticed by economists can be
dated back at least to Adam Smith and David Hume in the eighteenth century (Pearce and Turner
1990; Cornes and Sandler 1996). These areas include the establishment of a justice system, the
enactment and enforcement of laws, protection against invasion, and the provision of schools and
other public goods (Pearce and Turner 1990). Environmental services and goods are special
public goods. They can benefit individuals and groups, consumers and producers without
exclusivity and/or rivalry. Adam Smith in his Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth
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of Nations realized that the pollution problem was one of areas that need government
intervention (Swinton 1996; Mallette 1955).
In English history, during the twelfth century the Queen of England left the throne in
Nottingham because of heavy smoke. Three hundred years later, the brewers of Westminster
switched fuels from coal to wood to protect Queen Elizabeth from the ill effects of coal smoke.
By the end of Queen Elizabeth’s reign, Parliament prohibited the burning of coal during its
sessions (Cornes and Sandler 1996; Swinton 1996; Mallette 1955).
Another important contribution of general equilibrium theory for economists is as a guide
to the design of policy solutions for the pollution problem in the economic system, how the
government intervenes and in what regulatory form. The role that government can play in
pollution reduction may fall into two categories of pollution control policies, command and
control (CAC) and incentive-based pollution control policies. This classification is based on
whether the policy gives the polluting firms or individuals the inherent incentive to comply with
the environmental pollution reduction, while each category is a cluster of pollution control
policies. The former has a long history and has dominated environmental pollution control
policies in the U.S. and other countries. It relies on standards of various types to bring about the
improvement in environmental quality. There are three kinds of standards: ambient, emission,
and technology standards (Field and Field 2002). The standards are the thresholds set by law
that mandate all individuals or firms to obey and then provides the authority to enforce them.
With this approach the government sets up rules or standards as mandatory requirements that
polluting firms have to implement. For example, CAC was considered the approach to force
electricity plants to install scrubbers in the early stage of policy design to reduce SO2 pollution.
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Why is the command-and-control framework used or favored? The advantages of CAC
are explained as a simple and straightforward method for all of parties involved and some
positive control by regulators and affected parties (Stavins5 1998, 2003; Tietenberg 1985, 1999,
2000; Field and Field 2002). The difficulties with CAC relate to the information requirements
needed to develop and set up appropriate standards of various types to protect human health and
the eco-system; to estimate social damages caused by the various pollutants; and to estimate the
abatement costs with various levels of pollution as prescribed by the best available technology.
For many economists, the CAC approaches are neither socially efficient nor cost-effective in
most cases. Incentive-based policies for pollution control have been the preferred alternative
policy instruments to CACs. Such policies give polluting firms flexibility to reduce pollution at
minimum costs and thus provide incentives for innovation and technical progress. Therefore
economists have long advocated incentive-based policies, e.g., pollution taxes, effluent fees, and
transferable pollution permits. In the following sections these forms are discussed in more detail.
2.3.1 Tax Regime and Property Regime
The question for economists is how to convince government officials to adopt incentivebased public policies that should be used in pollution control. The consensus among economists
as well as some decision-makers and environmentalists is that pollution is the result of the lack
of well-defined property rights for air, water, and other environmental goods. When pollution is
a severe problem that affects public health, the authority has to intervene to reduce pollution and
protect the public interest. Under this logic, the government is the surrogate owner of air, water,
and public environmental goods and services. One of the rationales for government intervention
5

Stavins has listed the players involved in the process to regulate pollution and favored the CAC approaches. They
are the affected firms, environmental advocacy groups, organized labor, legislators, and bureaucrats. Therefore he
infers that the reasons that CAC are dominant in U.S. environmental pollution policy are due to political economy
factors.
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for environmental externalities is to provide incentives for the private sector to internalize the
full costs of their actions; this was long thought to be the theoretically correct solution to the
externality problem. The primary advocate of this view was Arthur Pigou. In The Economics of
Welfare (1920), Pigou proposed that the government impose a tax on emissions equal to the cost
of the related damages at the efficient level of control after he recognized and described the
third-party effects (externalities) of the pollution problem. He considered air and water to fall
within the realm of the public domain.
Pigou advocated the taxation of polluters as a method for bringing the polluter’s marginal
cost in line with the social marginal cost of production. By increasing the cost of production, the
government can both force the producer to internalize the social damage of the production
process and obtain the resources necessary to compensate the victims of the pollution. On the
other hand, if an activity has beneficial third-party effects, a state subsidy can increase the social
dividend by increasing the level of the activity.
Pigou was concerned with the potential divergence of social marginal product and private
marginal product because it revealed a departure from optimal investment behavior. He
described the optimal allocation of resources as that that equates the marginal return across
opportunities. Because investors are liable to ignore returns to those other than themselves,
“There might still be scope for State action designed to increase the magnitude of the national
dividend and augment economic welfare,” Pigou wrote (1920, p.141). Furthermore, he also
pointed out, “in any industry, where there is reason to believe that the free play of self-interest
will cause an amount of resources to be invested of the national dividend, there is a prima facie
case for public intervention” (p.331).
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In response to Pigou’s tax approach, Coase (1960) focused on the ability of free-market
transactions to remedy the effects of externalities. Because Pigou’s argument relied in part on a
well-functioning price mechanism to allow the state to affect outcomes through taxation, it
stands to reason that the price mechanism should work to remedy the external effects of all
transactions. Coase demonstrated that if one were to make the assumptions that markets worked
flawlessly and information flowed freely, then government intervention would be unnecessary to
internalize external effects. Coase gave an example of how the optimal solution could be
reached between a grain farmer and a cattle rancher. The grain farm has an open field that abuts
the cattle ranch’s gazing pasture. With the incidence of a cow straying into the corn field, the
question is to determine who should compensate whom and the efficiency that would result in
the exchange. If the rancher has the property right, the farmer should pay the rancher to restrain
the cattle if it is cheaper to do so than building a fence; if the farmer has the property right, the
rancher would either pay the farmer or build a fence, whichever is cheaper. Coase’s theorem
was that economic efficiency is served if the two parties negotiate a solution in the absence of
government intervention and transaction costs regardless of who compensates whom. With
established property rights and smoothly operating price mechanisms, there is no need to tax
either of the parties. He also carefully pointed out that this result rested heavily on the
assumptions that all agents could freely negotiate with all other agents and no costs were
incurred in making a transaction. Coase’s work was criticized by many free-market advocates in
that negotiation is infeasible when more parties are involved in air or water pollution cases, and
that transaction costs would be unavoidable. However, it is fair to say that Coase demonstrated a
very important foundation for environmental economics and public policy related to pollution
control. Well-defined property rights are more important than advocating an elimination of
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government involvement in the economy. The definition of property rights is a form of State
intervention in the market place for those public goods and services, e.g., air and water.
Randall (1983) gives a clarification to Coase’s theorem. He notes that two very
important characteristics of a good or service are rivalry and exclusivity. Rivalry refers to the
degree to which one individual’s consumption of a good affects the ability of others to consume
it and exclusivity refers to the ability of a producer to limit consumption of the good by others
once it has been produced. While air pollution is non-rival in consumption, government rules
can change air pollution availability as a means for producers to dispose of waste. By placing
restrictions or by establishing property rights for air, the government makes air pollution an
exclusive good rather than a non-exclusive good. Randall also clarifies the importance of the
distributional aspects of property rights and the role transaction costs play in the distribution of
benefits.
For a long time governments in the western hemisphere hesitated to use taxes or its
variant, fees, on emissions of pollutants as Pigou proposed (Pearce and Turner 1990). In reality,
effluent fees on water pollution in European countries are more popular than in the U.S. because
Europeans tend to believe that polluters should pay. These charges can reduce pollution from
industries, but effluent charges may not be based on calculations of social cost and, thus, may not
be cost effective (Tietenberg 1997; Field and Field 2002). The difficulties with efficiently
enforcing standards for clean air or water are multi-fold but mainly lie in two obstacles. The first
is that technology rapidly changes. Efficient tax or fees developed by a regulatory agency for
one specified industry require constant adjustment in a regional and/or dynamic sense based on
technological advances. The second is how to obtain information at the firm or industry level on
abatement costs and technology given that these are confidential business data that producers do

-22-

not want to provide to the agency. Enforcement issues to ensure compliance with the mandated
pollution reductions also exist.
2.3.2 Transferable Market Permits
Despite long debate between command and control and taxes, many economists have
long advocated market mechanisms to create a pollutant market in which transferable pollution
permits are allowed to be traded. The most appealing advantages of the transferable market
permit over unit taxes on pollutants are: (1) flexibility for polluting firms to have choices to
reduce pollution, (2) lower demand for information than needed for the authority to decide the
unit tax rate or discharge fee, and (3) gains in efficiency of pollution control that can be achieved
through market trading (Tietenberg 1985). Then what system of transferable market permit
should be designed for the pollution control market? Is the permit price or the total permit set by
the regulatory agency for the pollutant on the market? Weitzman (1974) offered insights into the
choice by examining the occasions when policy benefits from the use of a price tool as opposed
to a quantity tool. He concluded that the information the government possesses determines
which policy tool is most effective. Tietenberg (1974) first took up the problem of designing an
effective transferable pollution permit for air pollution. He favored “air-rights” and argued for
the supremacy of an “air-rights” market, which he found preferable to a taxation or a commandand-control approach. Collinge and Oats (1982) developed a system called rental emission
permits (REP) which would have more flexibility than the fixed unit tax. Rent in REP is a
designated increase sequentially corresponding to different ranges of pollution levels by the
administration. This differential rent system provides a supply curve of pollution permits (the
shape is similar to other goods with a positive slope) to confront the polluting firms that have
various pollution abatement costs. When the marginal rent of emission permit equals the
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marginal abatement cost for each individual polluting firm, efficiency of pollution reduction is a
result. Compared to the taxation approach, the demand for information on the total social
damage and the firm’s abatement costs for the administering agency is modest.
If there were well-defined property rights for water, air, and environment resources there
would have been a well-functioning market for them. This thought naturally led to the solution
to establish such a market for environmental goods or services. Crocker (1966) proposed the
idea of the government setting a cap on aggregate emissions and letting the market determine the
emission price and the degree of abatement at individual facilities, rather than having the
government set the price through an emission fee. Dales (1968) popularized the idea. He
proposed a market mechanism to tackle the pollution problem. His proposal is based on the
development of the Coase theorem. The essential spirit of the Coase theorem is that two parties
are involved in the pollution problem and they would bargain to reach a Pareto optimum if the
property rights were defined. The condition for this Pareto optimum is the assignment of
property rights. That is, either the polluter has the right to pollute or the victim of the pollution
has the right to avoid the pollution. Because there is no market for the pollution, the property
right has to be assigned by a third party. This third party can be the government agency that
provides the appropriate property rights. Then the market will allocate the cost of pollution
reduction efficiently. This approach offered regulators a tool to achieve a given level of
pollution abatement at least cost for polluters in the aggregate. Dales (1968), in his Property,
Pollution, and Prices, points out that the property regime that defines who has a right to the
environment drastically influences the marginal costs and marginal benefits of any project.
Furthermore, he offered a policy solution: a regulatory agency creates property rights for units of
pollution. Under his proposal the market forces could allocate the costs of pollution efficiency
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between polluters and those harmed by pollution if one could assign property rights to units of
pollution. Montgomery (1972) rigorously demonstrated that for any given level of emissions,
Dales’ market would efficiently allocate allowances among polluters. He showed that if the
number of allowances limited the aggregate level of pollution, polluters would have to
incorporate the cost of pollution into their production function. This would ensure that polluters
who could reduce emissions at a low marginal cost would do so either in order to sell residual
allowances or to avoid having to purchase allowances.
Montgomery offered two systems of property rights for pollution that could be the
underpinning of a market for pollution reduction. His first and preferred offering was a system
of pollution rights. In his pollution rights market, Montgomery described a system in which
polluters trade licenses based on the effect their emissions have on a set of monitoring sites.
Total emissions landing at any monitoring site is a linear combination of emissions from all
sources. His second offering was a less complicated system of emission rights. The transferable
emission rights entitled the holder to emit a specified pollutant at a certain rate. The benefit of
such a system of rights is that it is easier to monitor and administer. The shortcoming of such a
system of rights is that it risks allowing polluters in a particular area to increase emissions
beyond a level that is locally desirable. The regulatory agency can place some restrictions on
trading flows among possible “hot-spots.” Montgomery proved that a market equilibrium that
reduces the ambient concentration or emissions of pollutants at least cost to polluting industries
exists.
These theoretical preponderances provide a sound and logical outline for what the
economy should be and what ought to be done. It is often referred as normative analysis.
Normative analyses give the basis for value judgments and guidance for policy making. Under
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this guidance, environmental economics examines each specific pollution issue in the specific
field or industry. This brief review provides an outline of the general equilibrium conditions
when pollution presents a problem in the economic system that requires special treatment in
theory. It is a natural starting place for further consideration of practical policies and solutions to
pollution problems.
2.3.3 Pollution Permits from Theory to Reality: SO2 and NOx Allowance Markets
For economists the basic components for a pollutant market include the creation of
pollution rights for polluters by the authority, the total amount of pollution reduction or
emissions of a specific pollutant or a set of pollution permit prices, and an initial distribution of
the pollution permits. The economic players in this special market are the demand for
emission/pollution rights by polluting firms and the supply of such emission/pollution rights by a
regulatory agency.
In practice, the first application of emission trading was designed by economists and
policy analysts in the EPA’s Regulatory Reform group in 1975-76 (Burtraw et al. 2005;
Tietenberg 1985, 1999). This application is also known as offset policy or emission reduction
credits (Field and Field 2002). By 1976 the regions that were initially designated as
nonattainment regions obviously could not meet the ambient air quality standards by the
deadlines mandated by the Clean Air Amendments. The CAA would prevent new firms from
entering these regions to worsen air quality. EPA developed a system of emission offsets to
solve the conflicts between improving the air quality in a region and promoting economic
development. The existing polluting firms could obtain emission credits certified by local
authorities if they reduced their emissions sufficiently. Then, new firms could buy emission
credits from the existing sources when entering the region. The total emissions would not exceed
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the previous level before new firms’ operations. Therefore, “offsetting emissions increases with
reductions elsewhere” (Burtraw et al. 2005). The results were that new sources would enter the
nonattainment regions with sufficient emission reduction credits (120% of their emissions level
required of which 20% would be retired) and lower the regional emissions. The variations of
offset policy include “bubble”, “banking”, and “netting” (Tietenberg 1985). Successful programs
utilizing the offset policy were the lead phaseout program, reduction of ozone-depleting
chemicals, and Los Angeles Regional Clean Air Incentive Market (Tietenberg 1999). These
programs provided encouragement for authorities to move forward in using market mechanisms
for efficient and effective pollution control. It also came from change in the political arena – the
congress and the administrative branch – from those resistant to market mechanisms that can
help solve social problems to those favoring such approaches (Stavins 1998, 2003).
Title IV of the 1990 U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) created the world’s first
and largest pollution permit market, the SO 2 allowance market. It targeted coal-fired power
plants that are major contributors of SO2, NO x , and particulate matter that form acid rain. The
reduction of SO2 from these power plants was to be in two phases. The first phase (1995-1999)
had a goal of reducing SO2 emissions by10 million tons per year. It was a long process to move
from a general decision on a policy strategy to the design of an actual system of marketable
permits to the development and implementation of both the final policy and the functioning
market. Before the SO2 allowance market was initiated, the offset policy and other market-based
policies for pollution control were sporadic and regional or pollutant specific.
There are several unique features that the SO2 allowance market possesses. First is the
nature of tradable emission rights. Since the air is a common property resource, the
government’s intervention represents society’s welfare and benefits accrue from limiting the use
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of its environmental services. The permits issued by the authority to the polluting firms are the
legal limits to use air as a dumpster but are not private property rights to the air. Title IV of 1990
U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments makes no ambiguity: “An allowance under this title is a limited
authorization to emit sulfur dioxide…. Such allowance does not constitute a property right.”
Economists consider tradable pollution permits as “secure property rights to protect the incentive
to invest in pollution control equipment” (Tietenberg 1999, 2002). In practice, this means that
administrators are expected to recognize the security needed to protect control investments by
not arbitrarily confiscating rights. The authorities, however, do not give up their ability to
change control requirements as the need arises. Second, the initial permits for Phase I are based
on the average heat input of the historical base period, 1985-1987, times an emission rate as
yearly aggregated emissions. This calculation differs from the emission reduction credits in
offset policy. The allowance is source-based and measured in discrete terms (one-time
entitlement) while the credit in offset policy is technology-based and a continuing entitlement to
a pollutant flow.6 Once one unit of emission is discharged, the allowance is surrendered. Third,
the allowance allocation gives more flexibility compared to emission reduction credits. The
polluting firm can reduce the emission temporarily or permanently, while the reduction in offset
policy is permanent. The initial permits are equal to the target emission cap that is maximally
allowed for each power plant to emit in a specific year. In other words, for each unit of SO2
emitted the plant must have a one unit permit. Without sufficient permits, the plant must
internalize emissions within the company, buy permits from other plants, adopt pollution
reduction technology, or pay a fine. Fourth, the allowance calculation and allocation
mechanisms facilitate aggregate pollution control by the authority. The total number of permits

6

Tietenberg (1999, 2002) called them a credit denomination. ERCs are measured in terms of a pollutant flow, e.g.,
tons per year while allowances are in terms of tons for a pollutant.
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issued by the authority for a specific year is at the control of the regulatory agency. Therefore,
the agency can decrease the number of permits to reach the goal of emissions reduction over
time. This is referred to as the cap-and-trade in the SO2 allowance program. The allowance
market represents a shift of pollution control policy from price to quantity in pollution control
policy.
2.4 Pollution Control Modeling
The modeling presented in this section focuses on the pollution-generating firm. It
includes a discussion of both theoretical and empirical modeling including a brief discussion of
the distance function approach.
2.4.1 Theoretical Modeling
Pollution control modeling is discussed conceptually in Section 2.2 where the economic
theory of externalities is reviewed. Each general equilibrium theory has had its model laid out.
A general equilibrium model starts with the utility function. The theoretical foundation for
pollution control policy mainly lies with including externalities in the general equilibrium
framework. In the three justified general equilibrium models discussed in Section 2.2,
environmental pollution as a component is included. The equilibrium conditions for the
pollution component are discussed in addition to the traditional general equilibrium conditions.
These conditions have one thing in common compared to the conditions in a traditional general
equilibrium: one or a vector of public goods – pollutants – appears in the utility function for
consumers and the production function for producers. The optimal condition is that the marginal
price of the product equals the marginal cost of production or consumption. The problem is that
the pollutant does not have either direct market price or cost. In Lindahl-equilibrium, the price is
assumed to be set by a government agency and the cost is willingness-to-pay by the consumer or
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producer. The clearance for the pollutant is when these two are equal. The question that arises is
how the government agency decides the price.
A widely used approach in theoretical models with externalities is a damage function.
When a pollution problem is present, the individual’s welfare and thus social welfare are
affected. Theoretically, economists proposed the social damage function to measure welfare
change caused by pollution (Cornes and Sandler 1996; Pearce and Turner 1990; Field and Field
2002). When the cost of social damage is included in the general equilibrium model with
externalities, a new optimal solution can be found.
The damage function in environmental economics is an exogenous function in terms of
the socially optimal solution for pollution control. It accounts for all of damages or impairments
to the natural or common property resources. The damage function may consist of the costs of
degradation of air or water qualities, limited beneficial and recreational uses, diseases of humans
and animals, and deaths caused by pollution. The damage function is an aggregated function for
all of economic and social welfare losses. In most cases, the damage function is only a
conceptual model and difficult to specify or form. In some cases, the damage function is a
surrogat for benefit losses caused by pollution. Freeman (2003) calls it a naïve model7 even
though his view is in the context of valuing the environmental services. Pearce and Turner
(1990) consider it a virtual model.
There also is a marginal damage function that establishes a relationship between the
quantity of a pollutant and the damage that pollutant causes (Field and Field 2002). The quantity
of pollution represents the level of pollution while the damage represents the marginal cost that
corresponds to each level of the pollution. Therefore, a Pigovian tax set in accordance with the

7

Freeman characterizes the damage function approach as naïve and reasons that responses or behavioral changes to
adverse environmental effects from consumers or producers can rule out the damage (2003, p.27).
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marginal damage function provides an optimal solution (Pearce and Turner 1990). Field and
Field (2002) give two definitions for a damage function: an emission damage function and an
ambient damage function. The emission damage function measures the quantity of a residual
emitted from a source or a group of sources and the resulting damage while the ambient damage
function measures the relationship between the concentration of particular pollutants in the
ambient environment and the resulting damages. The same difficulty arises due to quantitative
estimates on the magnitude of damage for one pollutant or several pollutants. The damage
function is not appropriate for a polluting industry when the industry’s production activity and its
pollution control instruments are incorporated into the theoretical model. First, the modeling of
the production technology does not take into account the fact that the generation of pollutants is a
by-product of the production process if the pollution caused by the firm is external to the
production decisions about production. The second is that the polluting firm has an option, a
trade-off between the product and the pollutant. An exogenously imposed tax or damage
function cannot reflect this trade-off.
2.4.2 Pollution Control Modeling of the Firm
A theoretical general equilibrium model includes consumer market equilibrium, producer
market equilibrium, and equilibrium between these two markets. Most empirical analyses,
however, are based on partial equilibrium or models of particular aspects of an economy with the
rest of the economic relationships assumed to hold. That is the approach taken here. This
discussion focuses on a model of a polluting firm.
Models of production with explicit consideration of pollution modeling can be theoretical
or empirical. Such model serve as tools to design pollution control policy and examine the
effects of different policies after they are enforced in a specific firm or industry. Mishan (1969),
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Mäler (1985), and Baumol and Oats (1988) presented different theoretical models of potential
policy designs and analyses.
The firm is assumed to be profit maximizing while producing pollution that has an
adverse impact on the individual and society. The firm must reduce pollution based on specified
regulatory constraints. In the absence such constraints, the firm’s decisions concern production
costs of the normal inputs but ignores the cost of disposing of the pollutant(s), the by-product of
the production process. The issue is how to treat the pollutant within the production process of
the model. There are three ways to include pollutant in the production function: as an input, as
an output, or as an intermediate product.
The pollutant can be treated as an intermediate product within the firm. An intermediate
product is a by-product that comes out of a main production process and is used as an input to
another or secondary production process that neutralizes the pollutant and reduces pollution to
the environment (Mishan 1969; Ethridge 1981). A system that treats pollutants as intermediate
products in a firm is called an integrated production system or vertically linked system (Ethridge
1973; Uimonen 1992). The aim is to internalize the pollution; the problem is that some
processes cannot absorb all of the pollutants, or the secondary process generates other
pollutant(s). In this type of production model there can be one or more than one intermediate
product. For more than two processes or two outputs, a Leontief-technology is usually assumed.
This means that inputs enter the production processes in a linear way and that joint outputs occur
in fixed proportions to the main product. For simplicity, two processes in production are
assumed. The two processes are constrained by appropriate conditions. For example, an input
constraint is one where the total amount of each input in the firm must equal the summation of
the inputs used in the two processes. The constraint of an intermediate input is imposed on the
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interrelationship between the two processes. The intermediate product is used as an input into
the second process and may be only a fraction of the pollutant coming out of the first process
(Baumgärtner and Jöst 2000). The constraint on total emissions of the pollutant from both
processes is considered in some cases (Baumgärtner and Jöst 2000) where the pollutant cannot
be completely internalized. This is, some pollutant may be generated from a secondary
production process when the pollutant from a main production process is used. In this last
constraint, the damage function is introduced to measure the impact on the quality of the
environment.
An alternative approach to treat pollutants as inputs directly in a production model
(Shephard 1970, 1974; Färe 1988; Färe, Grosskopf, and Lovell 1994; and Färe and Primont
1995). This model treats the pollutant associated with a specific production process as either an
input or a vector of inputs. The pollutant as input in a production process is treated as a cost
incurred just as are other inputs used in the production process when pollutant has to be disposed
of at a cost to meet external constraints.
A third alternative is to treat the pollutant as an output generated by the production
process (Shephard 1970, 1974; Färe 1988; Pittman 1983; Färe, Grosskopf, and Lovell 1994; and
Färe and Primont 1995). The sign of the input price of a pollutant is assumed positive while an
output price of pollutants can be positive (Hetemäki 1996; Mishan 1969) or negative (Shephard
1970, 1974; Färe 1988; Pittman 1983; Färe, Grosskopf, and Lovell 1994; Färe and Primont
1995). For the intermediate product, the price for pollutant as one output in the main production
is positive but is negative as the input in secondary process (Uimonen 1992). Uimonen imposed
a constraint that the sum of the value of the marginal productivities for a pollutant must be zero
in two production processes.
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Another approach is to model production and pollution jointly (Mishan 1969). Mishan
(1969) discussed joint products in private and collective goods without externalities and with
externalities, respectively. The collective goods he defined are similar to Samuelson’s public
goods but not completely pure as one of two polar cases.8 The collective goods externality is
defined as a bad side-effect, e.g., when a dam provides electricity and prevents flood, it damages
the fish habitat. Without an externality, a private good and a collective good possess the same
marginal conditions. With an externality, the marginal condition for the private good is the
marginal value of the product equal to the marginal private cost plus the marginal public cost of
the product. For jointly produced collective goods, the marginal condition with or without the
externality is the same. Assume that for private good jointly produced with collective goods, the
cost is the sum of marginal private costs of all private goods jointly produced plus the sum of all
individual willingness to pay for the collective goods jointly produced. This analysis gives a
conceptual model of joint production of private and public goods. The discussion to this point
far is theoretical but an explicit model of production and joint externality is needed to evaluate
the U.S. market approach to reduce pollutant emissions that cause acid rain from power plants.
The distance function approach provides an answer (Shephard 1970, 1974; Färe 1988; Färe,
Grosskopf, and Lovell 1994; Färe and Primont 1995).
2.4.3 Distance Function Approach
The distance function approach includes a family of production models that can be
considered as two sub-families – input distance functions and output distance functions. The
input distance function treats the pollutant as an input measure in the model while the pollutant is
treated as an output in the output distance function. The distance in either function characterizes
8

Two polar cases are complete private goods and complete public goods and each is at one of ends of the line if one
horizontal line is used to characterize public nature of goods. There are goods that are between the two polar cases.
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the firm’s performance relative to the production frontier under the specified technology and
input set or output set. The production frontier is the minimum combination of inputs for a given
output level for the input distance function, or the maximum output given a set of inputs for the
output distance function. The production frontier represents the same efficiency as an optimal
solution in production economics. In these approaches, there is a dual function associated with
each, respectively. For the input distance function approach, the dual function is the cost
function. For the output distance function, the dual function is either the revenue function or
profit function. When the dual function is either minimized or maximized, the shadow price for
either the bad input (in the input distance function) or bad output (in the output distance function)
is estimated. The distance function is a promising approach to incorporate environmental “bads”
into the firm production model. There are several advantages compared to other models that
target the pollutant in the firm’s production decisions. First, it directly models each production
process without the complication of treating the pollutant as an output in one process and an
input in the other process. Second, the technology for a specific production process determines
the estimate of the price of the environmental “bads” since, in the distance function approach, a
given technology is mapped by the relationship between the input set and output set. In the input
distance function “the input correspondence maps output vector into subsets of input vectors,”
while the output correspondence maps the input vectors into subsets of output vectors in the
output distance function (Färe 1989). Duality theory links the production function to the
economic models. Shephard (1953, 1970, and 1974) initially developed the duality theory that
underlies the distance function approach and established the relationships between the desired
output and undesirable output through duality theory when environmental bads are also produced
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in the production process. His theoretic work has been extended and applied to the empirical
work by Färe (1988, 1990, 1995, 1998, and 2000).
The distance (either input or output) function essentially estimates an empirical
production frontier and evaluates each firm’s or plant’s performance relative to this estimated
frontier. Then, through the duality theorem and the appropriate economic model, the undesirable
input or output price can be derived or estimated. This is the most attractive property that this
approach possesses for production modeling with externalities. In this research the output
distance function approach is employed, more details are discussed in the next chapter.
The socially optimal price for emissions reduction is equal to the opportunity cost. The
output distance function can estimate this opportunity cost of pollution abatement in percentage
terms as an elasticity or in dollars as an absolute shadow price. The estimation of abatement cost
provides an indication of the potential effectiveness of the proposed penalties for failing to meet
the new clean air standards.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, a systematic literature review of production externalities starts with a
broad definition of externalities and a working definition. The theory of externalities presents
Samuelsson’s conditions, the Nash-equilibrium, and Lindahl-equilibrium. The Lindahlequilibrium includes government intervention in the general equilibrium and assumes that a
government agency is profit maximizing when it distributes pollution permits to polluters.
Among the pollution control policies are command and control, pollution tax or effluent fee, and
marketable pollution permit approaches. The1990 Clean Air Act Amendments enabled a SO2
allowance market to become reality. The model for the pollution producing firm is an output
distance function that provides a tool to evaluate the performance of abatement effectiveness

-36-

under the SO2 allowance market. The next two chapters provide additional detail for the output
distance function approach.

-37-

Chapter 3. Output Distance Function and Its Dual-Revenue Function
3.1 Introduction
When a production process produces multi-outputs, especially some undesirable outputs,
and is regulated by environmental law, the production model becomes complicated. Economic
theory states that an efficient allocation of social resources is achieved in such a way that the
firm generating pollutants, e.g., water or air pollutants, must internalize the pollution damage to
consumers or other producers to account for the full social costs of production. Generally, the
government either steps in to impose a tax on the industry for the social damage or sets up
stringent environmental standards (command and control) for the discharged pollutants. Both of
these popular policy instruments for pollution control have drawbacks in practice.
Environmental economists model production behavior by explicitly including the
environmental “bads” in the production process in order to understand the effects of pollution
controls. Normally there are two ways to model environmental “bads”: one is to treat pollutants
from the production as a kind of input. The reasoning behind this approach is that the firm has to
dispose of the “bads” at some cost and this has the same effect as if the firm “purchased” a
disposal input. The drawbacks for this modeling approach are two. First, the pollutants are not
inputs, but outputs generated from the same production process that produces the desirable
output(s). Second, trade-offs between desirable and undesirable outputs can not be explicitly
expressed.
Another way is to model multiple outputs and, thus, to directly include the undesirable
outputs. This is the approach used in this study. The advantages of this approach are threefold.
First, the production process model reflects the production technology. Given the inputs used,
all feasible combinations of outputs are determined. This set of feasible outputs is called the
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production requirement set. Details are given in the next section of this chapter. Second, the
substitution or trade-off between desirable and undesirable outputs can be explicitly measured.
This measure incorporates costs related to disposing of or reducing undesirable outputs to meet
environmental regulations or potential environmental regulations. More importantly, this
approach provides a means to derive the shadow price of undesirable outputs without requiring
explicit abatement cost data, information that is difficult to obtain. The abatement cost may not
be reliable even though sometime the data are available.
It may be possible for the firm or policy makers to obtain plant-specific opportunity or
abatement costs for the specific pollutant when facing potential environmental regulations. In
that case, the shadow price can be used to evaluate the efficiency of pollution control measures.
This information is especially useful when there is no market or no well-established market for
the pollutant. It can also be used when there is no regulation in place for some undesirable
outputs (see Fare et al. 1993).
In this chapter, section 2 presents the production technology requirement set and the
properties of the output requirement set. Section 3 introduces the output distance function
concept and discusses the properties of the output distance function. Section 4 covers the dual to
the distance function, the revenue function, and discusses the duality relationships. Section 5
explains how the virtual prices of the outputs are derived from the revenue function. Section 6
presents the equilibrium model in terms of the output distance function; and Section 7 concludes
the chapter.
3.2 Production Technology Requirement Set
The fundamental concepts that underlie the output distance function approach were laid
out by Shephard (1953, 1970) and developed and extended by Färe (1988) and Färe et al. (1994,
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1995). This section follows Färe’s framework. A production technology is represented by a
given input vector, x = {x1 ,x 2 ,...,x N } ∈ R +N , which is transformed into a collection of feasible
output sets, y = {y1 ,y 2 ,...,y M } ∈ R M
+ . That is, the technology representation maps a given input

vector into an output space. It is denoted as:
(3.2.1)

T = {(x, y}: x can produce y}

(3.2.2)

p(x)= {y ∈ R M
+ : x can produce y}

or

(3.2.1) is called the technology set while (3.2.2) is called the output requirement set. Both
contain the collection of all output vectors, ( y ∈ R M
+ ) that are obtainable from the input vector,

x ∈ R +N . The output requirement set is illustrated in figure 3.1 for a two-output case.
y2

P(x)

0

y1

Figure 3.1 The output requirement set, P(x)
The output requirement set possesses a number of desirable properties to ensure that the
functions defined in the next section have desirable properties. The following axioms for the
output requirement set, proposed by Shephard (1970), are also called maintained axioms (Färe,
1988):
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(b) y ∉ P(0), y ≥ 0 .
P.1 (a) P(0)=0
P.2 P(x) = 0M , for all x ∈ R+N .

P.3 P(x) ⊆ P(x'), if x' ≥ x, for all x, x' ∈ R +N .
P.4 (a) weak disposability of outputs
y ∈ P(x) ⇒ θy ∈ P(x),for all x ∈ R +N , 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.
(b) strong disposability of outputs
y ∈ P(x) ⇒ y' ∈ P(x), for all y ≥ y', for all x ∈ R +N
P.5 P(x) is a closed set, for all x ∈ R +N .
P.6 P(x) is a bounded set, for all x ∈ R +N .
P.7 P(x) is convex, for all x ∈ R +N .
Axiom P.1(a) states that a null output vector results from a null input vector, or no free
lunch. P.1 (b) says a semipositive output vector cannot be produced without employing some
positive amount of inputs.
P.2 says that inaction in production is possible given an input vector, x. P.3 imposes
strong disposability of inputs in the production process. Axiom P.4 (a) imposes weak
disposability on outputs. It says that if x can produce y then x can produce any proportional
reduction of y. Weak disposability allows for the possibility that one or more of the outputs is
bad. For example, if electricity is produced by burning coal, sulfur dioxide, nitrate oxide, carbon
oxide and other outputs are also generated. The weak disposability implies that a 10% reduction
in sulfur dioxide is possible if there is a 10% reduction in electricity generation, holding the input
vector constant. P.4 (b) defines the strong disposability of outputs. In other words, the output
can be disposed of without incurring any extra cost. The strong disposability only applies to
desirable outputs (i.e., where the prices are positive).
The output set, P(x), contains all vectors of desirable outputs on or below the boundary
(production possibilities curve). The slope of the production possibilities curve for P(x) is the
marginal rate of transformation between two outputs. The marginal rate of transformation
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represents the amount of one good that must be given up when an additional unit of the other
good is produced, holding inputs fixed. The output set depicts the production technology.
Weak disposability and strong disposability are shown in the figure 3.2.
Y2

B
A
4

E
C

3

F
P(x)

O

1

2

D

Y1

Figure 3.2 Weak vs. Strong Disposability of Outputs
In order to show strong and weak disposability, the output set is constructed as piece-wise linear
with one desirable output and one undesirable output. From P.4 (a), weak disposability requires
both outputs decrease when one undesirable output is present. The region OB represents the
positive slope of production on the boundary of P(x). When production moves from E to F, the
undesirable output moves Point 2 to Point 1 while the desirable output also is reduced from Point
4 to Point 3. Therefore, the pollution reduction requires the concurrent reduction of the good
output. It is no longer the case that some quantity of a good output must be sacrificed for the
gain of another good. In words, when more of the desirable output is produced, more of
undesirable output must also be produced. This area of production between DC is a noneconomic region.
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Several other regions are also shown in figure 3.2. The region OABO represents the
strong disposability of desirable output. The movement from B to A does not affect production
of the desirable output, while the undesirable output is reduced. The region of BC is
noneconomic and has negative slope. It means that the pollution increases while the desirable
output has to decrease in this region. This represents a trade-off between desirable and
undesirable outputs when environmental regulation is imposed on polluting firms.
In reality, environmental regulations prevent the free disposal of environmental “bads” so
this study limits the interest to the positively sloped region on the boundary of P(x). The
relationship between P.4(a) and P.4(b) is that P.4(a) implies P.4(b). Weak disposability can
apply to all outputs. Weak disposability also points out that desirable outputs and undesirable
outputs are jointly produced. Färe et al.(1992, 1997) call this property the nulljointness of
desirable outputs and undesirable outputs. If production of undesirable output goes to zero, the
production of desirable outputs must also go to zero. Using electricity production as an example,
if electricity is nulljoint with pollution, then the only feasible way to reduce pollution to zero is
to reduce production of electricity to zero as well.
P.5, the closed set assumption, imposes the requirement that the output set P(x) be closed.
Graphically, the boundary of P(x) is the production possibilities frontier in the output space R M
+ .
Alternatively, suppose there is a sequence of output vectors, y n ,n = 1,2,..., such that lim y n = y 0 ,
n →∞

then for every such sequence, if x can produce y n for all n, i.e., if y n ∈ P(x) for all n then x can
produce y 0 . This axiom allows us to define an output isoquant as a subset of the boundary of the
output set P(x).
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P.6 says the output set is finite because the amount of inputs is finite (x ∈ R +N ) . The
economic meaning simply is that the scarcity of resources implies the scarcity of outputs. P.5
and P.6 together imply that the output set is compact.
P.7 imposes convexity on the output set, P(x). If y and y’ are elements of the output set,

y ∈ P(x) and y' ∈ P(x) , then any convex combination of these points, [θ y + (1-θ)y'] , is also an
element of the output set where θ denotes a fraction between 0 and 1 ( 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 ). This axiom is
valid for time divisible technologies (Shephard, 1970). Thus, convexity can be interpreted as if
production of outputs y and y’ is feasible from a given set of inputs, then those inputs can be
used to produce output y some fraction of the time and output y’ the remainder of the time.

3.3 Output Distance Function
A production technology is represented by the output correspondence P(x) in the previous
section with the assumed properties. It provides a tool to model multi-outputs and multi-inputs.
Now we are ready to define the output distance function. First consider and describe intuitive
description of the output distance function. Consider Figure 3.3 where the boundary of the
output set P(x) represents the production frontier and observed production at point A is inside the
production frontier. The distance function measures how far away from the frontier an observed
production point is, i.e., OA/OB. This ratio is the same as Farrell (1957) called technical
efficiency or Debreu (1951) referred to as the coefficient of resource utilization. If we use θ as
the value of the distance function, Do, i.e., θ =Do(·), the distance function seeks to find the
minimum distance and maximum scalar value (1/ θ) to expand the feasible output of the frontier,
given the inputs, x. As shown in the figure, y 0 /θ is on the production frontier.
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Figure 3.3 The Output Set and Output Distance Function
Following the discussion of the output set, P(x), the definition of the output distance
function is:
(3.3.1)

D o (x,y ) = min{θ:(x,y/θ) ∈ P(x)},x ∈ R +N ,y ∈ R M
+ .
θ

This definition can be interpreted as finding a minimum value of θ such that the scalar 1/θ can
project the output to the production frontier. This definition of the output distance function
characterizes the firm’s technology in output space.
The output distance function can also be defined in terms of the production function,
F(x). This production function depicts the maximum feasible output for a given level of inputs
and underlying technology. Therefore, the distance function can be given by
(3.3.2)

Do (x,y ) = y/F(x) .

In figure 3.3, Do (x0 ,y 0 ) = y 0 /F(x0 ) and F(x 0 ) = y 0 /Do (x0 ,y 0 ) .
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So far we have considered the output as desirable in the discussion of the output distance
function presented. What happens to the output distance function when some outputs are
undesirable? Assume at least one output is undesirable. There are two different cases for the
output distance function.
First, assume both of the outputs can be scaled by θ. Following Färe, Grosskopf, and
Lovell (1994, p, 218) the output distance function is defined as:
Do = min{θ:(θ x, θ −1y g ,θ y b ) ∈ P(x)}, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 .

(3.3.3)

Thus, the output distance function says we find a minimum value for the output distance function
such that θ contracts the input vector and undesirable outputs while expanding the desirable
output at 1/θ. The treatment of the undesirable output and desirable output is asymmetric (see
Figure 3.4).
yg

((1/ θ)yg, θyb)

(yg, yb)
P(θx)

0

yb

Figure 3.4 The scale of desirable output and undesirable output
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For the second case, assume that the undesirable output is fixed and only the desirable
output is increased. Output is at point A with the undesirable output at its fixed level, y0b , and
desirable output at y gA . The desirable output is expanded by a scalar value (1/θ) to achieve the
projected output at B. The value of the scalar that projects the desirable output to the frontier,
1/θ, is equal to y gb / y ag as shown in figure 3.5.

yg

y gb

B
θ

y ga

A
P(x)
yb0

yb

Figure 3.5 The scale of desirable output when undesirable output fixed
Consider these two cases. For the first case, simultaneously expanding the desirable
output while contracting the undesirable output and input vectors gives several advantages.
First, it directly includes the environmental “bads” in the model as outputs instead of treating
them as inputs. One reason for this is that the desirable output cannot be increased when this
input is increased in the model if the environmental “bads” are treated as inputs. Second, the
good outputs and bad outputs are jointly produced as discussed in the Section 2.2. They may
have the same type of disposability when environmental regulation is absent. Third, the inputs
can be modified in different ways. This can be the case in the production of electricity by
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burning coal. The high sulfur content of coal can be substituted for by using low sulfur coal so
that both the input of sulfur content from the coal and sulfur dioxide emissions are reduced while
the production electricity might be expanded. Overall this model enables us to model the inputs,
desirable outputs, and undesirable outputs together.
A modification of this model is needed when environmental law requires the firm control
pollution and does not allow the firm to freely dispose of the environmental “bads.” This is
when weak disposability is employed for the outputs. Figure 3.2 shows the strong and weak
disposability of outputs. The technology with strong disposability is represented by output set
P s (x) and the area 0ABC0. This assumes that both outputs can be freely disposed of and, in
particular, that the amount of undesirable output 0y1 can be freely disposed of. The technology
with weak disposability is P w (x,y1 ) and area 0BCD, a reduction of underdesirable output must
require a reduction of desirable output. This relationship is shown on the ray 0B.
For the second case, the fixed amount of the undesirable output has two implications.
Economically, the pollution does not need to be completely eliminated. Second, the fixed
amount of the undesirable output might be set by environmental regulation such as sulfur dioxide
emissions set at 2.5 pounds per mmBtu for Phase I and 1.2 pounds per mmBtu for Phase II.
Under this regulation annual aggregate emissions of SO2 is determined for each firm, the firm
can expand the production feasibly on the frontier without incurring additional abatement cost if
it can hold SO2 emissions constant.
The properties of the output distance function under the assumed axioms of the output set
are summarized (Färe 1988; Färe and Primond 1995) as:
D.1 (a) Do (x,0) = 0 for all x ∈ R +N , (b) Do (0, y ) = +∞ for all y ≥ 0 .
D.2 Do (x,μy ) = μDo (x,y ) for all y ∈ R +N , y ∈ R +M , for all μ > 0 .
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+N
D.3 Do (x,θy ) ≤ Do (x,y ),0 ≤ θ ≤ 1,for all (x,y ) ∈ R M
.
+

D.3.S Do (x,y ) ≥ Do (x,y'), y ≥ y' for all x ∈ R +N .
D.4 Do (x,y ) is lower semi-continuous on R +N + M .
D.5 If Do (x,y ) ≤ 1 and y ≥ 0,then for all θ ≥ 0,∃λ θ such that Do (λ θ x,y ) ≤ 1/θ .
N
D.6 Do (x,y ) is convex on R M
+ , for all x ∈ R + .

D.7 Do (x,y ) is quasi − convex on R +N , for all y ∈ R M
+ .
Proofs of these properties are included in Shephard (1970, p. 208) and Färe (1988, pp.
31-33). Because these properties have a one to one relationship with those of the output set,
these properties can be summarized as follows:
D.1(a) is valid if P.1(a) is imposed; no production is taken given the inputs. D.1(b)
follows P.1(b); there is “no free lunch”. In this case, the value of the output distance function is
set to + ∞ . Therefore D.1 defines the value of distance function in the range, [0, + ∞ ] but in this
study, we restrict the value to [0,1]. Intuitively, we can see this from the figures 3.3, and 3.4.
D.2 states that the output distance function is homogeneous of degree one in outputs.

3.4 Revenue Function
In the context of output distance functions, the revenue function is the dual. Let

r = (r1 ,...,rM ) be associated with outputs y = (y1 ,...,y M ) for all r ∈ R M
+ and y ∈ P(x) . The output
prices are restricted to be nonnegative. The revenue function is given by:
(3.4.1)

R(x,r ) = max{ry:y ∈ P(x)} .
y

The maximum revenue, R, exists only if the properties of the output correspondence, P.1,
P.3, and P.4 hold. These assumptions guarantee that r·y is continuous.
The revenue function has the following properties (Färe 1988; Färe and Primond 1995;
Färe et al. 1993):
R.1 R(0, r ) = 0 for all r ∈ R M
+ .
R.2 R(x, λr ) = λR(x,r ) for all x ∈ R +N , r ∈ R M
+ .
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R.3 R(λ x, r ) ≥ R(x, r ), λ ≥ 1, for all x ∈ R +N , r ∈ R M
+
R.3.S R(x,r ) ≥ R(x',r )} x ≥ x', x ∈ R +N , r ∈ R M
+ .
R.4 R(λ x, r ) → ∞ as r → +∞ if R(x,r ) > 0 .
R.5 R(x,r ) is upper semi-continuous in x, for all r ∈ R M
+ .
R.6 R(x,r ) is convex in x, for all x ∈ R +N , r ∈ R M
+ .
R.7 R(x,r ) is nonnegative and nondecreasing in prices, for all x ∈ R +N , r ∈ R +M
R.8 R(x,r ) is convex and continuous in prices, for all x ∈ R +N , r ∈ R M
+ .
The above properties follow the interpretations of the output set in Section 2.2. R.2 says
it is homogeneous degree of one in output prices. R.3 is the weak disposability of inputs and
R.3.S is strong disposability of inputs. These properties were proven by Shephard (1970, p. 229)
and Färe (1988, pp. 92-95).
The discussions in Sections 3.2, 3.3, and this section show that revenue function
properties imply properties for the output set and equivalent properties of the output distance
function.

3.5 Duality between the Revenue Function and Output Distance Function
Following the Shephard (1953, 1970) and Färe (1988), recall from Section 2.3 that the
output distance function is limited to 0 ≤ Do (x,y ) ≤ 1 for an output correspondence P(x) given the
input vector. The duality between the output distance function and the revenue function is
established through the output set. It is:
(3.5.1)

y ∈ P(r ) ⇔ D o (r,y ) ≤ 1 .

This statement is proven in Färe and Primont (1995, pp. 15-16). It says both the output
requirement set and the distance function characterize the firm’s production technology. It is
possible to define either the output distance function or revenue function. Therefore, the revenue
function can also be considered a distance function:
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R(x, r ) = max{ry : Do (x, y ) ≤ 1}, x ∈ R +N , r ∈ R M
+ .

(3.5.2)

y

The revenue function characterizes the firm’s technology in quantity space.
The distance function is dual to the revenue function and can be defined in terms of the
revenue function:
Do (x,y ) = sup{ry:R(x,r ) ≤ 1}, x ∈ R +N , y ∈ R M
+ .

(3.5.3)

r

The proof of (3.5.3) is given in Färe (1995, p. 50).
Equations (3.5.2) and (3.5.3) are dual to each other and reflect the relationship between
the revenue function and the output distance function. In words, (3.5.2) says that if the revenue
function is derived from the output distance function by maximizing all feasible output vectors,
then the output distance function can be recovered from the revenue function. (3.5.3) says that if
we start with a revenue function, we can derive the output distance function.

3.6 The Derived Shadow Price
The revenue maximization function is given by Färe et al. (1993):
RM( x, r ) = {y ∈ P(x):ry = R(x,r )} .

(3.6.1)

where R(x, r) is a given revenue. This definition gives the maximum revenue when ry is
maximized equal to R(x, r) while the output set P(x) is convex.
Maximizing the revenue function subject to the output distance function is a Lagragian
problem:
Λ (y,λ) = ry + λ(Do (x,y ) − 1) .

(3.6.2)

The first order condition for (3.6.2) is:
(3.6.3)

(i)

r = λ∇ y Do (x,y )

(ii)

Do (x,y ) = 1

.
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From (3.6.2) and (3.6.3), get:
ry = λ ∇ y Do (x,y ) y

(3.6.4)

= λ Do (x,y )

Then,
(3.6.5)

or

r y (x,r ) = λ
R(x,y ) = λ.

where R(x, r) is the maximum revenue with parameter x and r. Equation (3.6.4) uses
homogeneity in outputs to get the result. Through (3.6.3) (ii), (3.6.4) becomes (3.6.5), which
says that at the optimum, the maximum revenue is equal to the Lagragian multiplier.
Substituting (3.6.5) into (3.6.3) (i) gives:
(3.6.6)

r = R(x, r ) ∇ y Do (x,y ) .

Here r is the shadow price vector for the output prices. Now let r*(x, r) be the maximizing
output price vector, and use (3.5.3):
(3.6.7)

Do (x,y ) = r*(x, r ) y .

Applying Shephard’s dual lemma to (3.6.7), yields:
(3.6.8)

∇ y Do (x,y ) = r*(x,r ) .

Substituting (3.6.7) into (3.6.6) gives:
(3.6.9)

r = R(x, r ) r*(x, r ) .

(3.6.9) implies that r*(x, r) is the revenue deflated or normalized price vector. In (3.6.9)
the undeflated shadow price r can be computed. If R(x, r) is known, the shadow price with
respect to the specific output can be computed. However, R(x, r) depends on the shadow price
vector, r, which is the vector of unknown shadow prices. For more detailed reference see Färe
(1988); Färe and Primont (1995); Färe et al. (1993); and Färe, Grosskopf, and Lovell (1994).
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According to Färe (1993), one assumption must be made to calculate the undeflated
shadow price. That is, one output price must be equal to its observed market price. Taking the
mth output, let its market price equal to its shadow price, rmo and (3.6.9) becomes:
(3.6.10)

R(x,y) =

rmo
.
rm'*

Combining (3.6.8), (3.6.9), and (3.6.10), for all m'≠ m, absolute shadow price:
rm' = R ⋅ r* (x, y)

(3.6.11)

= R⋅
= rmo ⋅

Or
(3.6.12)

∂Do (x,y)
∂y m'
∂Do (x,y)/∂y m'
∂Do (x,y)/∂y m

rm' ∂Do (x,y)/∂y m'
=
.
rmo ∂Do (x,y)/∂y m

(3.6.12) is the relative shadow price for two outputs and also shows the point where the
price ratio of two outputs is equal to their marginal rate of transformation. The marginal rate of
transformation of two outputs is depicted as the corresponding ratio of two distance function
derivatives.
3.7 Equilibrium Model
This section presents the general equilibrium model in terms of the output distance
function and the revenue function (Färe and Grosskopf, 1998).
In the production market, we know that the relative prices for two outputs in (3.6.12) are
the ratio of two derivatives of the output distance function. If we assume these two outputs are
produced by two different firms in competitive markets, (3.6.12) is the equilibrium condition for
producers; the price ratio is equal to the marginal rate of the production transformation.
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In the consumer goods market, we construct a consumer’s utility function subject to the
output distance function as:
Max U(y )
s.t. Do (x, y ) ≤ 1

(3.7.1)

where y is a vector of consumer goods produced by firms.
The utility maximization problem is the Lagrangian problem.
Λ(y, λ) = u(y ) + λ(Do (x, y ) − 1) .

(3.7.2)

The first order conditions for (37.1) are:
(3.7.3)

(i)

∇ y U(y ) = λDo (x, y )

(ii)
Do (x, y ) = 1
Together with (3.6.12), we get the equilibrium conditions for both the production and consumer

markets as:
(3.7.4)

∂U(y )/∂y m' rm' ∂Do (x, y )/∂y m'
=
=
∂U(y )/∂y m' rm ∂Do (x, y )/∂y m

for all m and m’.
(3.7.4) can be interpreted as that, in equilibrium, the marginal rate of substitution of
consumer goods is equal to marginal rate of production transformation through the market
clearing prices. On the other hand, these shadow prices can be computed either from the
producer or consumer model. These equilibriums only hold for competitive markets. This
discussion provides a link to general equilibrium theory in terms of the distance function
approach.
3.8 Summary
This chapter provides an outline of the theoretic model used for this study. The model
characterizes the production technology of the firm. The technology is represented by an output
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set, output requirement set, or technology set. For a specific production situation, the outputs are
determined given the input set. The output distance function is defined over the output set to
represent the specific technology and measure technical efficiency. The dual to the output
distance function is the revenue function. The revenue function can be defined either by the
output set or distance function, while the distance function is defined in terms of the revenue
function. The duality between the output distance function and the revenue function provides a
tool to derive the shadow prices of outputs. Finally the equilibrium model is presented in terms
of the output distance function.
This model differs from traditional production modeling. It departs from single output
production modeling and directly includes multiple outputs and multiple inputs. It is also
different from conventional approaches to consumer theory or the utility theory to approach.
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Chapter 4. Subvector Distance Function via Undesirable Outputs
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter presented a model that characterizes a multi-output and multi-input
production technology. This theoretical model can be used to analyze the production
performance of the firm, measure its allocation efficiency, and derive the virtual prices of
outputs. For this study, the focus is on the last of these and extends the model to consider some
environmental “bads” produced in the production process and derives their shadow prices. For
this purpose the output vector can be partitioned into good output and bad output subvectors that
are treated asymmetrically in the model.
Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell (1994) use a subvector output distance function to analyze
situations in which a subset of outputs are subject to scaling while other outputs are restricted or
fixed. McFadden (1978) and Diewert (1981) considered the general case of production in
restricted or regulated contexts. Turner (1994) uses an axiomatic approach to establish the
properties of the subvector output distance and the revenue functions, the duality of the two
functions, and then to derive the shadow prices for undesirable outputs. Following Turner’s
approach, the subvector output set is defined in the Section 2, the subvector output distance
function in the Section 3, and the subvector revenue function and the derived shadow prices of
undesirable outputs in Section 4. In the case of the electric utility industry, the derived shadow
prices of the undesirable outputs are used as the opportunity costs for the firm’s pollution control
cost or the loss of the revenue under Title IV of the 1990 CAAA. They are also used as a tool to
evaluate the performance of the electric plants in complying with the Phase I requirements from
Title IV of the 1990 CAAA. In Section 5, the specific functional form for the distance function
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and estimation methods are presented. Section 6 gives a brief comparison on output distance
function and data envelopment analysis. The last section is the summary for the chapter.
4.2 The Restricted Output Requirement Sets
When the outputs are not all desirable, let the output vector y be partitioned as two
subvectors, yg and yb. Subvector yg represents the desirable outputs and subvector yb the
G
environmental “bads.” The output space R M
+ is also partitioned as y g = (y g1 ,...,y gm' ) ∈ R+ and

y b = (y bm'+1 ,...,y bm ) ∈ R+B , two sub-output spaces. The input vector is defined the same as in the
previous chapter (Färe, Grosskopf, and. Lovell 1994; Färe and Primont 1995; and Turner 1994).
If we define undesirable outputs to be a fixed level as required by environmental
regulations, e.g., the emission of sulfur dioxide is 2.5 pounds per mmBtu in Phase I and 1.25
pounds per mmBtu in Phase II, we can define RP as the restricted output set:
(4.2.1)

RP(x,y b ) = {y g : (y g ,y b ) ∈ P(x)},for all x ∈ R+N , y b ∈ R+B

From the definition, the restricted output set is defined as the set of desirable outputs, yg,
producible given inputs and fixed undesirable outputs. This fully characterizes the firm’s
feasible technology. This definition differs from the general definition of output sets for two
practical reasons. The first is that it does not require that environmental regulation force
pollution to zero. The Earth has a certain assimilative ability to dilute or absorb pollutants and to
restore balance in the ecosystem. The permitted level of pollution set by environmental
regulations aims at a safety standard to protect human and animal life or specific ecosystems.
Secondly, it is not economically efficient to reduce pollution to zero. It may be very costly
because of the diminishing return rule for abatement costs to reach zero pollution. The
economically efficient point of pollution reduction is where the marginal abatement cost is equal
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to the marginal social benefit from pollution reduction. In most cases, the marginal social
benefit is not easily observable; the allowable level is chosen to be both politically feasible and
environmentally beneficial. Thus, a cost effectiveness approach is often used when pollution
reductions are externally set.
The restricted output set RP(x, y b) also implies that the undesirable outputs cannot be
disposed of freely. For example, electric utilities must take special measures to reduce emissions
of SO2 and NO x to meet the requirements of Title IV of the 1990 CAAA in two Phases. The
restricted output set is illustrated in figure 4.1.
yg

A’

A

y g0

P(x)

RP(x,yb)

0

yb0

yb

B

yb

Figure 4.1 The Restricted Output Requirement Set
Assuming yb is an undesirable output and yg is a desirable output in Figure 4.1, the
region, 0AB0, is the unrestricted output set while the region, 0AA' y b 0 is the restricted output
set, and yb is the fixed emission level of SO2 or NO x for electric plants. The restricted output
region, 0AA' y b 0 , is of interest for this study. This is when the pollution level is at or below the
level yb and the slope of the production frontier curve is nonnegative, which implies the
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undesirable output cannot be disposed of without incurring costs. In other words, the firm has to
divert resources to control pollutants at the expense of reducing good output.
We can define the output set in terms of the restricted output set because both represent
the firm's technology.
(4.2.2)

P(x) = {(y g , y b ) : y g ∈ RP(x, y b )}, for all x ∈ R+N , y b ∈ R+M

(4.2.1) and (4.2.2) are equivalent to
(4.2.3)

y g ∈ RP(x,y b ) ⇔ (y g ,y b ) ∈ P(x)

that means we can define that output set as the set of good and bad output vectors such that the
good output vector is an element of the restricted output set or that the restricted output set is the
set of the good output subvector, such that good and bad output subvectors are the elements of
the output set, given the input vector and fixed level of undesirable outputs. Equation (4.2.3)
shows the relationship needed to derive the properties for the restricted output set, RP(x, y b),
from the properties of the output set, P(x). The properties for the restricted output set are
summarized by Turner (1995); for the proofs of the properties, see Shephard (1970); or Färe
(1988):
RP.1

(a) RP(0,y b ) = 0

(b) y g ∉ RP(0,y b ), y g ≥ 0.

RP.2

(a) RP(x, 0) = 0

(b) y g ∉ RP(x, 0), y g ≥ 0.

RP.3

RP(x,y b ) ⊆ RP(x',y b ), for all x, x' ∈ R +N .

RP.4

If y 'g ≤ y g and y g ∈ RP(x,y b ), then y 'g ∈ RP( x, y b ).

RP.5

RP(x, y b ) is upper semi-continuous on x, i.e. if [xl → xo ,y bl → y b0
and y lg ∈ RP(x,y b ), for all l ], then yog ∈ RP(x,y b ).

RP.6 RP(x,y b ) is convex for all x ∈ R+N and y b ∈ R+B .
The interpretations of the properties of the restricted output set, except for RP. 2, are
similar to those of in P(x) in Section 3. 2. RP. 2 represents the relationship between the desirable
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and the undesirable output, the nulljointness. If bad output is zero the good output is also zero
(Turner 1994).
4.3 The Subvector Distance Function
The subvector output distance function is defined on the restricted output set (Turner
1994):
SD(x, yg , yb ) = min{θ:(yg /θ ∈ RP(x)},

(4.3.1)

x ∈ R+N , yg ∈ R+G , yb ∈ R+B.

The subvector distance function, (4.3.1) is interpreted as the desired output scaled by the
⎛1⎞
maximum scalar, ⎜ ⎟ , on the production frontier while the undesirable output is fixed and not
⎝θ ⎠
scaled, given the inputs. This function is defined as the minimum value θ or maximum scalar
⎛1⎞
value ⎜ ⎟ to feasibly expand the desirable output, holding the undesirable outputs and inputs
⎝θ ⎠
fixed.

Alternatively, the subvector output distance function can be given in terms of the output
correspondence set:

(4.3.2)

1
SD(x, y g , y b ) = min{θ : ( , y b ) ∈ P(x)}

θ

x ∈ R , y g ∈ R , y b ∈ R+B .
N
+

G
+

The properties of the subvector distance function inherit its properties from the restricted
output requirement set (Turner 1994). They are:

SD.1 (a) SD(x, 0, y b ) = 0, for all x ∈ R+N , y b ∈ R+B ;
(b) SD(x, y g ,0) = 0, for all x ∈ R+N , y g ∈ R+G ;
(c) SD (0, y g ,y b ) = +∞, for all y g ∈ R+G , y b ∈ R+B ;
(d) 0 < SD (x, y g ,y b ) < +∞, for all x ∈ R+N , y g ∈ R+G , y b ∈ R+B .
SD.2

SD (x, λ y g , y b ) = λ SD (x, y g , y b ), for all x ∈ R+N , y b ∈ R+B .

SD.3 SD(x, y g1 + y g2 , y b ) ≤ SD(x, y g1 , y b ) + SD(x, y g2 , y b ), for all x ∈ R+N ,
y g1 , y g2 ∈ R+G , y b ∈ R+B .
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SD.4

SD (x, y g , y b ) ≤ SD (x, y 'g , y b ), if y g ≤ y 'g , for all x ∈ R+N , y b ∈ R+B .

SD.5

SD (x, y g , y b ) is convex in y g ∈ R+G , for all x ∈ R+N , y b ∈ R+B .

SD.6

SD (x, y g , y b ) is continuous in y g ∈ R+G , for all x ∈ R+N , y b ∈ R+B .

SD.7

SD (x', y g , y b ) ≥ SD (x, y g , y b ), if x ≥ x', for all y g ∈ R+G , y b ∈ R+B .

SD.8

SD (x, λ y g , y b ) is lower semicontinuous on x ∈ R+N , for all y g ∈ R+N , y b ∈ R+B .

These properties are presented by Turner (1994); for proofs see Shephard (1970, p. 208)
or Färe (1988) with modifications in terms of subvectors.
The subvector distance function is in the range of values, (0, 1), for this study. It can be
proven by the definition of the restricted output set. The important property of the subvector
distance function is that the desirable outputs can be expanded while the undesirable outputs are
fixed. The question here is, is this property characterized in the production process? It can be
motivated by installation of a scrubber in an electric plant (unit). When the scrubber is installed
in the plant, SO2 emissions are reduced. If a fixed emission level is required by environmental
law, this needs to be imposed by an additional constraint on the production process.
4.4 The Subvector Revenue Function
As the dual to the subvector distance function, the subvector revenue function is defined
G
and
by partitioning the output price vector into two subvectors, rg = (rg1 , . . . , rgm' ) ∈ R++

rb = (rb1 , . . . , rbm'' ) ∈ R+B where rg is the strictly positive price subvector for desirable outputs,

and rb is a nonpositive price subvector for undesirable outputs, i.e., the prices for the desirable
outputs are strictly positive while the prices for undesirable outputs are negative or zero. In most
cases, undesirable outputs do not have market prices so shadow prices are computed as
approximations to market prices. Since Title IV of the CAAA of 1990 establishes an allowance
trading market for SO2, the derived shadow prices can be an evaluation tool for the firm. A
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comparison of the market trading price to the shadow price can help identify cost effective
approaches to pollution control – meeting the restriction or buying permits.
If the undesirable output price is negative, pollution control is not free as discussed in the
previous chapter. This follows from the weak disposability restriction imposed on the distance
and revenue functions. If the undesirable output price is zero, it may imply that the
environmental regulation is not binding or has been reduced as a consequences of other pollution
controls. That is, if the production process generates several pollutants, this effect might exist,
e.g., electricity production creates multiple pollutants, SO2, NO x , and CO2. Pollution controls
for SO2 might have reduced the emissions of NO x or CO2.
Now the subvector revenue function is defined as (Turner, 1994):
(4.4.1)

SR(x, rg , yb ) = max{rg ⋅ yg : yg ∈ RP(x, yb )},
yg

G
for all x ∈ R +N , rg ∈ R++
,

yb ∈ R+B

(4.4.1) defines the subvector revenue in terms of the restricted output requirement set using a
general form, P(x), (Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell 1994):
(4.4.2)

SR(x, rg , y b ) = max{rg ⋅ y g : (y g , y b ) ∈ P(x)},
yg

G
for all x ∈ R+N , rg ∈ R++
, y b ∈ R+B

The subvector revenue function is the maximum variable revenue that can be achieved
given the level of inputs and fixed amount of the undesirable outputs. The properties of the
subvector revenue function have properties similar to the revenue function. For details see
Turner (1995) and for the proofs see Shephard (1970, 229-230). These properties indicate that
the subvector revenue function characterizes the firm’s technology and inherits the parent’s
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technology.9 The duality between the subvector output distance function and the subvector
revenue function is given by
(4.4.3)

SR(x, rg , y b ) = max{rg ⋅ yg :SD(x, yg , y b ) ≤ 1},
yg

G
for all x ∈ R+N , rg ∈ R++
, y b ∈ R+B .

This duality can be presented and proven by the relationship (Turner, 1995) from (2. 5. 1)
yg ∈ RP(x, y b ) ⇔ SD(x, yg , y b ) ≤ 1

(4.4.4)

4.5. The Absolute Shadow Price for the Undesirable Output
There are two ways to derive the absolute shadow prices for undesirable outputs. Both
are presented here, first the total revenue approach, then the duality approach. Define the total
revenue function including both desirable and undesirable outputs as:

TR(x , rg , rb ) = max{(rg ⋅ y g + rb ⋅ y b ) : ( y g , y b ) ∈ P ( x )},
yg

(4.5.1)

for all x ∈ R+N , y g ∈ R+G , y b ∈ R+B .

The output vector is partitioned into a good output subvector and bad output subvector,
y → (y g , y b ) , and the output price vector into two corresponding subvectors, r → (rg , rb ) , where
rb ≤ 0 . Total revenue is maximized over the desirable outputs, yg, at given inputs and
undesirable outputs.
The Lagrangian problem that maximizes feasible revenue is:
(4.5.2)

L = rg ⋅ y g + rb ⋅ y b + λ ( SD(x, y g , y b ) − 1)

where rg and rb are the absolute shadow prices of the desirable and undesirable outputs.

9

Parent's technology refers to the output requirement set before the partition into two subvectors, the desirable
output subvector, rg , and undesirable output subvector, rb.
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Assuming that the subvector output distance function is differentiable, we derive absolute
shadow prices of both desirable and undesirable outputs. The first order conditions of (4.5.2)
are:
(i) rg = −λ∇ yg SD(x, y g , y b )
(4.5.3)

(ii) rb = −λ∇ yb SD(x, y g , y b )

(iii) SD(x, y g , y b ) = 1.
solving (i) and (ii) in (4.5.3) for λ gives:
rg
rb
(4.5.4)
−λ =
=
∇ yg SD(x, y g , y b ) ∇ yb SD(x, y g , y b )
where λ is a vector whose elements correspond to the values associated with a particular output,
yg or yb. Solve (4.5.4) for rb, the shadow prices of the undesirable output:
(4.5.5)
Note that the ratio,

rb = rg

∇ yb SD(x, y g , y b )
∇ yg SD(x, y g , y b )

∇ yb SD(x, y g , y b )
∇ yg SD(x, y g , y b )

.

is the marginal rate of transformation between the

desirable output and undesirable output, the slope of the production frontier, at the point on the
frontier determined by the solution of the subvector distance function.
Now assume that the shadow price of desirable output, rg, is its observable market price,
rgo , as in (3. 6). Calculate the absolute shadow prices for undesirable outputs from (4.5.5) as:

(4.5.5.a)

rb = rgo

∇ yb SD(x, y g , y b )
∇ yg SD(x, y g , y b )

.

4.6 Specification of a Production Frontier for the Output Distance Function
4.6.1 Choice of Output Distance Function
Now consider the specific functional form to capture the firm’s production technology
required by the output distance function from a given set of observations. The choices for
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empirical work must come from available models that deal with production that generate
environmental bads and choices of estimation methods for distance function approaches.
The choices for functional form include the Cobb-Douglas function, constant elasticity
function, and the translog production function. The criteria for the choice of production frontier
in empirical work include (1) the functional form exhibits good behavior globally, and (2) the
functional form has sufficient flexibility to reflect complex economic phenomena. The former
property often exists in simple production frontier functions, e.g., the Cobb-Douglas and
Constant Elasticity production frontiers. These functions satisfy certain regularity conditions
globally but lack the flexibility needed to model complex or sophisticated production
technologies. The Cobb-Douglas production frontier imposes a unitary elasticity of substitution
and transformation (Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau 1973; Denny and May 1977). This
property is more restrictive when some output is an externality (Pittman 1983). The second
criterion requires that the function be able to model complex production technology (e.g., the
translog production function). Its very flexibility, however, prevents globally good behavior
(Guilkey, Lovell, and Sickles 1983). However, the translog production function is a local
second-order approximation to a general form (Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau 1973).
Among these choices, the translog production frontier is most often chosen. Compared to
Cobb-Douglass and Constant Elasticity production functions, a translog production function has
several favorable characteristics for applied analysis. First, it can model a multi-output and
multi-input production frontier while the Cobb-Douglas and Constant Elasticity production
functions are restricted to a single output (Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau 1973). Pittman (1979,
1981) modeled two outputs (one good output, paper, and one bad output, water pollution) with
five inputs in his research on 30 Wisconsin and Michigan paper mills using a profit
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maximization approach with a translog production function. He incorporated pollution control
into his model as a constraint. The bad output, water pollution, is actually treated as an input in
his model, not an output. Such treatment has a direct flaw, as he pointed out, that a truly
‘general’ joint output production function would be of the form (f(y1, y2, x1, …, xi) = 0, where y1
as good output, y2 as a bad output, and x1, … xi as inputs), which was not used in his study
(Pittman 1981, p5). The general joint output production function he meant is the production
frontier function. Färe, Grosskopf, Lovell and Yaisawarng (1993) used the same data set as in
Pittman’s research but modeled five outputs (one good output, paper, and decomposed four
water pollutants for discharged wastewater from paper mills). Swinton and Coggings (1996) and
Swinton (1998) modeled electricity plants with two outputs (electricity and SO2) and four inputs
(the formerly cited research for Wisconsin plants in 1996) and five inputs (the latter research for
Wisconsin, Illinois, and Minnesota in 1998). Hetemäki (1996) in her dissertation used the
translog production function frontier for her model. These studies chose the translog production
frontier over other production function forms for flexibility to model multiple outputs and
because it does not impose unity of elasticity of substitution or transformation on either inputinput, output-output, or input-output relationships.
Second, the translog function allows the inclusion of undesirable outputs in the model.
This favorable feature is self-explanatory from the previous feature because the Cobb-Douglas or
Constant Elasticity production functions are restricted to a single output (Pittman 1979).
Third, the translog does not impose constant elasticity of substitution and transformation
on inputs and outputs; for more than one product or two input factors in the production, the
“constancy of elasticity is highly restrictive” (Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau 1973). CobbDouglas or constant elasticity functions require constant elasticity.
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Finally, when the restrictions imposed on the production function are based on economic
theory and the restriction imposed by the specific functional forms may be incorrect, the translog
function should be applied in terms of the absence of correct a priori information on the specific
functional form (Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau 1973). Therefore, the translog function is a
more suitable, flexible functional form that provides “a local second-order approximation to any
production frontier” and “permit a greater variety of substitution and transformation patterns than
frontier based on constant elasticities of substitution and transformation.” (Christensen,
Jorgenson, and Lau 1973).
Empirical estimation methods used in distance function estimation include mathematical
programming and econometric methods. Each method has its advantages and disadvantages.
Econometric methods for the distance function approach takes measurement and other errors into
account when empirical estimation is performed. They also allow for statistical inferences,
which is a favorable characteristic when compared with mathematical programming (Hetemäki
1994a, b, 1995a, b, 1996; Groskopf and Hayes 1997; Hadley 1998). Hetemäki applied
econometric methods to the output distance function for her Finnish paper mill data (1994a,
1994b; 1995a, 1995b; 1996). She uses a panel data set and specifies a two-factor random effects
model that allows for constant terms that are randomly distributed across cross-sectional plants
and time. She employs strong disposability for all outputs and does not constrain the price of the
undesirable output to be negative (1994a, b). Her estimates of absolute shadow prices10 on all
outputs are positive, indicating that increasing pollution would add to revenue, and are typically
small for each plant. She attributes this finding to increased productivity and/or modernization

10

Absolute shadow prices are used to distinguish them from the relative prices that are the ratio of two output prices
for the derivation of the shadow price of one output.
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caused by firms taking measures to satisfy environmental regulations. Specifically, it implies
that the paper mill recycle the waste water to reuse in the plant.
A basic problem, however, with this estimation method is that the distance measure as a
dependent variable is not observable even though it takes values from zero to one (0 ≤ D ≤ 1). If
one sets the distance value to 1 (that is, every observation is assumed to lie on the production
frontier), then all the dependent variable values are invariant, an intercept term can not be
estimated, and the OLS estimate is biased (Hetemäki 1994a, b; 1995a, b; 1996). If the distance
function is estimated in logarithm form, then all distance measures are zero (e.g., D = log1 = 0)
for those on the production frontier. The residuals are one sided. Lovell et al. (1990), Grosskopf
et al. (1996) propose normalizing the dependent variable by one of the outputs in the model by
using the property that the output distance function is homogeneous of degree +1 in outputs.
Thus, for each observation used in estimating the distance function, a value that is unique to that
observation can be used to multiply all output values on the right-hand side and the value of the
distance function on the left-hand side. But the choice is arbitrary and different estimated results
may be obtained when a different output value is used to normalize in estimation process.
The second criticism for econometric estimation is the assumption that all outputs are
weakly disposable. It means that the desirable output cannot be freely taken by anyone and
would seem to have important implications for the positive absolute shadow prices of some
pollutants, calculated as the ratio of the dual values of pulp and the pollution outputs. Also,
Hetemäki maximizes the output distance function over all outputs, good and bad. It is
questionable what the appropriate maximization problem is when some outputs are undesirable.
The last problem for her studies is that the error measures for the distance function following the
definition are one sided, either 1 or less than 1, or either 0 or less than 0 if the values are taken in
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logarithms. The fourth disadvantage is that the estimates from the econometric method cannot
give efficiency measures or productivity changes. Thus, the econometric model estimation is not
appealing, at least to date.
The empirical model for the output distance function approach that has been most
commonly used is mathematical programming. Empirical research includes Färe et al. (1989,
1993); Yaisawrng (1989); Turner (1995); Hetemäki, (1996); Coggings and Swinton (1996); and
Swinton (1998, 2002, 2004). Programming approaches can be further classified as either
nonparametric and parametric programming. Nonparametric programming is simply to set up
the optimization problem under a set of constraints without specifying a functional form. This
method is the same as special linear programming used in activity analysis or data envelopment
analysis. What is used in activity analysis is a piece-wise linear programming algorithm that
estimates a performance efficiency frontier given the observed data set. Applications of this type
of linear programming estimation can be seen in Färe et al. (1989); Yaisawrang and Klein
(1994); Färe, Grosskopf, and Lovell (1994); Shaik (1998); Tyteca (1997); Yaisawarng (1989);
Färe and Primont (1995); and Turner (1995).
Estimation with nonparametric linear programming for a distance function can measure
production efficiency. The first such study was Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell (1985) and the book
by Färe, Grosskopf, and Lovell (1994). In the book they give a number of numerical examples
of different types of linear programming computations for distance functions. Färe et al. (1989),
Yaisawrang and Klein (1994), Yaisawrang (1989), Hakuni (1994), and Brannlund et al. (1995)
are examples of this approach using the weak disposability assumption to compute the impact of
environmental regulations on production efficiency. These studies are based on the idea that one
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computes the linear programming problem and, thereby, production efficiency under two sets of
efficiency scores, which is then interpreted as the measure of pollution control or regulation.
The more popular parametric mathematical programming approach employed for
distance function estimation is the translog function. The translog function was first applied to
shadow price estimation for pollutants by Pittman (1981). He specified the firm’s production
function as a transcendental function and incorporated environmental regulations as constraints
directly in the function. After the estimation of the translog function as revenue maximization,
the shadow prices for pollutants are derived as Lagrange coefficients. The output distance
function adopting the translog function form was first used by Färe et al. (1993). Färe et al.
adopted the nonlinear programming estimation method proposed by Aigner and Chu (1968) to
estimate the translog output distance function. The study showed the estimates of shadow prices
for four undesirable outputs (BOD, TSS, PART, and SOX11) for Wisconsin paper mills. Work
on parametric mathematical programming is also used in Coggings and Swinton (1996), Swinton
(1998, 2002, 2004), and Hetemäki (1994a, b; 1995a, b). The translog function has desirable
properties, including homogeneity of degree one in outputs, symmetry for second order cross
products between inputs and outputs, and allows nonnegative prices for desirable outputs, and
nonpositive prices for undesirable outputs. These properties will be covered in more detail in the
following section.
4.6.2 Translog Production Frontier Function
The general traslog production frontier was first proposed by Christensen, Jorgenson and
Lau (1973). They called it a transcendental logarithmic production frontier and its dual, the price
frontier. This production frontier provides the flexibility to estimate multi-output and multi11

BOD represents biological oxygen demand, TSS total suspended solids, PART particulate, and SOX sulfur
oxides.
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input production technologies for a wide variety of production processes. It also possesses
desirable properties on equality, normalization, and symmetry in parameters. The tradeoff for
using a translog production frontier instead of the Cobb-Douglas production frontier is that it
may satisfy the desired regularity conditions over a range of observations that contain or intersect
the set of sample observations even though it is not globally well behaved. The translog
production frontier takes the following form:
M

N

ln( F ( x, y ) + 1) = α 0 + ∑ α i ln yi + ∑ β j ln x j +
i =1

j =1

+

(4.6.1)
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1 N M
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x
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γ ii ' ln x j ln yi
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∑∑ ii ' j j ' 2 ∑∑
2 j =1 j, =1
j =1 i =1
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= 1;

i =1 i '=1

(iii)

1 M M
∑∑ α ii ' ln yi ln yi '
2 i =1 i, =1

(iv) α ii' = α i 'i , and β jj' = β j ' j

for i ≠ i' and j ≠ j'.

In (4.6.1), ln(F(x, y) + 1) is the logarithm of the production frontier plus one, when the
production function is frontier F(x, y) = 0. The unity term avoids the logarithm of zero problem.
Ln(F(x, y) + 1) = 0 if the logarithm production function is a frontier point. In equation (4.6.1), x
and y are the input and output vector, respectively, for a specific production process. The
properties of a translog production frontier are (4.6.1(i)-(iv)). (4.6.1(i)) implies homogeneous
degree of one in output, and (4.6.1(ii)-(iii)) impose the homogeneous of degree zero restriction
on the second-order output terms and cross interactive terms between outputs and inputs,
respectively, while (4.6.1(iv)) requires symmetry of both second-order output and input terms.
When the output distance function approach is applied, it not only measures a single
firm’s production frontier, but a set of production firms used to construct an industry production
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frontier. Each firm included in the data set is placed either on or inside the industry frontier.
Production efficiency can be measured or compared in this context. This is also called a data
envelopment analysis in the operations research and management fields. In Shephard and Färe’s
theoretical framework, the output distance function approach provides an analytic instrument to
focus on the undesirable output generated through the good output. Therefore, the subvector
distance function laid out here can be written as:
M'

lnSDo (x, yg , yb ) = α0 + ∑α g ln yg +
g =1

(4.6.2)
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(v) αgg'' = α g ' g , α bb' = α b'b , αgb = αg'b' , and βnn' = βn ' n
for g ≠ g' and b ≠ b , and n ≠ n'.
where 0 < SDo (x, yg , yb ) ≤ 1, because it takes the logarithim, instead of 0 ≤ SDo (x, yg , yb ) ≤ 1,
the domain subvector output distance function.
The empirical estimation model can be further specified as:
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k

min

∑ [ln1 -lnSD
k =1

(i)
(4.6.2)

(ii)

o

(x k , y gk , y kb )]

lnSD o (x k , y gk , y bk ) ≤ 0,
∂lnSD o (x k , y gk , y bk )
∂ ln y gk

≥ 0,

k = 1, ...,K,
g = 1, ..., m',

∂lnSD o (x k , y gk , y bk )

≤ 0, b = m '+ 1, ..., m,
∂ ln ybk
where k=1, …, K indexes individual observations and lnDo(x, yg, yb) is the explicit functional
(iii)

form as in (4.6.2). The objective function minimizes the sum of the deviations of individual
observations from the frontier of the technology. Since the distance function takes a value of
less than or equal to one, the natural logarithm of Do ( x k , y gk , ybk ) is less than or equal to zero.
The condition (4.6.3. i) sets the value range for the natural logarithmic output distance function.
(4.6.3. ii) imposes strong disposability on the desirable output, while (4.6.3. iii) imposes weak
disposability on undesirable outputs. Equations (4.6.2) and (4.6.3) together are the empirical
model for this study. Efficiency in this study is a relative efficiency as the shadow price of
pollutant is evaluated.
The computation of (4.6.2) and (4.6.3) provides the parameters for an empirical industrial
output distance function (given the observations in the data set). The parameters are used to
compute each firm’s output distance score in (4.6.2). The estimates of the shadow values for
each undesirable output are then calculated. This provides measures of the output transformation
rate, the marginal transformation rate of two outputs, e.g., between electricity and SO2,
electricity and NO x , electricity and CO2. These rates are calculated as
(∂Do / ∂y1 ) /((∂Do / ∂y 2 ) = ∂y 2 / ∂y1 . The economic interpretation for the shadow values may be
opportunity costs for abatement options, the forgone revenue for the firm under environmental
regulation, or the firm’s individual abatement costs. The marginal rate of transformation is

-73-

directly interpreted as the sacrifice of the desirable output in order to meet the environmental
regulation.
4.6.3 Comparison and Connections between Output Distance Function and Data
Envelopment Analysis

It is worthwhile to discuss a concept which is very closely related to the distance
function, data envelopment analysis (DEA). There are interesting relationships between the two.
The distance function approach is rooted in Shephard’s activity/productivity analysis (Shephard
1970). The terms activity analysis, productivity analysis, and distance function analysis are
interchangeable. Data envelopment analysis model was developed by Charnes, Cooper, and
Rhodes (CCR) in 1978. DEA means that given inputs, the analysis uses the observed data to
maximize an approximate envelop curve (equivalent to the production frontier in this study),
then measure the difference between each observed activity/point and the estimated envelop
curve. The concept is very similar to the output distance function approach, but productivity
analysis and DEA were long considered different approaches. Hetemäki (1996, p. 30) compares
the two and concludes that the output distance function approach is superior to DEA. In her
words: “…distance functions are firmly based on neoclassical production theory, whereas no
such theory lies behind the DEA.” Thus, in using DEA, one does not define the production
technology. Moreover, there is no parametric functional representation of DEA. While her
claim may be true on theoretical grounds, the methods are often identical in practice. This latter
connection is identified by Färe and Grosskopf (2002) where they prove the link between DEA
and the distance function12.

12

Färe and Grosskopf called it CRC instead of DEA and distance function in their work. CRC represents Charnes,
Cooper and Rhodes (1978) and they termed data envelopment analysis while Shephard (1970) introduced the
distance function approach. In this article they prove the connection between DEA and the input distance function,
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Approximate DEA curve are piece-wise linear. Thus, the common estimating method of
DEA is linear programming, a nonparametric method. Since DEA is originally and widely used
in the management field and operations research, many think they are the same as the distance
function in estimating the production frontier and efficiency as production activity analysis
(Seiford and Thrall 1990; Charnes, Cooper, and Seiford 1985). The connection was first pointed
out by Grosskopf (1986) for the input output distance function. The relationship includes, first,
that the two approaches have a theoretical relationship through duality. DEA measures Farrell’s
production efficiency using linear programming and its dual is a cost function, while the input
distance function is the reciprocal of Farrell’s efficiency measure (see Chapter 3, Sections 2 and
3) and the cost function is dual to the distance function.13 Second, the regularity conditions
stated in distance function are also met by DEA (Grosskopf, 1986).14 Third, the empirical
formulations of both approaches are related. In theory, Shephard uses linear programming to
prove the existence of the derived output price from the cost function as the dual. DEA models
form the linear programming model following Shephard’s cost function (even though they don’t
make the direct connection) and give the dual to the cost function, output pricing model, which
determines a shadow price vector for outputs and inputs. The latter structure is similar to the
DEA input oriented dual model. Their conclusion is that the “two approaches coincide” (p. 41)
by appropriate normalization of Shephard’s output price model.
As for the two approaches, from the discussions above several differences are obvious.
First, DEA and the distance function were developed in different fields of application. The
but the same relationship should exist between output distance function and DEA as well. This may require further
study.
13
As they point out “It is of interest to note that Shephard never formulated a linear programming model for directly
estimating the input distance function. Nor did Farrell formulate his efficiency measure as a linear programming
problem in his 1957 article. ” P.43.
14
The regularity conditions are (1) the technology is a closed set; (2) outputs cannot be produced without inputs; (3)
free or strong disposability of both inputs and outputs if they both are desirable; and (4) the input requirement set is
convex for each output vector.
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former started by representing Farrell’s efficiency measure while the latter started as a cost
function. Second, the applications, at least at the early stage, were different; the former
employed in public services and activity/management evaluations or decision-making units
(especially for service sections, bank, school, hospital and governmental agencies) while the
latter laid the foundation for measuring efficiency and deriving the shadow prices for
environmental bads. Third, the difference following the second point is that all outputs and
inputs in DEA are assumed to be strictly positive while the outputs or inputs are not subject to
these constraints in the distance function.15 However, both approaches can use the same linear
programming techniques to reach the analytic/managerial goal.
4.7 Summary

This chapter is presented as a bridge between the theoretical model and an empirical
application. The output set is partitioned into two subvectors corresponding to the desirable
outputs and the environmental bads as are the revenue functions and the set of price vectors.

15

The conditions in the distance function are (1) each output is at least produced by one decision making unit
(DMU); (2) Each DMU produces at least one output; (3) each input is used by at least DMU; and (4) each DMU
uses at least one input. These conditions allow some zeros in DMUs.
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Chapter 5. Empirical Estimates and Interpretation
5.1 Introduction

This chapter applies the output distance function to coal-fired electricity production to
measure the shadow prices of selected by-products, SO2, NOx, and CO2. As Färe et al. (1993, p.
375) state “… shadow prices reflect the impact of regulations faced by the firms, and so they can
be used to assess the effectiveness of existing regulation. They could be used by firms to
determine whether emission trading is worthwhile under the Clean Air Act of 1990.” The choice
of the empirical model, the translog production function, is discussed. A description of the data
for 16 coal fired electricity plants in West Virginia for the 1995-2000 time period and other
variables used in the analysis follows. The estimation results and interpretation are given in the
final section of the chapter.
5.2 The Variables and Data Used in the Analysis
5.2.1 Variables

The electricity sector is a major source of emissions of several air pollutants including
sulfur dioxide (SO2) which contributes to acid rain and fine particulate concentrations in the
atmosphere, nitrogen oxides (NOx) which contribute to both of these pollution problems and to
ground-level ozone, mercury which is a toxic substance linked to neurological and other health
problems, and carbon dioxide (CO2) which contributes to global warming. The electricity sector
contributes roughly 68 percent of national SO2 emissions, 22 percent of NOx, 40 percent of
mercury, and 40 percent of CO2. The effects of the emissions of SO2 and NOx are particularly
strong in the northeast which is downwind of a large number of coal-fired generators located in
the Mid-Atlantic states and the Ohio Valley (Burtraw et al. 2005; EPA 2005).
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Electricity is the only desirable output considered; choices for undesirable outputs
include SO2, NOx, CO2, and Mercury. In several empirical studies SO2 is the only bad output
chosen (Swinton 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2004). However, SO2, NOx, and CO2, a subvector of
undesirable outputs, were chosen for analysis in this study. There are two reasons for doing so.
First, the contributions of NOx emissions to acid rain were addressed for the first time in Title IV
of 1990 CAAA. Title IV requires the reduction on NOx from existing sources including coalfired boilers. The requirements specify emission rate limitations based on emissions per unit of
heat content of the coal input. The emission reduction approach for NO x sets up a trading
scheme for NO x of the same type used for the SO2 reduction calculations. Second, the U.S.
Department of Energy (USDOE) has proposed strategies for reducing multiple emissions from
power plants including SO2, NOx, and CO2. This strategy recognizes that pollutants are
generated from the same process, electricity production from coal, and can be jointly reduced in
the long run. The proposal suggests that the reduction of the multiple emissions is a more
attractive alternative than the separate sets of SO2 and NO x emission reductions as required in
the 1990 CAAA (EIA 2000).16 Electricity, SO2, NOx, and CO2 are the four outputs analyzed in
this study. Electricity is measured in kilowatts hour per year while SO2, NOx, and CO2 are in
tons per year.
The vector of inputs includes coal (broken into heat and sulfur as a function of coal
quality), labor, and capital. The heat input is used as a uniform measure for the energy input,
calculated from coal used, and measured in millions of British thermal units (mmBtu). Heat was
also used as a base measure to assign allowances to each coal-generating power plant as required
16

EIA: Analysis of Strategies for Reducing Multiple Emissions from Power Plants: Sulfur Dioxide, Nitrogen
Oxides, and Carbon Dioxide. This analysis was requested by the Subcommittee on National Economic Growth,
Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs of the U.S. House Committee of Government Reform. It examined the
potential costs of various multiple emissions reduction from electric power plants.
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by the 1990 CAAA. Sulfur is calculated from the sulfur content of the coal used and measured
in tons. Labor is in annual hours based on the number of full-time employees times 2000 hours
per year. Capital is represented by production capital and deflated by the 1997 GDP price index.
Electricity prices are based on delivered quantities deflated to 1997 dollars; prices are plant
averages.
5.2.2 Data

This study uses data on 16 coal-fired electricity generating power plants operated by
public investor-owned utilities and cooperatives in West Virginia. Of the 16 plants, six are on
the Phase I list,17 four plants voluntarily participated in Phase I as either substitute or
compensating units, and six plants are Phase 2 plants. For details about these plants and their
respective generating units, see Appendix A. The electricity industry is regulated under various
laws and required to report inputs and outputs to FERC (Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission). Therefore, these data are available to regulators and the public in paper and in
electronic format through the FERC website. FERC’s Form 1 is an annual report required of
each power plant and contains the power plant’s annual inputs, production capital, and labor
utilized, while Form 423 has production cost data and quality of fuels used at the unit-level
including the content of heat and sulfur in each coal used by each boiler unit on an annual basis.
Because different coals have various content of heat and sulfur, the coal-boiler (unit-level)
operator reports each purchase of coal with its respective contents of heat and sulfur. Therefore,
the data in Form 423 were aggregated to the plant level on an annual basis to be compatible with
the data in Form 1. The heat content is the major factor input in the production of electricity and
17

The Phase I list is commonly known as the Table A list, the boiler units on the list include the dirtiest units as
assigned by Congress and they were required to meet the emission cap of Phase I. Thus, it is more accurate to say
that the Table A list is the dirtiest boiler units. I refer to the units as plants because of some data availability only at
the plant level.
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sulfur is the primary measure of a bad input factor. Form 1 also provides output data including
the total annual electricity generated by each electric plant and the price of electricity (at the
sales meter).18 The data from Form 1 and Form 423 were downloaded from the FERC website,
extracted by the applicable software utilities for the 1995-1999 period, and summarized to
provide the format described in the previous section. Electricity prices are deflated to 1997
dollars. To develop estimates of undesirable outputs, SO2, NOx, and CO2 emissions data were
collected and compiled from the US EPA acid rain market program website. Descriptive
statistics of the inputs and outputs for the 16 WV plants participating in Phase I for the five year
study period are included in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Descriptive Summary of Data (observations=80)
Variable
Electricity
SO2
NO x
CO2
Heat
Sulfur
Labor
Capital
Price

Unit
MEAN
STD
MIN
MAX
Kwh/year (millions)
4,973
4,215
117
17,655
Tons/year
43,720
38,585
1,270
165,458
Tons/year
20,461
15,632
479
71,025

Tons/year
mmBtu/year
Tons/year
Hours/year
1997 Dollars
Cents/kWh

6,124,259
4,961,101
156,007
19,853,965
58,802,391 47,150,431 1,520,546
17,560,5985
41,558
52,044
14
198,824
308,333
183,556
82,000
966,000
292,990,938 280,766,169 5,212,304 1,528,098,254
6.64044
2.27046
4.21000
10.80000

5.3 Empirical Results

The major goal of the empirical study is to employ the output distance function approach
laid out in Chapter 4 to estimate the shadow prices of undesirable outputs as an evaluation tool
defined by the specific production technology. These estimates can serve several purposes in the
pollution reduction setting, as Färe et al. (1993) outlined. The estimates can be used as a tool by
power plants operators to self-evaluate their estimated abatement costs; they can also be used to
18

Electricity prices are based on the delivered quantities. These prices are plant averages, weighted by quantities
delivered to each ratepayer classification.
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evaluate the impacts of environmental regulations on a firm’s production and to examine the
performance of SO2 and NO x allowance markets. The estimation method presented in chapter 4
is implemented and the estimations are carried out using the constrained optimization
programming package (version 2.0.7) in GAUSS (version 7).19
5.3.1 Estimated Distance Function

The empirical estimation approach to the output distance function and the development of
estimates of appropriate shadow values can be described in as a series of specific steps. The
implementation of these steps as a GAUSS application and the output obtained is included as
Appendix E and F, respectively.
The first step in the empirical application is to estimate the parameters of the distance
function (Equation 4.6.3) using all (80 – 16 plants x 5 years)) observations of the four outputs
(one good, three bad) and four inputs related to electricity production and subject to the
constraints imposed by the choice of the translog production function in (4.6.3). The four
outputs are electricity, SO2, NOx, and CO2 and the four inputs are heat, sulfur, labor, and capital.
The translog production function imposes four constraints on the estimation: homogeneous of
degree one in output, homogeneous of degree zero in second-order output terms and cross
interactive terms between output and inputs, respectively; and symmetry of second-order output
and output and input terms, respectively. See Section 4.6 of the dissertation for details. In this
case, there are 57 total terms to be estimated for the translog production function, 56 parameters
and one constant.
The second step is to calculate the values for the output distance function based on the
parameter estimates obtained from the first step for each observation, i.e., a value of the distance
19

I sincerely give my thanks to Dr. Swinton for generously providing his program code and cheerful attitude.
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function is calculated for each plant for each year. The third step is to calculate the shadow price
for the undesirable outputs. T from the derivative of output distance function with respect to one
of the undesirable outputs given inputs, outputs, and the price of electricity.
The parameter estimates obtained are presented in Appendix C. The empirical output
distance functions are calculated based on the estimated parameters. Table 5.2 lists each plant’s
output distance function estimates for each year during the Phase I time period, 1995-1999. The
values of the distance function estimates provides estimates of the relative production efficiency
for each plant. Relative efficiency means that the production frontier is fitted to the data set
collected for this study. The frontier represents the best operating results observed; the results
would most likely be different if data for other time periods were used in the estimation
procedures.
Table 5.2 Distance Function Estimates by Plant by Year

Plant
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

1995
0.7961
0.9975
0.7749
0.9098
0.8148
0.8720
0.7985
0.3767
0.7502
0.8826
1.0000
0.9669
0.7359
0.7751
1.0000
1.0000

1996
0.9037
0.8740
0.6430
0.8839
0.7796
1.0000
0.9587
1.0000
0.6737
0.4568
0.6160
0.9234
0.4700
0.9996
0.7054
0.9537

1997
0.8907
0.7962
0.6367
0.8377
0.8489
0.9380
0.9987
0.8472
0.6678
0.5137
0.6548
0.8560
0.4687
0.8569
0.7576
0.9810
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1998
0.9064
0.8708
0.7127
0.8131
0.8326
0.9885
0.9647
0.9108
0.6292
0.4917
0.6561
0.9130
0.4694
0.7372
0.6964
0.8776

1999
0.9588
0.9049
0.7374
0.8247
0.8609
1.0000
0.9853
0.8990
0.6569
0.5666
0.6662
0.8801
0.4678
0.7257
0.5771
1.0000

A distance value of one indicates a plant operating at the production frontier (technically
efficient), while values less than one are inside the frontier and indicate inefficient operations for
the specified time period. As noted, the efficiency estimates would likely be different for
different data.20 The efficiency measure is equivalent to the inverse of Farrell’s radial efficiency
measure (Farrell 1957). The values in Table 5.2 provide a comparison among plants for a given
year or changes across time for a given plant. For example, there are five points that lie on the
production frontier in Table 5.2. Plants 2, 11, 15, and 16 operated on the production frontier for
1995 while Plants 6 and 8 did so for 1996 and Plants 6 and 16 for 1999. There were no frontier
points for the years of 1997 and 1998. Several plants operated near the frontier as shown in the
table. Values of the output distance functions less than 1 indicate the extent of inefficiency; one
minus the output distance function times the potential output on the frontier is the required
increase in production to be efficient. Take for example, the lowest value for Plant 16 in 1995 of
0.3767, which indicates that the plant would have to increase its current electricity production by
62% of potential output to reach production efficiency. The overall weighted average (weighted
by each plant’s electricity production) of the output distance functions across firms and time
periods is 0.8391. The electricity production for all plants in this sample must be increased by
about 16%, on average, of potential output if all plants are to operate on the frontier of the
production possibility set (a total output increase of about 20% of current levels).
Possible explanations for fluctuations in estimated distance function values for a given
plant in Phase I primarily relate to operating efficiency reflected in inputs, i.e., heat or/and
20

Swinton (p.234, 2004) gives an explanation about relative efficiency. He states that if all of the plants are
somewhere below the production frontier then the estimated distance function value provides relative measures of
efficiency. Because all of the plants face some state regulation it is unlikely that any of the observations are on the
production frontier. This explanation is not accurate because, if all of plants face the regulation all of them should
respond to the regulation and make decisions on their production choices. Some may operate efficiently while others
may not. The empirical fitting of the output distance function can reflect these plants’ responses from the data set.
The relative efficiency is an empirical concept from the data envelope analysis approach.
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output, i.e., electricity fluctuations21. Much of this will relate to long term operations and
scheduled maintenance decisions. Some variation may also be due to the panel data used in the
study which includes 16 plants in the first phase of five years. Another reason may be that only a
limited range of factors are explicitly included in the model; others are ignored. For example,
plant age and capacity affect efficiency but are not explicitly considered. Although each plant
consists of two or more generating units, FERC Form 1 only provides plant level data, e.g., year
originally constructed and date last unit installed. It is not possible to obtain this data at the
generating unit level. Appendix D lists basic information (capacity, year of the earliest
generating units built, and the year of latest generating unit installed) for the plants considered in
this study.
5.3.2 Shadow Values of Undesirable Outputs

Estimation of the output distance function is not the primary purpose of this study. The
focus is to derive shadow prices of undesirable outputs from coal-generating power plants
through the slope of the production possibility frontier. The slope of the production frontier
curve in traditional production economics is the rate of substitution between two desirable
(normal) outputs or production transformation given the input vector. The slope of the
production frontier here reflects the trade off between the desirable output and the undesirable
output. Assume the price of the desirable output is known (given by market price). The shadow
value of the undesirable output is then the ratio of the derivative of D(x,u) with respect to one of
the specified undesirable outputs and the electricity output times the price of electricity as
described in equation (3.6.11). The shadow values for the three undesirable outputs, SO2, NO x ,

21

An attempt to plot heat and electricity against estimated distance function value for each plant in Phase I did not
reveal any pattern of relationship.
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and CO2, are calculated. The shadow values of CO2 are much lower than those of SO2 and NOx
and may deserve further analysis in the future. Here the analytical focus is on the shadow values
of SO2 and NO x .

5.3.2.1 Shadow Values of SO2

Shadow prices of SO2 reported in Table 5.3 vary greatly from plant to plant. Overall the
shadow values range from nearly zero (virtually unconstrained negative outputs) to $7,426 per
ton. The lowest shadow values, Plant 4 for all years except 1995, range from $0.01 to $10.04
while the highest values for Plant 11 range from $2486 to $7426. These shadow prices can be
viewed as estimates of the virtual abatement cost for each plant. This empirical work attempts to
evaluate the performance of the power plants, especially those listed in Table 1 for Phase I of the
1990 CAAA.
Of the total 41 units in 16 plants, 14 units in six plants were listed in Table 1. Since the
data used in the study can not be separated at the unit level, plants that have Table I unit(s) are
indicated as Table I plants, i.e., plants 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, and 12. Of these, two plants, 11 and 13,
have implemented SO2 emission control measures. Plants 7, 8, 13, and 14 are substitution plants
in Phase I and only Plant 13 has taken control measures. Plants 11 and 13 use wet line flue gas
desulfurization (scrubbers) and Plant 12 uses wet limestone. Plant 11 has three units; all have
installed scrubbers. Details of plant status in Phase I are included as Appendix B. From plantyear unit estimations of shadow prices for SO2 (each entry in Table 5.3), the lowest estimated
shadow prices of SO2 for the 1995 to 1999 period are for Plant 4 and seem low while the highest
are for Plant 11 and are unexpectedly high. The estimated shadow values the other plants are in
the range of reasonable values.
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Table 5.3 SO2 Shadow Prices Per Ton by Plant and Year

Plant
1995
c
1 -135.65
2 c -189.56
3c
-60.22
a
4
-0.0066
5 c -117.68
6 a -165.42
7 b -227.92
8 b -0.9156
9 a -0.0002
10 a -6.6028
11a -2486.43
12 a -129.57
13b -116.07
14 b 0.0001
15 c
-41.83
c
16
-41.59
Average -119.18
Note:

1996
1997
-442.51 -467.77
-571.36 -462.56
-71.83 -205.21
-2.02
-5.33
-395.60 -478.62
-224.70 -239.98
-751.77 -790.47
-95.50 -121.13
-90.17
-59.99
-46.55
-50.37
-3182.70 -7425.89
-78.31 -200.07
-318.33 -238.67
-87.91 -100.64
-185.87 -206.27
-227.20 -120.96
-261.07 -297.77

1998
1999
-468.29 -259.80
-550.46 -316.40
-273.32 -159.10
-5.13
-10.04
-450.97 -238.64
-260.80 -278.59
-772.72 -390.63
-114.23
-61.24
-68.67
-58.19
-56.54
-39.08
-7146.36 -5042.32
-187.20 -175.33
-236.30 -177.88
-72.03 -152.67
-100.01 -162.67
-130.58 -191.39
-303.66 -204.60

a

indicates Table 1 units;
Substitution units in Phase I;
c
Phase II units.
b

Differences in SO2 shadow prices among plants can be explained if a plant installs the
scrubber (formally scrubber is the nickname for flu-gas desulfurization equipment to reduce SO2
emissions). If a scrubber is installed in the boiler unit, the abatement cost is reflected in a much
higher shadow price than if scrubbers are not installed. Although there are different types of
scrubber technologies, in all cases the installation of a scrubber represents a large capital
investment. Plant 11 (Harrison) has three units; all of three units have scrubbers installed, while
Plant 4 (Kammer) with the lowest average shadow price for SO2 did not install scrubbers for its
three units even though all three units were listed in Table 1 for Phase I. Plant 4 has the lowest
abatement cost. Conversely, it has the highest SO2 emission rates among the 16 plants ranging
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from 5.50 to 5.086 lb per mmBtu. Kammer was allocated 54,127 allowances22 while its 1995
emissions were 122,193 tons and, thus, short by 68,066 allowance units. The plant opted for the
second option, buy enough allowances to fill the shortage gap between the allocation of
allowances and generated SO2. This is discussed in more detail in Section 5.4.
The last row of Table 5.3 shows the weighted average yearly shadow values for WV
plants. Note also that, in most cases, the shadow prices for 1995 are lower than for other years.
5.3.2.2 Shadow Values of NOx

The shadow prices for NO x reported in Table 5.4 provide estimates of the marginal
abatement cost for each ton of NO x removed by plant each year. Each plant can use this
information as an evaluation tool as an approximate abatement cost for each year. For this study
each entry in Table 5.4 represents an observation as a plant-year unit. The shadow values of
NOx vary from $0 (Plant 10 and 14 in year of 1995, Plant 16 in year of 1998) to $818.5 (Plant 8
in year of 1996). When compared to the estimates of shadow values of SO2, the shadow values
of NOx overall are much lower. The highest shadow price is $818.5 for NOx while the highest is
$7426 for SO2. The annual average shadow values of NOx across plants (last row of Table 5.4)
are lower than those of SO2 (last row of Table 5.3).

22

Each allowance represents one ton of SO2 gas. The calculation of SO2 allowance for each plant in operation in
1985 is based on the average heat input of the plant for the years of 1985, 1986, and 1987.
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Table 5.4 Estimated NOx Shadow Prices by Plant and Year of 1995-1999

Plant name
Plant
Amos, John E
1a
Clinch River
2
Glen Lyn
3a
Kammer
4
Kanawha River
5
Mitchell
6a
Mountaineer
7a
Phil Sporn
8
Albright
9a
Ft Martin
10
Harrison
11a
Mt. Storm
12b
Pleasants
13a
Rivesville
14 a
Willow Island
15
R. Paul Smith
16a
Average
Note:

a
b

1995
-171.52
-41.99
-132.45
-0.0001
-21.29
-244.47*
-222.04
-404.06*
-76.72
0.0001
-0.2719
-91.59
-28.53
0.0000
-3.54
-99.40
-110.06

1996
-364.20*
-118.04
0.0001
-3.26
-80.92
-95.51
-738.90*
-818.45*
-314.74*
-38.60
-96.00
-142.36
-141.03
-91.98
-38.76
-360.42*
-227.87

1997
-310.75*
-92.96
-261.19*
-1.83
-82.55
-261.61*
-722.87*
-112.93
-217.42
-29.39
-46.14
-85.98
-79.74
-47.81
-41.95
-167.34
-145.06

1998
-472.74*
-108.92
-310.37*
-2.97
-74.04
-253.63*
-673.78*
-161.36
-151.51
-48.03
-52.41
-175.58
-106.93
-21.44
-0.00001
-125.28
-184.10

1999
-239.58*
-106.03
-138.68
-27.09
-54.85
-233.72*
-315.86*
-116.21
-155.01
-24.42
-29.62
-176.18
-76.10
-58.39
-39.51
-240.68*
-125.72

indicates Phase 1 units with dry-bottom wall-fired boiler;
Plants with tangentially fired boiler in Phase I;

* indicates the abatement cost per ton of NO x is higher than the average
abatement cost $227 for all of Phase I units reported by US EPA.
It is possible to examine potential relationships in the shadow values of SO2 and NOx.
Regulators and economists try to understand correlations to minimize total abatement cost when
several pollutants are reduced simultaneously (EIA 2000). This is also a motivation of this study
to include multiple pollutants into the output distance function. The annual average shadow
values for NOx (last row in Table 5.4) are lower than those for SO2 (last row in Table 5.3). As
reported in Appendix A, the data collected for this study show that the control/abatement
technology for these two air pollutants is different. For SO2 emission control the plant can install
“scrubbers” while for NOx control power plants change coal burning technology by installing
low-NOx burners. In Phase I two types of boilers are targeted by NOx emission limits. Another
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control measure for SO2 is to switch from high sulfur coal to low sulfur coal to reduce emissions;
this measure was not observed in West Virginia power plants during the study period.
The regulatory requirements for reduction of NOx emissions are more complicated than
for SO2 emission reductions. NOx is regulated under two provisions of the 1990 Clean Air
Amendments Act, Title IV and Title I. A key component of the acid rain provisions outlined in
Title IV is a two million ton per year reduction of NO x emissions from coal-fired boilers.
Unlike the SO2 cap-and-trade program, the reduction of NO x is also required in Title I of the
1990 CAAA. Title I targets NOx emissions to control ozone problems while Title IV deals with
stationary NOx emissions reduction, Title I is for non-stationary source NOx emissions that are
mostly from off- and on-road vehicles. The two provisions in the 1990 CAAA resulted in two
major programs, different except for Southern California’s Regional Clean Air Incentive Market.
They are the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC) NO x Budget Program under Title I and NO x
State Implementation Plan (SIP) Call Program under Title IV. The OTC NO x Budget Program
was created by Congress to develop a regional strategy to enable the Northeast corridor (see
Footnote 22) to achieve compliance with the ozone standard. The states that belong to the
commission cooperated in the development of emission rate standards for NO x and volatile
organic compounds (VOC) from point sources (as well as harmonizing compliance strategies for
mobile sources). The OTC NO x Budget Program originally had three phases: Phase I was the
preexisting emissions rate standards required by Title I of the 1990 CAAA, Phase II marked the
beginning of the cap-and-trade policy and was to run from 1999 to 2002, and the third phase was
to begin in 2003. By 2003, the emission cap would represent an approximate 70% reduction
from the five-month summer emissions of 490,000 tons in 1990 by the affected sources. The
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third phase has been replaced by the NO x SIP Call Program. The states23 included in the NO x
OTC budget program represented only a portion of the eastern United States affected
significantly by transboundary movements of NO x . In late 1997, under Section 110 of the 1990
CAAA, EPA exercised its authority to require states to impose restrictions on electricity
generators and industrial sources of NO x emissions to help downwind states comply with ozone
standards. The rule is known as the NO x SIP Call, because it called on states to revise their
state implementation plans that outline their strategies for complying with federal ambient air
standards. The NO x SIP Call assigns each state a summertime NO x emission budget for large
point sources. These programs of SIP Call and OTC Budget Program incorporate the cap-totrade to reduce NOx emissions to be implemented in 1999, 2003, or later. The results are varied
and complex and are not discussed further.
The reduction of NO x required by Title IV of is 1990 CAAA was implemented through
the Acid Rain Program. The goal of the Acid Rain Program is to reduce two million tons of
NO x from 1980 emission levels from coal-fired power plants.24 Approximately 90 percent of
total stationary NO x emissions in 1980 came from coal-fired electric utility power plants. As
with the SO2 emission reduction requirements, the NO x program was implemented in two
phases; Phase I began in 1996, one year later than the beginning year of the SO2 Phase I.
However, the NO x program does not "cap" NO x emissions as the SO2 program does, nor does it
23

These states are CT, DC, DE, MA, MD, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, and VT.
Title IV specifies a two-part strategy to reduce emissions from coal-fired electric power plants. The first stage of
the program, promulgated April 13, 1995, will reduce annual NOx emissions in the United States by over 400,000

24

tons per year between 1996 and 1999 (Phase I), and by approximately 1.17 million tons per year beginning in the
year 2000 (Phase II). These reductions are achieved by coal-fired dry bottom wall-fired boilers and tangentially fired
boilers (Group 1). The total annual cost of this regulation to the electric utility industry is estimated at $267 million,
resulting in an overall cost-effectiveness of $227 per ton of NOx removed.
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initially utilize an allowance trading system. The program directly targets two sets of boilers to
meet the NOx emission limits: dry-bottom wall-fired boilers and tangentially fired boilers (which
were already targeted for Phase I SO2 reductions). Dry-bottom wall-fired boilers were required
to meet a limit of 0.50 lbs of NO x per mmBtu averaged over the year, while tangentially fired
boilers had to achieve a limitation of 0.45 lbs of NO x per mmBtu, again averaged over the year.
Plants 1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, and 16 are dry-bottom wall-fired while only Plant 12 is
tangentially fired. For the former type of plant, seven have taken NOx control measures by using
low NOx burner technology; Plants 14 and 16 are exceptions. Plant 12 uses low NOx-closecoupled overfire air (OFA) technology.
The estimated shadow values for NOx for dry-bottom wall-fired plants that have also
taken pollution control are higher than those of plants are not under the regulation of NOx Phase
I. The exceptions are for Plant 16 in the NOx Phase I which did not adopt control measure and
Plant 8 which was not required to adopt by the regulation. Plant 12 has higher shadow values
than those that are not regulated but lower than those of dry-bottom wall-fired plants.
5.3.2.3 Shadow Values of CO2

Reduction of CO2 is not required in Title IV of 1990 CAAA but a subject included
because of the increased interest in global warming effects. The estimated shadow values of CO2
for the WV power plants are reported in Table 5.5.
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Table 5.5 Estimated CO2 Shadow Prices by Plant and Year of 1995-1999

Plant name
Plant
1995
Amos, John E
1 -4.3744
Clinch River
2 -1.4458
Glen Lyn
3 -3.0632
Kammer
4 -0.0237
Kanawha
5 -0.8760
River
Mitchell
6 -5.2633
Mountaineer
7 -5.2777
Phil Sporn
8 -10.4311
Albright
9 -1.3564
Ft Martin
10
0.0000
Harrison
11 -0.0003
Mt. Storm
12 -1.9722
Pleasants
13 -0.0001
Rivesville
14
0.0000
Willow Island
15 -0.2955
R. Paul Smith
16 -1.9977
Average
-2.5537

1996
-8.6254
-3.2505
0.0000
-0.0853
-2.2105

1997
-7.5715
-2.6281
-5.4538
-0.0298
-2.3310

1998
-10.7583
-3.0229
-6.5992
-0.0013
-2.0932

1999
-5.4953
-2.6138
-2.9688
-0.4718
-1.4024

-1.6201 -5.7477
-16.1026 -15.9160
-20.5380 -3.0560
-5.3572 -3.5972
-0.3997 -0.3718
-1.6137 -0.6515
-3.0119 -1.6384
-0.8522 -0.1422
-1.3024 -0.4127
-0.7802 -0.9868
-6.3271 -2.9589
-4.7460 -3.4717

-5.6057
-14.6777
-4.0906
-2.1624
-0.7266
-0.7775
-3.7264
-0.7542
-0.2738
-0.0001
-1.8491
-4.2562

-5.1317
-6.8046
-2.6503
-2.6617
-0.2970
-0.3734
-3.6432
-0.3552
-0.7897
-0.6454
-4.0286
-2.7230

Compared to the shadow values of SO2 and NOx, the shadow values of CO2 are low.
There are two reasons to explain the values. First, CO2 emission reduction is not required by
Title IV of 1990 CAAA, so the abatement technology is not in place for WV power plants and
not reflected in the data. The estimated shadow values of CO2 can still be good indicator for WV
power plants to self evaluate their virtual abatement cost for CO2 if they are required to make
small reductions in CO2 under the current production technology and emission control
conditions.
5.3.2.3 Phase I Average Shadow Values of SO2, NOx, and CO2

The preceding sections discuss the shadow values of SO2, NOx, and CO2 in terms of
plant-year units under Phase I for West Virginia plants. This section turns to the five-year
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averages of the output distance function, shadow prices of SO2 and NO x , and emission levels of
SO2 and NO x for each plant (see Table 5.6).
The five-year average output distance values vary from 0.4 (Plant 13) to 1.0 (Plant 16)
and with an overall mean of 0.7944. These averages are weighted by the five-year average
electricity output.
The five-year average shadow values for SO2 range from $4.50 per ton (Plant 4) to
$5058.77 per ton (Plant 11). The average emission rate between these two plants exhibits an
inverse relationship. Plant 11 has the lowest emission rate (0.128 lb per mmBtu) while Plant 4
has the highest five-year emission rate (5.51 lb per mmBtu), far beyond the 2.5 lb per mmBtu
cap for Phase I. All plants, except Plant 4, have emission rates below the cap. The overall mean
shadow value of SO2 is $239.81.
The shadow prices of NO x for plants vary from $0 to $818.45. Generally, there is again
an inverse relationship between shadow values and emission rates, i.e., the lower the average
emission rate for a given plant, the higher the shadow prices of NO x . The emission rate
for NO x , however, is complex. As noted, emission reductions of NO x in Phase I target two
types of boilers, dry bottom wall-fired (DB) boilers and tangentially fired boilers. The emission
limit for dry bottom wall-fired boilers is 0.45 lb per mmBtu while it is 0.50 lb per mmBtu for
tangentially fired boilers. Table I plants,25 as indicated by “a,” except Plant 12 are of the DB
type. Detailed information is listed in Appendix B. The emission rates for Plants 4, 6, 9, 10, and
11 should be 0.45 lb per mmBtu since they use the same burner technology, while Plant 12
should be 0.5 lb per mmBtu. Plant 16’s emissions were less than the cap while other plants

25

Table 1 plants are accurate but approximate while Table 1 units are designated by Title IV of 1990 CAAA.
Because the estimation is based on plant data, the analysis can only be reported in terms of plants, not units.
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exceeded the Phase I cap. The inverse relationship between shadow values and emissions rates (high
shadow values correspond with low emission rates, and vice versa) was also reported in Swinton’s studies
(Coggins and Swinton 1996, Swinton 1998, 2002, 2004).

Table 5.6 Estimated Phase I Mean Shadow Prices; Emissions of SO2, NOx, and CO2; and
Output Distance Function by Plant

Plant name
Amos, John E
Clinch River
Glen Lyn
Kammer
Kanawha River
Mitchell
Mountaineer
Phil Sporn
Albright
Ft Martin
Harrison
Mt. Storm
Pleasants
Rivesville
Willow Island
R. Paul Smith
Average
a

Plant Distance Shadow Price ($/ton)
SO2
CO2
NO x
1c
2c
3c
4a
5c
6a
7b
8b
9a
10 a
11a
12 a
13b
14 b
15 c
16 c

0. 85
-355.26 -362.36
0. 89
-418.38 -389.01
0. 71
-154.19 -168.56
0. 97
-4.50
-4.50
0. 82
-337.84 -319.02
0. 94
-233.97 -249.74
0. 96
-587.71 -586.55
0. 73
-78.66 -159.08
0. 74
-55.35 -70.73
0. 35
-39.88 -38.57
0. 47
-5058.77 -4563.13
0. 93
-154.10 -146.50
0. 40
-217.47 -199.95
0. 78
-83.07 -83.07
0. 90
-139.42 -131.80
1
-142.74 -154.12
0. 7944 -239.81 -168.91

-7.37
-2.59
-3.62
-0.12
-1.79
-4.68
-11.77
-8.15
-3.03
-0.36
-0.68
-2.80
-0.42
-0.55
-0.54
-3.44
-3.84

Mean Emission (lb/mmbtu)
SO2
CO2
NO x
1.30
1.19
1.62
5.51
1.276
1.32
1.09
2.27
2.44
2.43
0.13
1.991
1.08
1.58
1.99
1.49

0.51
1.19
0.46
1.41
0.74
0.48
0.43
1.03
0.55
0.76
0.51
0.75
0.43
0.59
0.87
0.35

151.57
183.29
190.01
212.98
119.21
196.67
156.29
200.96
229.76
170.11
196.86
199.51
228.08
176.14
180.28
154.96

indicates Table 1 units;
Substitution and compensation units in Phase I;
c
Phase II units.
b

5.3.2.4 Comparison with Other Studies

EPA declared the allowance trading policy a success when the Phase I trading of SO2
allowance was concluded at the end of 1999. A comparison can now be made between the
performance of WV plants and the EPA annual spot auction results. An interesting comparison
is the relationship of the abatement cost of WV plants to auction clearing prices and to the
estimated shadow prices of SO2 for all of Table I units (Swinton 2004). From Table 5.7, for the
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first year of Phase I, the average estimated shadow prices for WV plants were lower than the
clearing prices in the allowance market while for the remaining four years, the shadow prices for
WV plants were higher than the clearing prices.
Table 5.7 Comparisons of WV Plants to EPA Annual Spot Auction Results and Table 1
Units of SO2

Auction Allowances
year
sold
1995
50600
1996
150000
1997
150000
1998
150000
1999
150010

Successful Clearing WV avg.
bids
price1
shadow value
46
$130.00
$119.18
47
$66.05
$261.07
23
$106.75
$297.76
21
$115.01
$303.66
27
$200.55
$204.60

Table 1 units
avg. price2
$132.00
$68.14
$110.36
$116.96
$207.03

1

Source: EPA website http://www. epa.gov/airmarkets/emissions/index. html
Source: Swinton (2004): Phase I Completed: An Empirical Assessment of
the 1990 CAAA. Environmental and Resource Economics 27: 227–246, 2004

2

Next, compare the average shadow values of WV plants to those of all of the 110 Table I
units estimated by Swinton (2004). The same pattern emerges. These differences can guide WV
plants in achieving economic gains, either by participating in the allowance market or adopting
alternative abatement technologies. A third comparison between market clearing prices in the
allowance market with estimated abatement costs of Table I units shows the convergence.
5.4 Evaluation and Interpretation for WV Power Plants

Based on the estimation results reported, further analysis of the performance of WV
power plants in Phase I can consider emission reductions, participation in the allowance market,
and cost savings. The evaluations of the emission reduction performances for SO2 and NO x for
WV power plants in Phase I are considered separately because they fall under different
regulatory programs, have different measures for emissions reduction, and require different
abatement equipment. The evaluations include emission reductions and economic performance.
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5.4.1 Evaluation of SO2 Reduction Performance
5.4.1.1 Emissions Reductions

The overall national assessment of Phase I SO2 emissions reductions was considered a
success (EPA 2000; Stavins 1998, 2003; Burtraw et al. 2005). Total SO2 emissions in 1995, the
first year of the program, was 11.87 million tons – 25% below 1990 levels and more than 35%
below 1980 levels. For affected utilities (the dirtiest 110 plants in the Title IV list plus early
reduction or substitute units) emissions were set at 2.5 lb. mmBtu, equivalent to about 6.9
million tons annually in Phase 1. Total emissions from affected units were well below annual
allocations throughout the Phase I period. The unused allowances yielded a bank totaling nearly
11.6 million allowances by the end of Phase I (McClean 2000; Burtraw et al. 2005). The
emission reductions of SO2 and NO x in WV presented the same pattern. The emission
reductions by affected power plants in WV under Title IV of Phase I is presented in Table 5.8.
Table 5.8 Performance Comparison of SO2 Emission Reductions by WV Plants

State
S&C
Units*
Table I

SO2 Emissions (Tons)
Number
1985
1990
1995 of Units
78667 804062 436885
22
8
62244
62929
63914
8

Emission Reductions
(tons)
% change
349793
-44.5%
1670

2.7%

72443 741133 372971
14
351463
-48.5%
4
* S & C units represent substitute and compensation units in Phase I.

5.4.1.2 Participation in the SO2 Allowance Market

The economic performance of the affected power plants in Phase I has been the focus of
numerous studies (Hahn 1989; Joskow et al. 1998; Schmalensee et al. 1998; Carlson et al. 2000;
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Burtraw et al. 2005). These studies examined the allowance market trading, participation of the
affected electric plants, trading parties, and trading volumes.
Aggregate annual caps on national SO2 emissions from affected coal-generating
electricity units are specified in Title IV of 1990 CAAA. These caps define the number of
emissions allowances issued for use in each year. An emission unit is the right to emit one ton of
SO2 into the atmosphere. An affected source covered by the statute must have enough
allowances to cover its annual emissions at the end of each year during Phase I. Title IV has also
created a pollution permit market for SO2 with the purpose of giving the affected sources the
flexibility to choose the best tools for pollution reduction at the least or less costs. The nature of
the allowance market or pollution market is noticeably different and requires clarification. It is
obvious that the allowance market is not a common commodity market. There are several
features that are different from standard markets. First, the commodity is not a purely welldefined good or service but is one created by the legislature. Second, the maximum amount of
the commodity and the issuance are set by the legislature or a designated authority. Third, the
distribution of the commodity is decided by the government. In the SO2 allowance trading case,
the initial distribution of the allowance is free as endowments to the polluting firms. Fourth, the
commodities final destination is back to the agency that issues them. Therefore, the pollution
allowance market, also paraphrased as market-based pollution control policy, is a hybrid market.
In practice, such markets are still in their infancy and need time to grow and mature.
To the extent that plants participate, trading is one indicator of whether the allowance
market achieves its policy goal – cost savings. Allowance trading includes EPA’s annual auction
and private transactions where different firms and organizations buy or sell allowances. Because
SO2 allowance trading is the centerpiece of Title IV, several studies have scrutinized SO2
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allowance trading by power plants for the pre-Phase I, Phase I, and the on-going Phase II
periods. These studies examined how the market performed and if it resulted in cost savings.
Here participation of WV power plants is examined. The records from EPA auction data
show that all WV plants in the Table 1 list started buying allowances in 1993 and 1994, two
years before Phase I started. These allowances were for use in 1995, the first year of mandated
Phase I compliance. EPA first followed the guidance laid out in Title IV in 1993 and that year
held 2.8% of allowances auctioned by the Chicago Board of Trade to help jump-start market
exchange.26 This portion of the annual allowance auction was held by EPA through the entire
Phase I period. Two types of auctions were administered by EPA, a spot auction and a futures
auction. The spot auction sells the current year allowances for use at the end of the same year as
the auction is held (the auctions held in 1993 and 1994 for 1995 allowances before Phase I began
were also called spot auctions in order to distinguish them from futures auctions). The futures
auction includes 6-year and 7-year advance auctions so that the allowances can be first used 6 or
7 years after the year the allowances are purchased.27 All WV power plants, including nonPhase I plants in this study, participated in the 1993 auction, purchasing allowances for the year
2000, which was the first year of Phase II that required all power plants to comply with the SO2
emissions reduction program. It is notable that all affected plants in WV participated in both
spot and future auctions. As for the volume of allowance auctions, the total expenditures for the
allowance auction divided by the clearing price of each year are used to approximate the number
of allowances traded. The allowances bought among 16 WV power plants ranged from 26 to
550 units (one unit of allowance is one ton of SO2 emissions).

26
27

Joskow, Schmalensee, and Bailey (1998) reported the first allowance trades were in May 1992.
For more details on allowance auctions and trading see Joskow, Schmalensee, and Bailey (1998)
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Private trading is permitted in addition to EPA’s annual auction. A firm or broker can
offer to sell allowances while other firms and organizations can buy them. An important feature
of buying allowances designed in Title IV is to allow non electric-generating organizations to
buy allowances, e.g., environmental groups or individuals that may choose to retire the
allowances from the market after purchase. In this case, the total allowances available would be
reduced which would reduce the total allowed emissions from polluting plants resulting in
additional environmental quality improvement. Active participation in the market by WV power
plants indicates that they had a positive expectation for allowance trading, even though the
evidence from the trading market through EPA’s auction showed the transactions to be relatively
small at the beginning of the program in 1995. At the national level, the volume of SO2
allowance trading between economically distinct parties in the first three years of Phase I
roughly doubled each year compared to the previous year (Burtraw et al. 2005). The data on
private trading show that WV power plants actively took part in private transactions in the
market while the trading partners varied from power companies to brokerage companies. A
summary of the trading behavior of WV power plants during Phase I is included as Table 5.9.
The 1’s in Table 5.9 indicate that purchase or sale of allowances occurred in the specified year
by a given plant. Since an advance auction exists, the plants’ buying or selling allowances for
future years of Phase I also are counted as market activities in Table 5.9. Trading activities for
Phase II and beyond are excluded. The observed trading patterns of WV plants include both
sellers and buyers (Albright and Mitchell, etc.), either buyers (Kammer) or sellers (Harrison), or
neither buyers nor sellers (Clinch River, Glen Lyn, Kanawha and Mountaineer). Note that the
three plants that did not participate in the market were not covered by Phase I regulations.
Therefore, they did not need to respond to the allowance market. The plants covered by Phase I
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not only participated in EPA’s annual auctions in 1993 and 1994 before Phase I and all five years
of Phase I, but also participated in private trading.
Table 5.9 Allowance Transactions by WV Power Plants in Phase I

Year

1994 1995
B S B S
Albright*
1 1
Fort Martin*
1 1 1
Harrison*
1
1
John E Amos
1
Kammer*
1
Mitchell*
1
1
Mount Storm* 1 1 1
Phil Sporn
Pleasants
1 1
Rivesville
1
Willow Island
1
R. Paul Smith
1

1996
B S
1 1
1 1
1
1 1
1
1 1
1 1

1997
B S
1 1
1 1
1
1
1

1998
B S
1 1
1 1
1
1
1

1
1

1
1
1
1

1
1
1 1
1

1 1
1 1
1

1999
B S
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1 1
1 1
1

* indicates plant is in Table I list of Phase I.
B = buy allowances
S = sell allowances
1 = either selling or buying activity occurred
Source: http://oaspub.epa.gov/pls/ats/atr and
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/tracking/ats/transactions.html
Note: the allowance trading includes EPA’s annual auctions and private transactions. The
transactions analyzed in this table are private transactions. The year of 1993 did not have any
private allowance sales in the market (Joskow, Schmalensee, and Bailey 1998).
Participation in allowance markets includes buying and selling future years allowances.
Clinch River and Glen Lyn did not participate in private transactions in Phase I. Plant R.P.Smith
did buy allowances at the yearly auction in 1995, 1996, and 1997, respectively, and used
allowances at the end of the same year they bought to cover their emissions. R.P.Smith also
bought future allowances in 1998 and 1999 for future years of Phase II and after Phase II28; it
28

US EPA hold two types of SO2 allowance auction, spot auction and advance auction. EPA held allowance auction
starting in 1993 for the first year, 1995, of Phase I and advance auction for the year of 2000. Since 1994, EPA has
spot allowance auction and 6- and 7-year advance allowance auctions.
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sold in Phase I and sold future allowances for Phase II and after Phase II. This behavior signals
the complications in trading, either they really need allowances in different years or they use the
transactions to reduce abatement costs. However the firm reacts as a market player in the
allowance market and minimizes its abatement cost. On the other hand, Kammer bought
allowances in all five years of Phase I to be used for each year in Phase I. Kammer purchased
344,546 total allowances. Kanawha did not buy allowances in Phase I but bought for 2001,
2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005. Harrison, Kanawha and Albright did not buy allowances from
private parties in Phase I, only from EPA auctions. Fort Martin sold allowances in four out of
six years from 1994 to 1999. Mountaineer sold future allowances beyond Phase I.
The activities of two plants are worth special notice. Large volumes of trading took place
at the two extremes. Plant 4, which had the highest emissions rate for SO2 (5.5 lb per mmBtu),
bought allowances in all five years in Phase I totaling 34,356 allowances purchased and the
allowances were used each year as designated redemption in Phase I; it did not have any sales of
allowances. On the other hand, Plant 11 had the lowest emission rate (0.128 lb per mmBtu) and
sold allowances in the Phase I years but did not purchase allowances. Their trading behaviors
were rational among the choices faced.
5.4.1.3 Cost Effectiveness and Efficiency

Since the SO2 allowance market is the centerpiece of Title IV, evaluation criteria to
measure the success of the market include cost effectiveness and efficiency compared to
command-and-control policy and emission charges. Estimation of cost savings under Title IV
have been the focus of many studies at the macro-level since the initial proposal with the debate
on SO2 allowance trading; see Hahn 1989, Burtraw 1995, Schmalensee et al. 1998, Joskow et al.
1998, Lile and Burtraw 1998, Burtraw et al. 2005. The concept of cost effectiveness has several
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different meanings in the context of pollution control policy. One is the common sense
interpretation that market mechanisms allow trading to set the clearing price resulting in the
optimum allocation of resources to control pollution. Another is the cost savings when
allowance trading is used in pollution control compared with costs using taxes or the commandand-control approach. The last is the cost savings when the actual observed allowance clearing
price is compared to the estimated/expected allowance price before the allowance market. For
the last one, the evidence after Phase I came into effect indicated that the early allowance (prePhase I) price was too low as expected. Therefore, early studies claimed that the cost saving was
much larger than expected. In this study cost effectiveness is based on the first of the two
meanings described above using a micro-level analysis. More specifically, the analysis focuses
on the plants participating in the allowance market over other alternatives available to help them
comply with Title IV requirements.
The empirical results indicated an inverse relationship between the estimated shadow
value and the actual emission rate for WV power plants. Several similar studies (Coggins and
Swinton 1996; Swinton 1998, 2002, 2004) also show the same relationship. An explanation of
the relationship and a plant’s response offers some insight into the evaluation of the performance
of WV power plants in Phase I.
The estimated shadow values of SO2 can be used in the analysis in several ways. One
can compare the shadow value to the allowance clearing price and then make an evaluation.
Swinton (2004) did an analysis based on all Phase I plants. Swinton’s assertion about a firm’s
economic rationale is that a firm should buy (sell) allowances if its shadow value of SO2 is
higher (lower) than the clearing trading price in SO2 allowance market. Conceptually, this
criterion is correct but not the only one used in empirical analysis. For the SO2 allowance,
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trading in Phase I was only one mechanism used to comply with SO2 emissions requirements for
SO2 while other options, e.g., installation of scrubbers, switching from high sulfur coal to low
sulfur coal, or internalizing/averaging emissions, are also available. The decision of a firm to
either buy or sell allowances requires that they analyze the alternatives carefully and thoroughly.
For example, the Krammer Plant is the highest rate emitter of SO2 (5.5lb per mmBtu) but has the
lowest shadow value of SO2 ($4.5 per ton) as reported in Table 5.6 of Section 5.4. This plant
bought allowances in all five years of Phase I but, based on Swinton’s criterion, the plant should
have sold allowances instead. However, if this plant had sold its allowances in the market, its
SO2 emissions would have exceeded the allowed levels and it would have been subject to fines
imposed by the law ($2,000 per ton). For this plant, it not only needed to use all of its
allowances to cover its standard emission requirement in Phase I but needed more allowances to
cover actual emissions which were higher than the standard emission rate. The other choice for
this plant was to install scrubbers for its three units. Why did it choose to buy allowances and
not to install scrubbers? To understand this, consider the shadow value of SO2 of the Harrison
Plant. Harrison’s shadow value is $5,058 since Harrison installed scrubbers in all three of its
units. Installation of scrubbers for the dirtiest plants was a mandatory requirement in the early
stages of the Acid Rain Program. The investment in scrubbers at that time was very high. Once
the scrubber is installed, the investment becomes part of the fixed costs of production. It also
explains why Harrison (Plant 11) sold allowances each year in all Phase I periods, because it had
the lowest emission rate (0.13 lb per mmBtu) among all of plants. Comparing the shadow value
of SO2 in a plant with a scrubber to the clearance price in the allowance market, it is clear that
buying allowances is cheaper than installing a scrubber. It is clear that Swinton’s criterion alone
cannot be used to judge a firm’s behavior in the SO2 allowance market, but that other conditions
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have to be considered to make a correct judgment. One caveat is in order. That is, the estimated
shadow value can be one of the opportunity costs for abatement but has to be analyzed in context
when there are alternative choices to control pollution. As Burturaw (1996, 2005) point out,
“There are a variety of mechanisms for compliance under Title IV in addition to allowance
trading including intrafirm reallocation of emission allowances, fuel switching and/or blending,
installing scrubbers (flue gas desulfurization), retiring plants, repowering plants, energy
conservation, reduced utilization and substitution among facilities.” Among these choices, the
plant operators tend to choose the cheapest way to meet the environmental regulation. Fuel
switching at a national level is estimated to have contributed to cost savings in reducing total SO2
emissions, but this was mainly in mid-western states when railroad deregulation greatly reduced
transportation costs.29 In West Virginia this was not the case; it is cheaper to use local coal. The
sulfur content of coal used in WV power plants was unchanged in Phase I. One also needs to be
aware of each unit’s age in a plant if a plant decides to install scrubbers or other pollution control
equipment.
The overall conclusion of this analysis is that power plants in WV participated in the
allowance market and made the best decision among the alternatives available for complying
with the requirements mandated by Title IV of 1990 CAAA.
5.4.2 Evaluation of NOx Reduction Performance

The evaluation of emission reductions of NOx in affected plants under the Acid Rain
Program in Phase I is based on several distinct features that are different from those in the SO2
program. First, Title IV of the NOx program establishes standard emission limitations for
affected units but does not include the cap-and-trade aspect of the SO2 program. Title IV of the
29

Fuel switching is that power plants change from high content sulfur coal to low sulfur content coal. This reduces
SO2 and NOx emissions.
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1990 Clean Air Act Amendments required EPA NOx annual average emission limits (in pounds
of NOx per million British thermal units of fuel consumed, (lb/mmBtu)) for coal-fired electric
utility units in two phases. In April 1995, EPA promulgated 40 CFR Part 76 which established
NOx emission limits beginning on January 1, 1996 for Group 1 boilers that were also part of the
Phase I SO2 program. Second, standard emission limitations were established in Phase I for two
boiler technologies, dry bottom boilers subject to an NO x emission limit of 0.50 lb/mmBtu and
tangentially-fired boilers subject to an NO x emission limit of 0.45 lb/mmBtu. The affected units
and plants by NO x emission limitation are listed in Table 5.10. Some plants first were targeted
for SO2 emission reductions as they are included in the Table I list. These same plants were then
targeted for NO x reductions if the boiler is dry-bottom or tangentially fired. For example, Plant
11 is in the Table I list and the boiler is dry-bottom wall-fired, thus is affected by NO x
regulation. Plant 4 is included on Table I list but the boiler is cyclone and not affected by NO x
regulation. Plants 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 15 are not in the Table I and neither affected by NO x even
though the boiler is dry bottom.
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Table 5.10 WV Power Plant Boiler Type and NOx Pollution Control in Phase I

Plant Boiler
Type
1
DB
2
DVF
3
DB
4
C
5
DVF
6
DB
7
DB
8
DB
9
DB
10
T
11
DB
12
T
13
DB
14 DVF
15 DVF
16
DB
Average

Phase I

Pollution
control

Not affected
Not affected
Not affected
Not affected
Not affected
Not affected
Not affected
Not affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Not affected
Affected

LNB
U
U
U
U
LNB
LNB
U
LNB
U
LNB
LNC1
LNB
U
U
LNC3

Shadow
Mean
Value Emission
-362.36
0.5062
-389.01
1.1939
-168.56
0.4594
-4.50
1.4056
-319.02
0.7373
-249.74
0.4834
-586.55
0.4245
-159.08
1.0325
-70.73
0.5479
-38.57
0.7633
-4563.13
0.5107
-146.50
0.7515
-199.95
0.4336
-83.07
0.588
-131.80
0.8619
-154.12
0.3453
-168.91

Abbreviation in table
DB = dry bottom wall-fired;
C = cyclone;
CB = cell burner wall-fired;
DVF = dry bottom vertically fired;
T = tangentially fired;
LNB = low NO x burner technology;
LNC1 = low NO x -close-coupled OFA;
LNC3 = low NO x -close coupled and separated OFA;
U = uncontrolled.
Third, one control technology for reducing NOx emissions is to adopt low NOx burners.
There are two control technologies adopted by WV affected plants, LNB, LNC1 and LNC3. The
emission limitations in the in Acid Rain Program give flexibility to the affected plants. That is,
the control approaches have an averaging plan that plants can average emission rates over two or
more units to meet an overall emission rate limitation and alternative emission limitation (AEL)
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that corresponds to the level that the utility demonstrates is achievable. These options give
utilities flexibility in meeting the emission limitations in a cost-effective way and allow for the
further development of technologies to reduce the costs of compliance. Phase I for NO x was
from 1996 to 1999, one year later than Phase I for SO2.
The NOx emission reductions in Phase I achieved the goal set by EPA (reductions of over
400,000 tons per year between 1996 and 1999 (Phase I)). There were some differences among
affected plants between SO2 and NOx emission reductions. The affected plants for NOx were
among the group affected by the SO2 emissions reduction program but the specific effects were
determined by boiler type, dry bottom or tangentially fired. They are required to meet two
different standard emission limitations based on the type of boiler the plant has. In practice, for
the affected plants (the status shown in column 5 in Table 5.10) in WV, four out of seven
installed lower NOx burner equipment to reduce NOx emissions to meet the standard emission
limitations. The average emission rates in affected plants are lower than those in unaffected
plants. According to the EPA’s estimations, the cost of the NOx removed was $227 per ton, the
estimations from this study of the five-year average shadow values (weighted by electricity) of
NO x among plants range from $4.50 to $4563.13 per ton. Among the affected plants in WV,
the cost in plants is lower without control equipment than those of plants that installed the
control equipment. The control status is reported in column four of Table 5.10. The costs for
uncontrolled plants are from $4.50 to $389.00, while the costs for controlled plants from $70.73
to $4563.13 per ton of NOx removed. Further classification of plants as affected and not-affected
with control or no-control technology adopted by the estimated shadow value of NOx shows the
same pattern. The shadow values of the uncontrolled and affected plants range from $38.57 to
$83.07 while for the controlled and affected the range is from $70.73 to $4563.13. The costs for
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the uncontrolled and unaffected group are from $4.50 to $389.00 while for controlled and
unaffected plants they from $249.74 to $586.55. This relationship is similar to that seen in the
analysis of SO2 shadow values. That is, the higher the emission rate a power plant has, the lower
the estimated shadow price of NOx is.
The five-year average emissions of NOx are shown in the last column in Table 5.10. The
plants emissions can be grouped into dry bottom and tangentially fired boiler for those affected
with control technology or those without control technology. Affected plants with dry bottom
boilers should meet the emission limitation of 0.45 lb per mmBtu. Among plant’s taking control
actions, Plants 13 and 16 have averaged emission rate of 0.43 lb and 0.35 lb per mmBtu,
respectively, while Plants 9, 11, and 15 are slightly higher than 0.45 lb per mmBtu. Compared to
those not affected and uncontrolled plants, 2, 4, and 8, the emission rates are all above 1 lb per
mmBtu.
5.5 Summary

This chapter discusses the empirical estimation of shadow values for SO2, NO x , and CO2
for WV power plants in Phase I of the 1990 CAAA. The shadow values of SO2, NOx, and CO2
can be used for self-evaluation as abatement cost for each undesirable output, respectively,
regardless there is any environmental regulation imposed on each of these three undesirable
outputs. The annual shadow values of the three pollutants for each plant are estimated from
1995 to1999. Therefore each plant can see their yearly abatement cost for each respective
pollutant when one ton of SO2, NOx, or CO2 is removed.
The estimated shadow values of SO2 and NOx are used as an evaluation tool to analyze
cost effectiveness at the plant level since these two air pollutants emission reduction are required
by Title IV of 1990 CAAA. The analyses offered insights for evaluating performances in Phase
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I. The empirical evidence reveals an inverse relationship between the shadow values and the
corresponding emission rates. This relationship exists for both SO2 and NOx. The interpretation
for this inverse relationship is that the pollution reduction is costly when firms take control
measures, either by installing scrubbers for SO2 or low NOx burners. On the other hand, plants
with the lower abatement costs have higher emission rates. Another aspect of evaluation is to
observe if a plant actively participates in the SO2 allowance market. In terms of participating in
SO2 allowance markets or taking alternative available control measures to meet environmental
regulations, plants operators actively participated in both EPA’s auction market and private
market for SO2 allowances. Typically, however, plants installed equipment to meet the NOx
emission limits.
For CO2 the estimated shadow values are really low and emission rates high. Since there
are no regulations directly imposed on CO2 emission reduction, this study has provided a selfevaluation tool for the plants to look at the virtual abatement cost of CO2 and the total abatement
cost if all of three pollutants were reduced together at current production technology and
pollution control technology.
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Chapter 6. Summary and Conclusions
6.1 Introduction

The objectives of this dissertation are to provide empirical estimates of the shadow values
of SO2, NO x , and CO2 for WV coal-generating power plants. The estimated shadow value of
SO2 is used to evaluate the performances of these plants in Phase I (1995-1999) in complying
with the pollution reduction requirements in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. The shadow
values provide insight into plant level decisions and implications for the efficacy of the SO2
allowance markets. The estimates of shadow values for NOx are compared to the EPA estimates
of average abatement cost in the Acid Rain Program while the estimate for CO2 is a potential
abatement cost for these plants if they were required to reduce (marginally) emissions given the
current technology and pollution control measures in their plants. This chapter summarizes the
findings of the analysis.
The next section of this final chapter gives a summary of the main results of the study
with an emphasis on the key empirical findings in Chapter 5 as they relate to the SO2 allowance
market and findings of previous studies. Section 3 concludes the chapter with suggestions for
further research.
6.2 Summary

The first chapter of this dissertation provides an overview of the appropriate regulations
and the mandated reductions of emissions by coal-fired power plants under the first and largest
pollutant allowance market created by Title IV of the CAAA. Chapter 2 includes a review of the
literature on production externalities starting with the definitions of externalities and the
theoretical models that provide insight into these issues. The theories presented includes
Samuelson’s conditions, Nash-equilibrium, and Lindahl-equilibrium. The Lindahl-equilibrium
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supports the use of governmental intervention using market mechanisms to control detrimental
externalities. Pollution control policies discussed include command and control, pollution tax or
effluent fee, and marketable pollution permits. Title IV of the1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
finally made the market mechanisms long advocated and supported by economists a reality with
support for a SO2 allowance market. Title IV also required reduction of NO x emission from
power plants but the emission control approach was markedly different than that for SO2 (Capand-Trade). Plants tend to take a technology based control approach by using low NO x burners
to reduce emissions to meet the NO x limits.
The approach used to analyze a pollution-producing firm is the output distance function
which has several unique advantages for the purpose of this study. First, it models production
processes directly and captures the characteristics of a specific production process. Second,
input and output data for the production process are sufficient; abatement cost information from
each firm is not required. Since abatement cost data is difficult to obtain from firms and may be
unreliable even though it is available in some situations, this is a definite advantage. Third, the
output distance function approach can explicitly model multiple outputs from a production
process. Fourth, explicit imposition of environmental regulations are not required. This
approach provides a tool to estimate the shadow values of multiple outputs from the production
of electricity by coal-fired power plants. In this study the model includes four outputs, one good
output, electricity, and three undesirable outputs, SO2, NOx, and CO2. Based on the estimates
obtained, the study evaluates the performance of the abatement effectiveness under the SO2
allowance market and the evaluation of the NOx emission reduction in Phase I.
Chapters 3 and 4 present a theoretical and empirical model of the output distance
function, respectively. In chapter 3, the theoretic model of output distance function used for this
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study is outlined. The model is characterized by the production technology of the firm. The
technology is represented by an output set, or output requirement set, or technology set. For a
specific production, a given input set for the outputs is determined. The output distance function
is defined on the output set to represent the specific technology and also to measure technical
efficiency. The dual to the output distance function is the revenue function. The revenue
function can be defined either by the output set or distance function while the distance function is
defined in terms of the revenue function. The duality of the output distance function and the
revenue function provides a tool to derive the shadow prices for the outputs, especially for the
“bads,” the SO2, NOx, and CO2 gases. Finally, the equilibrium model is presented in terms of the
output distance function. This model is very different than the traditional production model. It
departs from the single output production model by directly modeling multi-outputs. A feature
of the output distance function that is especially useful is the ability to directly depict
relationships between and among desirable and undesirable outputs when environmental “bads”
are included as outputs in the model. Null-jointness of desirable outputs and undesirable outputs
demonstrates that (1) the disposal for environmental “bads” is costly because a power plant has
to allocate its resources to reduce emission or disposal it; (2) the undesirable output can be
reduced but is never reduced to zero.
Chapter 4 presents a bridge between the theoretical model and empirical application. The
output set is partitioned into two subvectors corresponding to the desirable outputs and the
environmental “bads”, as are the revenue functions and the set of price vectors. The properties of
partitioned output distance function and revenue function are derived based on the axioms of
unrestricted output sets. These properties are used to establish the duality that connects two
functions, to specify a restricted output set, and its duality with the subvector output distance
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function. Because the subvector output distance function completely characterizes the
production technology, this function is used to derive absolute shadow prices from the
unrestricted output price set. The empirical model specified in Chapter 4 is a translog production
frontier function. Compared to other empirical models, the translog production frontier function
has flexibility and is able to model multiple outputs of a production process. The estimation
method is parametric constrained nonlinear programming (Färe et al. 1989; Swinton 1996, 1998,
2002, and 2004).
The estimation was carried out in two steps and discussed in detail in Chapter 5. Data for
16 coal-fired power plants in West Virginia were collected from 1995-1999. The parameters
were estimated from observed data and used to derive shadow prices for SO2 and NOx.
Empirical estimates of the shadow values for SO2 and NOx for WV coal-fired electric powergenerating plants were developed while estimates for CO2 were also included in the analysis.
The estimated CO2 shadow prices are low while emission rates are high. Since there are no
regulations on CO2 emission reduction in the Acid Rain Program, the analysis of the estimation
for CO2 offers insights for the power plants to evaluate their abatement cost for CO2 if CO2 were
required to reduce its emission. The shadow prices for SO2, NOx, and CO2 in the study are
estimated based on observed data and current production technology. If CO2 is regulated by law
and pollution control technology is adopted by the plant, the estimates of shadow values for SO2,
NOx and CO2 would be different from what is estimated in this study. The focus of the analysis
of this study is on SO2 and NOx and offers insights for evaluating the performance of the power
plants during Phase I of the 1990 CAAA. The empirical evidence reveals an inverse relationship
between the shadow values and the corresponding emission rates for SO2, NOx, and CO2.
Evaluations were in terms of participation in the SO2 allowance market and the choice of
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alternative control measures for cost-effectiveness to meet the requirements of environmental
regulations. The plants actively participated in both the EPA’s auction market and private
markets for SO2 allowances.
The case for NOx is more complex since pollution reduction is mandated by two different
sections of the 1990 CAAA (Title I and Title IV). The focus of this study is Title IV of the 1990
CAAA and promulgated by the USEPA as Acid Rain Program. The compliance with NOx
emission limitations is based on two boiler types of power plants spelled out in Title IV of 1990
CAAA. The plants under regulations by the 1990 CAAA adopted pollution control technologies
and had higher estimated abatement costs than the plants that were not regulated in Phase I.
The estimated shadow values of CO2 are low compared to the shadow values of SO2 and
NOx, while the emission rates of CO2 in Phase I are high. Since there is no explicit regulation on
CO2 that are generated and emitted from power plants no detailed analysis is given for CO2. But
the estimated CO2 shadow values provide information for plant self-evaluation and as so to the
decision maker.
6.3 Conclusions

This study examined empirically the performances of WV 16 power plants in Phase I in
compliance with the requirements of the 1990 CAAA. The output distance function approach
underlies the theoretical framework of the study. The values of the distance function are
estimated annually for each plant in Phase I (Table 5.2) and the five-year average for 16 plants.
The estimated value of output distance function is the measure of the operating point of each
plant from the production frontier estimated by this data set and an efficiency indicator. A value
of one for a plant in a given year indicates that the plant operates on the frontier and is
empirically efficiency. A plant does not operate at an efficient point if the value is less than one.
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The overall weighted average (weighted by each plant’s electricity production) of the output
distance functions across firms and time periods is 0.8391. The electricity production for all
plants in this sample must be increased by about 16% of potential output, on average, if all plants
are to operate on the frontier of the production possibility set. The purpose of this study is not to
examine the efficiency of each plant production but is its derived shadow values of undesirable
outputs.
The three undesirable outputs of SO2, NOx, and CO2 are calculated from the output
distance values for each plant annually and overall average of 16 plants in Phase I. The main
findings are summarized as follows. The estimated shadow values of SO2 for all 80 observations
(each plant at each year of Phase I) are from nearly zero (virtually unconstrained negative
outputs) to $7,426 per ton. The empirical results showed the shadow prices (opportunity costs of
undesirable output for abatement) for SO2 are higher in plants that installed pollution control
scrubbers than those without installation of scrubbers. The highest values for Plant 11 range
from $2486 to $7426 with its each of three generating units that had installed scrubber while the
lowest shadow values, Plant 4, range from $0.01 to $10.04 without installation of scrubbers in its
three generating units. The estimated five-year average shadow prices for each plant in Phase I
(Table 5.6) show Plant four has $4.05 per ton while Plant 11 $ 5058.77 per ton for SO2. These
estimated shadow values reflected the capital abatement investment in their respective
production capital. These two plants are both in the Table I list. On the other hand the emission
rates for these two plants are inversed. Plant 11 has the lowest emission rate of five-year average
at 0.13 lb per mmBtu as the contrast Plant 4 at 5.51 lb per mmBtu mush higher than the cap set
by Title IV for plants in Table I list of Phase I, 2.5 lb per mmBtu.
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The annually estimated shadow values of NOx for each plant of range from $0 (Plant 10
and 14 in year of 1995, Plant 16 in year of 1998) to $818.5 per ton (Plant 8 in year of 1996). The
relationship of the shadow values between plants with emission control and plants without
emission control shows the similar pattern as what has been discussed for SO2. The target for
NOx emission reduction is on two types of burners, dry-bottom fired and tangentially fired
burners, to meet the respective emission limit. The emission limit is 0.50 lb per mmBtu for drybottom fired burner and 0.45 lb per mmBtu for tangentially fired burner. The affected plants are
required to meet the emission limit by either adopting the low NOx burner or averaging emission
rate at plant level over its all units. The affected plants by NOx emission limits with the control
have higher estimated shadow values than the plants without control. The costs for uncontrolled
plants are from $4.50 to $389.00, while the costs for controlled plants from $70.73 to $4563.13
per ton of NOx removed. This is similar as what is observed for plants regulated by SO2
emission cap. Consequently, the emission rates for NOx in plants that have taken pollution
control measures are lower than those that have not adopted the pollution control technology.
For dry-bottom fired plants with control technology, Plants 13 and 16 have five-year averaged
emission rate of 0.43 lb and 0.35 lb per mmBtu (the emission limit is 0.50 lb per mmBtu),
respectively, while without control, Plants 2, 4, and 8, the emission rates are all above 1 lb per
mmBtu .
Under newly created SO2 allowance markets by Title IV of 1990 CAAA, the plants
actively participated in the allowance trading, in both the EPA auctions and private markets. The
observed participation in allowance market of WV power plants includes both purchases and
sales in Phase I. The plants with high emission rates that did not install pollution control
equipment heavily traded in both the EPA’s allowance auctions and private allowance trading
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markets. On the other hand, plants with high shadow values of SO2 and lower emission rates
than the cap set up in Phase I of 1990 CAAA were sellers of allowances. The study reveals the
rational behavior for a power plant to either buy or sell its allowance is related to if the plant
installs pollution control equipment in WV power plants. Installing pollution control equipment
is an abatement investment costly and therefore results in high shadow value of an undesirable
output. A plant with the installation of pollution control equipment and resulting in higher
abatement cost likely sells its allowances in the market since its emission rate is lower than the
required when pollution investment has already incurred. The sale of the allowance in the
market is one way to offset the abatement investment. On the other hand a plant without the
installation of pollution control equipment the estimated shadow value is much lower than the
one with control and has much higher emission rate than the emission cap for SO2 in Phase I. If
the cost of purchase of allowance is lower than their abatement investment it is cost effective to
buy allowance. This empirical analysis of this study is different from the criterion stated
normally in environmental economic analysis (the firm should sell pollution permit if the
abatement cost is lower than the market price, or purchase pollution permit otherwise). That is
the elaboration is needed to the observed evidence from each specific case. It is also due to the
data collected for this study, the installation of abatement equipment is control measure. The
bottom line is that the plants utilized whichever would give then minimum abatement or
compliance cost in foreseen available choices: installing pollution reduction technology or
trading in the market for SO2 allowances.
This study attempted to estimate and analyze three nonmarket and undesirable outputs in
electricity production process by output distance function approach. It provided the encouraging
result and a tool to evaluate the behavior of WV power plants in compliance with the
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requirement set by Title IV of 1990 CAAA and participating in SO2 allowance market. Through
the study there are several aspects of this analysis need to be emphasized. First the data that
characterize the production process of electricity may need more examination to capture the
characteristics of the production as closely as possible. In this study the production capital used
but it is aggregation of production investment and abatement investment. If it is possible it can
be divided into production capital and abatement investment. The other aspect of the model is to
specifically consider if there is any relationship among multiple undesirable outputs, e.g., SO2
and NOx, the estimated shadow values of NOx are lower than those of SO2. It may need further
examining if there is some relationship to be explicitly expressed in the model. Third it is
needed to provide statistical inference for the model estimation since this is a deterministic
model.
Further study can be to follow up when Phase II of 1990 CAAA for all of electricity
generating companies is completed in 2010. A thorough evaluation of power plants
performances in pollution reduction among the different available technologies and pollution
control policies can be examined. The comparisons of both the SO2 and NO x markets can be
studied in order to provide valuable insight to design or develop a mature market to effectively
reduce pollution and improve environmental quality. The technological jointness relationship
among these pollutants, SO2, NOx, CO2, mercury and others need to be specified in the model in
order to explore the effectiveness of abatement cost when a comprehensive abatement approach
can be designed.
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Appendix A. CAAA Phase I Affected and Early Election Units
Plant name
Amos, John E (1)

Clinch River (2)

Glen Lyn 3

Kammer 4

Kanawha River 5
Mitchell 6

Mountaineer 7
Phil Sporn 8

Albright 9

Ft Martin 10
Harrison 11

Mt. Storm 12

Pleasants 13
Rivesville 14
Willow Island 15
R. Paul Smith 16

Unit Status
ID
1
2
3
1c
2
3
36 c
51
52
1
2
3
5c
1
2
1
11
21
31
41
51
1
2
3
1
2
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
7
8
1
2
9c
10

P2
P2
P2
P2
P2
P2
P2
P2
P2
P1
P1
P1
P2
P1
P1
Early
Election
P2
P2
P2
P2
P2
P1.5
P1.5
P1
P1
P1
P1
P1
P1
P1
P1
P1
P1.5
P1.5
P1.5
P1. 5
P2
P2
P1.5
P1.5

SO2

NO x

SO2
control

NO x
control

Not Affected
Not Affected
Not Affected
Not Affected
Not Affected
Not Affected
Not Affected
Not Affected
Not Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Not affected
Affected
Affected
Affected

Not Affected
Not Affected
Not Affected
Not Affected
Not Affected
Not Affected
Not Affected
Not Affected
Not Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Not Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected

U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U

LNB
LNB
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
LNB
LNB
LNB

Not Affected
Not Affected
Not Affected
Not Affected
Not Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Not Affected
Not Affected
Affected
Affected

Not Affected
Not Affected
Not Affected
Not Affected
Not Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Affected
Not Affected
Not Affected
Affected
Affected

U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
WL a
WL
WL
U
U
WLS
WL
WL
U
U
U
U
U
U

U
U
U
U
U
LNB
LNB
LNC3
U
U
LNB
LNB
LNB
LNC1
LNC1
LNC1
O
LNB
U
U
U
U
U
LUC3

Source: US EPA Acid Rain Program website.
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In Appendix A, the following definitions apply:
“P1” for the Phase I units identified in the Clean Air Act,
“P1.5” for the units which volunteered to meet 1995 emission limits as either substitution or
compensating units, and
“P2” for the Phase II units.
The emissions of SO2 and NO x in the Phase I units and substitution units or compensating units
were affected while those of Phase II units are not affected.
SO2 control and NO x control indicates if each unit adapts control technology to reduce
emissions of SO2 and NO x .
“U” is for an uncontrolled unit,
“WL” is for wet line flue gas desulfurization,
“LNB” is for low NO x burner technology,
“LNC3” for low NO x -closed coupled separated OFA,
“LNC1” for low NO x closed coupled OFA
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Appendix B. Boiler Type and Pollution Controls for 16 West Virginia Plants
Plant

No. of Plant

Boiler Type

DB
Amos, John E
1c
c
DVF
Clinch River
2
c
DB
Glen Lyn
3
C
Kammer
4a
c
DVF
Kanawha River
5
DB
Mitchell
6a
b
DB
Mountaineer
7
DVF
Phil Sporn
8b
a
DB
Albright
9
a
CB
Ft Martin
10
DB
Harrison
11a
a
T
Mt. Storm
12
DB
Pleasants
13b
b
DB
Rivesville
14
c
DVF
Willow Island
15
c
DB
R. Paul Smith
16
a
represents Phase I plants;
b
represents substitute and compensation plants in Phase I; and
c
represents Phase II plants.
Abbreviations used:
DB
= dry bottom wall-fired;
C
= cyclone;
CB
= cell burner wall-fired;
DVF
= dry bottom vertically fired;
T
= tangentially fired;
LNB
= low NO x burner technology;
NO x -close-coupled OFA;
LNC3 = low NO x -close coupled and separated OFA;
LNC1

= low

U
WL
WLS

= uncontrolled.
= wet line flue gas desulfurization;
= wet limestone.
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NO x control

SO2 control

LNB
U
LNB
U
U
LNB
LNB
U
LNB
U
LNB
LNC1
LNB
U
U
U

U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
WL
WLS
WL
U
U
U

Appendix C. Parameters Estimates for the Output Distance Function
Variables
Constant
Y1
Y2
Y3
Y4
Y11
Y22
Y33
Y44
Y12
Y13
Y14
Y21
Y23
Y24
Y31
Y32
Y34
Y41
Y42
Y43
X1
X2
X3
X4
X11
X12
X13
X14
X21
X22
X23
X24
X31
X32
X33
X34
X41
X42
X43

Parameter Estimates
4.8954
0.6170
0.2112
0.1679
0.0040
0.0255
0.0200
0.0070
0.0001
-0.0191
-0.0062
-0.0002
-0.0191
-0.0010
0.0000
-0.0062
-0.0010
0.0001
-0.0002
0.0000
0.0001
0.3429
-2.0410
1.0537
-1.6870
0.1428
0.0106
-0.2325
-0.0502
0.0106
0.0485
0.1813
-0.0450
-0.2325
0.1813
-0.1333
0.1504
-0.0502
-0.0450
0.1504
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Gradient
-80.0000
-1742.4484
-809.6146
-753.2617
-1207.0529
-19039.4811
-4160.7509
-3615.9088
-9169.0805
-8870.8072
-8266.5566
-13207.0274
-8870. 8072
-3868.2183
-6159.6606
-8266.5565
-3868.2183
-5745.7853
-13207.0275
-6159.6606
-5745.7853
-1387.9733
-914.3910
-1000.1661
-1508.7836
-12102.9947
-7997.7537
-8697.5640
-13126.0626
-7997.7537
-6110.3384
-5715. 0397
-8731.4127
-8697.5634
-5715.0398
-6264.8951
-9441.1588
-13126.0625
-8731.4127
-9441.1588

Variables
X44
Y1X1
Y1X2
Y1X3
Y1X4
Y2X1
Y2X2
Y2X3
Y2X4
Y3X1
Y3X2
Y3X3
Y3X4
Y4X1
Y4X2
Y4X3
Y4X4

Parameter Estimates
0.0524
0.0123
-0.0049
-0.0072
-0.0002
-0.0055
-0.0002
0.0056
0.0001
-0.0112
0.0120
-0.0008
0.0000
0.0051
-0.0041
-0.0010
0.0000

Note:
Y1 = electricity (KWh)
Y2 = SO2 (tons)
Y3 = NOx (tons)
Y4 = CO2 (tons)
X1 = Heat input (mmBtu)
X2 = Sulfur input (tons)
X3 = Labor (hours)
X4 = Capital (1997 dollar)
Yjk = Yj*Yk
jœ{1,2,3,4}, kœ{1,2,3,4}
Xjk = Xj*Xk
jœ{1,2,3,4}, kœ{1,2,3,4}
YjXk = Yj*Yk jœ{1,2,3,4}, kœ{1,2,3,4}
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Gradient
-14297.3451
-30354.4653
-14149.5294
-13193.6888
-21067.0453
-20034.3369
-9332.984
-8713.0230
-13924.5379
-21831.8596
-10163.6536
-9462.5975
-15133.7223
-32938.8876
-15327.0241
-14274.8518
-22840.1893

Appendix D. Basic Information for 16 West Virginia Power Plants
Plant name

Status Capacity Year built Year last
(MW) (original)
unit
installed
P2

2932.6

1971

1973

P2

712.5

1958

1961

1918

1957

1958
1953

1959
1953

1971
1980

1971
1980

1950

1960

1952

1954

1967

1968

1972
1953

1974
1962

1979

1980

1919
1949

1951
1960

1923

1958

Amos, John E (1)
Clinch River (2)
P2
337.5
Glen Lyn (3)
713
P1
Kammer (4)
Kanawha River P2
439.4
(5)
P1
1633
Mitchell (6)
Early 1300
Mountaineer (7) Election
P2
1105.6
Phil Sporn (8)
P1, P1.5 487.5
Albright (9)
P1
566
Ft Martin (10)
1185.23
P1
Harrison (11)
650
P1
Mt. Storm (12)
P1. 5
410.4+342
Pleasants (13)
109.75
Rivesville (14) P1. 5
Willow Island
P2
213.2
(15)
R. Paul Smith P1. 5
110
(16)

Company
Appalachian Power
Company
Appalachian Power
Company
Appalachian Power
Company
Ohio Power Company
Appalachian Power
Company
Ohio Power Company
Appalachian Power
Company
Appalachian Power
Company
The Potomac Company,
MongahelaPower Company
The Potomac Company,
MongahelaPower Company
The Potomac Company,
Virginia Electic & Power
Company
The Potomac Company,
MongahelaPower Company
MongahelaPower Company
MongahelaPower Company
The Potomac Power
Company

Source: FERC Form 1
The table provides technology information on plants in this study.
Numbers in parenthesis in Column 1 of the table are plant numbers in tables used in chapter 5.
In Column 2 of the table, Status: P1, power plant participates in Phase I; P2 in Phase II for SO2
emission reduction required by Title IV of 1990 CAAA; and P1.5 for substitute and
compensation plants.
Capacity represent total installed capacity (Max Generate Name Plate Ratings-MW).
Since each plant has more than one generating unit, the original year of the plant built and the
year last unit was installed are reported in FERC Form 1. This information can give some
glimpse on some plants’ decision among pollution control alternatives. The ownership and
operation can be split. This can be seen in several plants, e.g. Albright, Fort Martin, and
Pleasants. One unit is operated by owner and other units are operated by tenants.
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Appendix E. GAUSS Program to Estimate Distance Function and Shadow Values for
Pollutants

(GAUSS version 7, and Constraint Optimization Version 2.0.7)
new;
library co;
#include co.ext;
coset;
output file= distthree_nov2306.out reset;
format /rdn 11,4;
@__output=0; @
load wv95[16,9] = 1995_16plants.txt;
load wv96[16,9] = 1996_16plants.txt;
load wv97[16,9] = 1997_16plants.txt;
load wv98[16,9] = 1998_16plants.txt;
load wv99[16,9] = 1999_16plants.txt;

let runnum = 1;
M=16;
N=80;
row1 = wv95[1:16,.];
row2 = wv96[1:16,.];
row3 = wv97[1:16,.];
row4 = wv98[1:16,.];
row5 = wv99[1:16,.];
choose = seqa(1,1,16);
inout = row1|row2|row3|row4|row5;

/* regular sample */

/* define variables */
one = ones(N,1);
zero = zeros(N,1);
/* outputs */
Y1 = inout[.,1]; /* electricity */
Y2 = inout[.,2]; /* SO2
*/
Y3 = inout[.,3]; /* NOx
*/
Y4 = inout[.,4]; /* CO2
*/
/* inputs */
X1 = inout[.,5]; /* mmbtu
X2 = inout[.,6]; /* sulfur
X3 = inout[.,7]; /* labor
X4 = inout[.,8]; /* capital

*/
*/
*/
*/

/* price */
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py1 = inout[.,9]; /* electricity price */
/* parameter starting values
*/
/* Need rewrite parameter values */
start= {5,
0.96000, 0.01000, 0.01000, 0.01000,
0.00500, 0.00500, 0.00500, 0.00500,
-0.00250, -0.00250, 0.00000,
-0.00250, -0.00250, 0.00000,
-0.00250, -0.00250, 0.00000,
-0.00250, -0.00250, 0.00000,
1.10850, -1.71450, 1.71690, -1.01280,
-.009700, 0.36990, -0.49630, -0.05710,
0.36990, -1.13920, 0.24810, -0.68880,
-0.49630, 0.24810, -0.21080, -0.18520,
-0.05710, -0.68880, -0.18520, -0.40670,
0.00000, -0.00000, 0.00000, 0.00000,
0.00000, -0.00000, 0.00000, 0.00000,
0.00000, -0.00000, 0.00000, 0.00000,
-0.00000, 0.00000, 0.00000, 0.00000};
/* take natural log of variables */
LY1 = LN(Y1);
LY2 = LN(Y2);
LY3 = LN(Y3);
LY4 = LN(Y4);
LX1 = LN(X1);
LX2 = LN(X2);
LX3 = LN(X3);
LX4 = LN(X4);
/* create ln interactive terms */
LY11 = (LY1.*LY1);
/* outputs */
LY22 = (LY2.*LY2);
LY33 = (LY3.*LY3);
LY44 = (LY4.*LY4);
LY12 = (LY1.*LY2);
/* output interactive term */
LY13 = (LY1.*LY3);
LY14 = (LY1.*LY4);
LY21 = (LY2.*LY1);
LY23 = (LY2.*LY3);
LY24 = (LY2.*LY4);
LY31 = (LY3.*LY1);
LY32 = (LY3.*LY2);
LY34 = (LY3.*LY4);
LY41 = (LY4.*LY1);
LY42 = (lY4.*LY2);
LY43 = (LY4.*LY3);
LX11 = (LX1.*LX1);
/* inputs */
LX22 = (LX2.*LX2);
LX33 = (LX3.*LX3);
LX44 = (LX4.*LX4);
LX12 = (LX1.*LX2);
/* input interactive terms */
LX13 = (LX1.*LX3);
LX14 = (LX1.*LX4);
LX21 = (LX2.*LX1);
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LX23 = (LX2.*LX3);
LX24 = (LX2.*LX4);
LX31 = (LX3.*LX1);
LX32 = (LX3.*LX2);
LX34 = (LX3.*LX4);
LX41 = (LX4.*LX1);
LX42 = (LX4.*LX2);
LX43 = (LX4.*LX3);
LY1X1 = (LY1.*LX1);
LY1X2 = (LY1.*LX2);
LY1X3 = (LY1.*LX3);
LY1X4 = (LY1.*LX4);

/* input output cross terms */

LY2X1 = (LY2.*LX1);
LY2X2 = (LY2.*LX2);
LY2X3 = (LY2.*LX3);
LY2X4 = (LY2.*LX4);
LY3X1 = (LY3.*LX1);
LY3X2 = (LY3.*LX2);
LY3X3 = (LY3.*LX3);
LY3X4 = (LY3.*LX4);
LY4X1 = (LY4.*LX1);
LY4X2 = (LY4.*LX2);
LY4X3 = (LY4.*LX3);
LY4X4 = (LY4.*LX4);
/* define the objective function */
/* Ainger Chu translog function */
lobj = one~LY1~LY2~LY3~LY4~
.5*LY11~.5*LY22~.5*LY33~.5*LY44~
.5*LY12~.5*LY13~.5*LY14~
.5*LY21~.5*LY23~.5*LY24~
.5*LY31~.5*LY32~.5*LY34~
.5*LY41~.5*LY42~.5*LY43~
LX1~LX2~LX3~LX4~
.5*LX11~.5*LX12~.5*LX13~.5*LX14~
.5*LX21~.5*LX22~.5*LX23~.5*LX24~
.5*LX31~.5*LX32~.5*LX33~.5*LX34~
.5*LX41~.5*LX42~.5*LX43~.5*LX44~
LY1X1~LY2X1~LY3X1~LY4X1~
LY1X2~LY2X2~LY3X2~LY4X2~
LY1X3~LY2X3~LY3X3~LY4X3~
LY1X4~LY2X4~LY3X4~LY4X4;
/* positive derivative with respect to electricity output */
grady1 = zero~one~zero~zero~zero~
LY1~zero~zero~zero~
LY2~LY3~LY4~
zero~zero~zero~
zero~zero~zero~
zero~zero~zero~
zero~zero~zero~zero~
zero~zero~zero~zero~
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zero~zero~zero~zero~
zero~zero~zero~zero~
zero~zero~zero~zero~
LX1~zero~zero~zero~
LX2~zero~zero~zero~
LX3~zero~zero~zero~
LX4~zero~zero~zero;
/* negative derivative with respect to SO_2 output */
grady2 = zero~zero~one~zero~zero~
zero~ly2~zero~zero~
zero~zero~zero~
LY1~LY3~LY4~
zero~zero~zero~
zero~zero~zero~
zero~zero~zero~zero~
zero~zero~zero~zero~
zero~zero~zero~zero~
zero~zero~zero~zero~
zero~zero~zero~zero~
zero~LX1~zero~zero~
zero~LX2~zero~zero~
zero~LX3~zero~zero~
zero~LX4~zero~zero;
/* negative derivative with respect to NOx output */
grady3 = zero~zero~zero~one~zero~
zero~zero~ly3~zero~
zero~zero~zero~
zero~zero~zero~
LY1~LY2~LY4~
zero~zero~zero~
zero~zero~zero~zero~
zero~zero~zero~zero~
zero~zero~zero~zero~
zero~zero~zero~zero~
zero~zero~zero~zero~
zero~zero~LX1~zero~
zero~zero~LX2~zero~
zero~zero~LX3~zero~
zero~zero~LX4~zero;
/* negative derivative with respect to CO2 output */
grady4 = zero~zero~zero~zero~one~
zero~zero~zero~ly4~
zero~zero~zero~
zero~zero~zero~
zero~zero~zero~
LY1~LY2~LY3~
zero~zero~zero~zero~
zero~zero~zero~zero~
zero~zero~zero~zero~
zero~zero~zero~zero~
zero~zero~zero~zero~
zero~zero~zero~LX1~
zero~zero~zero~LX2~
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zero~zero~zero~LX3~
zero~zero~zero~LX4;
proc ldist(beta);
retp(SUMC(-(lobj*beta)));
endp;
/* This section creates the coefficient constraints
*/
/* a) homgeneity degree plus one in outputs
*/
/* b) homogenity of degree zero in second order output effects */
/* c) symmetry in output second order effects
*/
/* d-m) symmetry in second order input effects
*/
/* n-r) symmetry in cross input output effects
*/
_co_A={0 1 1 1 1
0000
000
000
/* homogeneity of degree one */
000
000
/* a1+a2+a3+a4=1 */
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0 0 0 0,
00000
/* symmetry A12=A21
*/
0000
100
-1 0 0
000
000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0 0 0 0,
00000
/* symmetry A13=A31
*/
0000
010
000
-1 0 0
000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
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0000
0 0 0 0,
00000
0000
001
000
000
-1 0 0
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0 0 0 0,
00000
0000
000
010
0 -1 0
000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0 0 0 0,
00000
0000
000
001
000
0 -1 0
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0 0 0 0,
00000
0000
000
000
001
0 0 -1
0000
0000
0000

/* symmetry

A14=A41

*/

/* symmetry

A23=A32

*/

/* symmetry

A24=A42

*/

/* symmetry

A34=A43

*/
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0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0 0 0 0,
00000
0000
000
000
000
000
0000
0100
-1 0 0 0
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0 0 0 0,
00000
0000
000
000
000
000
0000
0010
0000
-1 0 0 0
0000
0000
0000
0000
0 0 0 0,
00000
0000
000
000
000
000
0000
0001
0000
0000
-1 0 0 0
0000
0000
0000
0 0 0 0,
00000
0000
000
000
000

/* symmetry

B12=B21

*/

/* symmetry

B13=B31

*/

/* symmetry

B14=B41

*/

/* symmetry

B23=B32

*/
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000
0000
0000
0010
0 -1 0 0
0000
0000
0000
0000
0 0 0 0,
00000
0000
000
000
000
000
0000
0000
0001
0000
0 -1 0 0
0000
0000
0000
0 0 0 0,
00000
0000
000
000
000
000
0000
0000
0000
0001
0 0 -1 0
0000
0000
0000
0 0 0 0,
00000
0000
000
000
000
000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
1111
0000
0000
0 0 0 0,
00000

/* symmetry

B24=B42

*/

/* symmetry

B34=B43

*/

/* Homogeneity degree of zero for cross term of output and input

*/

/* c11=-c21-c31-c41 */

/* Homogeneity degree of zero for cross term of output and input
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*/

0000
000
000
000
000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
1111
0000
0 0 0 0,
00000
0000
000
000
000
000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
1111
0 0 0 0,
00000
0000
000
000
000
000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
1 1 1 1,
00000
1000
111
000
000
000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000

/* c12=-c22-c32-c42 */

/* Homogeneity degree of zero for cross term of output and input

*/

/* c13=-c23-c33-c43 */

/* Homogeneity degree of zero for cross term of output and input
/* c14=-c24-c34-c44 */

/* Homogeneity degree of zero for 2nd order output
/* a11=-a12-a13-a14 */

-153-

*/

*/

0000
0000
0 0 0 0,
00000
0100
000
111
000
000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0 0 0 0,
00000
0010
000
000
111
000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0 0 0 0,
00000
0001
000
000
000
111
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
};

/* Homogeneity degree of zero for 2nd order output

*/

/* a22=-a21-a23-a24 */

/* Homogeneity degree of zero for 2nd order output

*/

/* a33=-a31-a32-a34 */

/* Homogeneity degree of zero for 2nd order output
/* a44=-a41-a42-a43 */

_co_B={1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
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*/

0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0
};
_co_C= (-lobj|
grady1|
-grady2|
-grady3|
-grady4);
_co_D= zero|
zero|
zero|
zero|
zero
;
_CO_ALGORITHM=3;
_CO_DirTol=1e-2;
_co_MaxIters=1000;
{v1,v2,v3,v4}=COPRT(co(&ldist,start));
/*************************************/
/* Compute the distance function */
/* for each plant
*/
/*************************************/
lnx
lny
y
x

= Lx1~Lx2~Lx3~Lx4;
= Ly1~Ly2~ly3~ly4;
= y1~y2~y3~y4;
= x1~x2~x3~x4;

a0 = ones(n,1)*v1[1,1];
a = v1[2:5,1];
b = v1[22:25,1];

/* Intercept parameter estimate */
/* Slopes on outputs
/* Slopes on inputs

*/
*/

aa11 = v1[6,1];
aa22 = v1[7,1];
aa33 = v1[8,1];
aa44 = v1[9,1];
aa12 = v1[10,1];
aa13 = v1[11,1];
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aa14 = v1[12,1];
aa21 = v1[13,1];
aa23 = v1[14,1];
aa24 = v1[15,1];
aa31 = v1[16,1];
aa32 = v1[17,1];
aa34 = v1[18,1];
aa41 = v1[19,1];
aa42 = v1[20,1];
aa43 = v1[21,1];
aa =(aa11~aa12~aa13~aa14)|(aa21~aa22~aa23~aa24)|
(aa31~aa32~aa33~aa34)|(aa41~aa42~aa43~aa44) ;
bb1 = v1[26:29,1];
bb2 = v1[30:33,1];
bb3 = v1[34:37,1];
bb4 = v1[38:41,1];
bb = bb1'|bb2'|bb3'|bb4';

/* beta sub jj' */

cc1 = v1[42:45,1];
cc2 = v1[46:49,1];
cc3 = v1[50:53,1];
cc4 = v1[54:57,1];
cc = cc1'|cc2'|cc3'|cc4';

/* gamma sub ij */

lnd0 = a0 + lny*a + lnx*b
+ .5*diag( (lny*aa)*lny' )
+ .5*diag( (lnx*bb)*lnx' )
+ diag( (lnx*cc)*lny' );
d0 = exp(lnd0);
"Distance function: " d0'; ?;
wtmndist = sumc( ( inout[.,1]./sumc(inout[.,1]) ) .* d0 );
"(Weighted) Mean distance function: " wtmndist;?;
/********* Derivatives of d0 wrt outputs. *************/
del_y = ( a[1,1] + lny*aa[.,1] + lnx*cc[.,1] ) ./ y[.,1];
del_s = ( a[2,1] + lny*aa[.,2] + lnx*cc[.,2] ) ./ y[.,2];
del_n = ( a[3,1] + lny*aa[.,3] + lnx*cc[.,3] ) ./ y[.,3];
del_c = ( a[4,1] + lny*aa[.,4] + lnx*cc[.,4] ) ./ y[.,3];
/********** Derivatives of d0 wrt inputs. *************/
del_btu = ( b[1,1] + lnx*bb[.,1] + lny*(cc[1,.]') ) ./ x[.,1] ;
del_sul = ( b[2,1] + lnx*bb[.,2] + lny*(cc[2,.]') ) ./ x[.,2];
del_lab = ( b[3,1] + lnx*bb[.,3] + lny*(cc[3,.]') ) ./ x[.,3];
del_kap = ( b[4,1] + lnx*bb[.,4] + lny*(cc[4,.]') ) ./ x[.,4];
shadvalu_s = (py1/100).*( del_s ./ del_y );
"shadvalu_s = " shadvalu_s ; ?;
wtmnsv_s = sumc( ( inout[.,2]./sumc(inout[.,2]) ) .* shadvalu_s );
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/* alpha sub ii' */

"(Weighted) Mean shadow value of SO2 = " wtmnsv_s;
shadvalu_n = (py1/100).*( del_n ./ del_y );
"shadvalu_n = " shadvalu_n ; ?;
wtmnsv_n = sumc( ( inout[.,3]./sumc(inout[.,3]) ) .* shadvalu_n );
"(Weighted) Mean shadow value of NOx = " wtmnsv_n;
shadvalu_c = (py1/100).*( del_c ./ del_y );
"shadvalu_c = " shadvalu_c ; ?;
wtmnsv_c = sumc( ( inout[.,4]./sumc(inout[.,4]) ) .* shadvalu_c );
"(Weighted) Mean shadow value of CO2 = " wtmnsv_c;
/* ******** Build 5 13x1 vectors to get annual averages ********** */
so2_95 = row1[.,2];
so2_96 = row2[.,2];
so2_97 = row3[.,2];
so2_98 = row4[.,2];
so2_99 = row5[.,2];

/* SO2 levels in 1995, etc. */

nox_95 = row1[.,3];
nox_96 = row1[.,3];
nox_97 = row1[.,3];
nox_98 = row1[.,3];
nox_99 = row1[.,3];
co2_95 = row1[.,4];
co2_96 = row1[.,4];
co2_97 = row1[.,4];
co2_98 = row1[.,4];
co2_99 = row1[.,4];
shad_95_s = shadvalu_s[1:16]; /* Shadow values for SO2 in 1995, etc. */
shad_96_s = shadvalu_s[17:32];
shad_97_s = shadvalu_s[33:48];
shad_98_s = shadvalu_s[49:64];
shad_99_s = shadvalu_s[65:80];
shad_95_n = shadvalu_n[1:16]; /* Shadow values for NOx in 1995, etc. */
shad_96_n = shadvalu_n[17:32];
shad_97_n = shadvalu_n[33:48];
shad_98_n = shadvalu_n[49:64];
shad_99_n = shadvalu_n[65:80];
shad_95_c = shadvalu_c[1:16]; /* Shadow values for CO2 in 1995, etc. */
shad_96_c = shadvalu_c[17:32];
shad_97_c = shadvalu_c[33:48];
shad_98_c = shadvalu_c[49:64];
shad_99_c = shadvalu_c[65:80];
sval_95_s = sumc( ( so2_95./sumc(so2_95) ) .* shad_95_s );
"(Weighted) 1995 SO2 Mean shadow value = " sval_95_s;
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sval_96_s = sumc( ( so2_96./sumc(so2_96) ) .* shad_96_s );
"(Weighted) 1996 SO2 Mean shadow value = " sval_96_s;
sval_97_s = sumc( ( so2_97./sumc(so2_97) ) .* shad_97_s );
"(Weighted) 1997 SO2 Mean shadow value = " sval_97_s;
sval_98_s = sumc( ( so2_98./sumc(so2_98) ) .* shad_98_s );
"(Weighted) 1998 SO2 Mean shadow value = " sval_98_s;
sval_99_s = sumc( ( so2_99./sumc(so2_99) ) .* shad_99_s );
"(Weighted) 1999 SO2 Mean shadow value = " sval_99_s;
?;

sval_95_n = sumc( ( nox_95./sumc(nox_95) ) .* shad_95_n );
"(Weighted) 1995 NOx Mean shadow value = " sval_95_n;
sval_96_n = sumc( ( nox_96./sumc(nox_96) ) .* shad_96_n );
"(Weighted) 1996 NOx Mean shadow value = " sval_96_n;
sval_97_n = sumc( ( nox_97./sumc(nox_97) ) .* shad_97_n );
"(Weighted) 1997 NOx Mean shadow value = " sval_97_n;
sval_98_n = sumc( ( nox_98./sumc(nox_98) ) .* shad_98_n );
"(Weighted) 1998 NOx Mean shadow value = " sval_98_n;
sval_99_n = sumc( ( nox_99./sumc(nox_99) ) .* shad_99_n );
"(Weighted) 1999 NOx Mean shadow value = " sval_99_n;
?;
sval_95_c = sumc( ( co2_95./sumc(co2_95) ) .* shad_95_c );
"(Weighted) 1995 CO2 Mean shadow value = " sval_95_c;
sval_96_c = sumc( ( co2_96./sumc(co2_96) ) .* shad_96_c );
"(Weighted) 1996 CO2 Mean shadow value = " sval_96_c;
sval_97_c = sumc( ( co2_97./sumc(co2_97) ) .* shad_97_c );
"(Weighted) 1997 CO2 Mean shadow value = " sval_97_c;
sval_98_c = sumc( ( co2_98./sumc(co2_98) ) .* shad_98_c );
"(Weighted) 1998 CO2 Mean shadow value = " sval_98_c;
sval_99_c = sumc( ( co2_99./sumc(co2_99) ) .* shad_99_c );
"(Weighted) 1999 CO2 Mean shadow value = " sval_99_c;
?;
/*************************************/
/* Compute SO2 average shadow price
/* for each plant
*/
/*************************************/

*/

rux1 = shadvalu_s[1:16,1];
rux2 = shadvalu_s[17:32,1];
rux3 = shadvalu_s[33:48,1];
rux4 = shadvalu_s[49:64,1];
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rux5 = shadvalu_s[65:80,1];
dux1 = d0[1:16,1];
dux2 = d0[17:32,1];
dux3 = d0[33:48,1];
dux4 = d0[49:64,1];
dux5 = d0[65:80,1];
elc1 = ly1[1:16,1];
elc2 = ly1[17:32,1];
elc3 = ly1[33:48,1];
elc4 = ly1[49:64,1];
elc5 = ly1[65:80,1];
avgp_s = (rux1 .* elc1 + rux2 .* elc2 + rux3 .* elc3 + rux4 .* elc4 + rux5 .* elc5) ./
(elc1 + elc2 + elc3 + elc4+ elc5);
"(Weighted) Mean Shadow Value of SO2 by plant= " avgp_s; ?;
/*************************************/
/* Compute NOx average shadow price
/* for each plant
*/
/*************************************/

*/

rux1_n = shadvalu_n[1:16,1];
rux2_n = shadvalu_s[17:32,1];
rux3_n = shadvalu_s[33:48,1];
rux4_n = shadvalu_s[49:64,1];
rux5_n = shadvalu_s[65:80,1];
dux1 = d0[1:16,1];
dux2 = d0[17:32,1];
dux3 = d0[33:48,1];
dux4 = d0[49:64,1];
dux5 = d0[65:80,1];
elc1 = ly1[1:16,1];
elc2 = ly1[17:32,1];
elc3 = ly1[33:48,1];
elc4 = ly1[49:64,1];
elc5 = ly1[65:80,1];
avgp_n = (rux1_n .* elc1 + rux2_n .* elc2 + rux3_n .* elc3 + rux4_n .* elc4 + rux5_n .* elc5) ./
(elc1 + elc2 + elc3 + elc4+ elc5);
"(Weighted) Mean Shadow Value of NOx by plant= " avgp_n; ?;
/*************************************/
/* Compute CO2 average shadow price
/* for each plant
*/
/*************************************/

*/

rux1_c = shadvalu_c[1:16,1];
rux2_c = shadvalu_c[17:32,1];
rux3_c = shadvalu_c[33:48,1];
rux4_c = shadvalu_c[49:64,1];
rux5_c = shadvalu_c[65:80,1];
avgp_c = (rux1_c .* elc1 + rux2_c .* elc2 + rux3_c .* elc3 + rux4_c .* elc4 + rux5_c .* elc5) ./
(elc1 + elc2 + elc3 + elc4+ elc5);
"(Weighted) Mean Shadow Value of CO2 by plant= " avgp_c; ?;
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avgd = (dux1 .* elc1 + dux2 .* elc2 + dux3 .* elc3 + dux4 .* elc4 + dux5 .* elc5) ./
(elc1 + elc2 + elc3 + elc4+ elc5);
"(Weighted) Mean Distance Function by plant = " avgd; ?;
/***************************************************/
/* Compute average so2 emission for each plant */
/***************************************************/
plant_so2 = ((so2_95 + so2_96 + so2_97 + so2_98 + so2_99).*2000);
ene_95=row1[.,5];
ene_96=row2[.,5];
ene_97=row3[.,5];
ene_98=row4[.,5];
ene_99=row5[.,5];
plant_ene = ene_95 + ene_96 + ene_97 + ene_98 + ene_99;
avg_so2 = plant_so2 ./ plant_ene ;
"1995-1999 Mean so2 emission by plant = " avg_so2; ?;
output off;
end;
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Appendix F. Final GAUSS Estimation Results

************************************************************************
return code = 0
normal convergence
Value of objective function

19.750563

Parameters Estimates Gradient
----------------------------------------P01
4.8954 -80.0000
P02
0.6170 -1742.4484
P03
0.2112 -809.6145
P04
0.1679 -753.2618
P05
0.0040 -1207.0526
P06
0.0255 -19039.4808
P07
0.0200 -4160.7511
P08
0.0070 -3615.9085
P09
0.0001 -9169.0811
P10
-0.0191 -8870.8072
P11
-0.0062 -8266.5567
P12
-0.0002 -13207.0273
P13
-0.0191 -8870.8071
P14
-0.0010 -3868.2177
P15
0.0000 -6159.6605
P16
-0.0062 -8266.5566
P17
-0.0010 -3868.2175
P18
0.0001 -5745.7854
P19
-0.0002 -13207.0272
P20
0.0000 -6159.6604
P21
0.0001 -5745.7854
P22
0.3429 -1387.9733
P23
-2.0410 -764.7229
P24
1.0537 -1000.1661
P25
-1.6870 -1508.7836
P26
0.1428 -12102.9947
P27
0.0106 -6701.8138
P28
-0.2325 -8697.5634
P29
-0.0502 -13126.0626
P30
0.0106 -6701.8141
P31
0.0485 -3799.0113
P32
0.1813 -4796.3740
P33
-0.0450 -7268.6729
P34
-0.2325 -8697.5634
P35
0.1813 -4796.3740
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P36
P37
P38
P39
P40
P41
P42
P43
P44
P45
P46
P47
P48
P49
P50
P51
P52
P53
P54
P55
P56
P57

-0.1333
0.1504
-0.0502
-0.0450
0.1504
0.0524
0.0123
-0.0049
-0.0072
-0.0002
-0.0055
-0.0002
0.0056
0.0001
-0.0112
0.0120
-0.0008
0.0000
0.0051
-0.0041
-0.0010
0.0000

-6264.8951
-9441.1588
-13126.0625
-7268.6729
-9441.1588
-14297.3451
-30354.4653
-14149.5294
-13193.6889
-21067.0452
-16781.7552
-7844.0920
-7326.2716
-11673.4404
-21831.8596
-10163.6536
-9462.5975
-15133.7224
-32938.8877
-15327.0241
-14274.8518
-22840.1894

Number of iterations
25
Minutes to convergence 0.01302
Distance function: 0.7961 0.9975 0.7749 0.9098 0.8148
0.8720 0.7985 0.3767 0.7502 0.8826 1.0000 0.9669
0.7359 0.7751 1.0000 1.0000 0.9037 0.8740 0.6430
0.8839 0.7796 1.0000 0.9587 1.0000 0.6737 0.4568
0.6160 0.9234 0.4700 0.9996 0.7054 0.9537 0.8907
0.7962 0.6367 0.8377 0.8489 0.9380 0.9987 0.8472
0.6678 0.5137 0.6548 0.8560 0.4687 0.8569 0.7576
0.9810 0.9064 0.8708 0.7127 0.8131 0.8326 0.9885
0.9647 0.9108 0.6292 0.4917 0.6561 0.9130 0.4694
0.7372 0.6964 0.8776 0.9588 0.9049 0.7374 0.8247
0.8609 1.0000 0.9853 0.8990 0.6569 0.5666 0.6662
0.8801 0.4678 0.7257 0.5771 1.0000
(Weighted) Mean distance function:

0.8391

shadvalu_s =
-135.6536
-189.5643
-60.2219
-0.0066
-117.6784
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-165.4190
-227.9225
-0.9156
-0.0002
-6.6028
-2486.4273
-129.5728
-116.0695
0.0000
-41.8320
-41.5859
-442.5066
-571.3573
-71.8273
-2.0186
-395.6019
-224.7010
-751.7688
-95.5026
-90.1686
-46.5451
-3182.6993
-78.3082
-318.3319
-87.9146
-185.8697
-227.2036
-467.7720
-462.5629
-205.2086
-5.3298
-478.6199
-239.9756
-790.4674
-121.1247
-59.9857
-50.3654
-7425.8904
-200.0719
-238.6719
-100.6436
-206.2697
-120.9611
-468.2888
-550.4622
-273.3203
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-5.1265
-450.9651
-260.7946
-772.7211
-114.2316
-68.6720
-56.5413
-7146.3631
-187.1955
-236.3026
-72.0339
-100.0076
-130.5773
-259.7970
-316.4006
-159.1026
-10.0362
-238.6380
-278.5885
-390.6341
-61.2436
-58.1886
-39.0810
-5042.3168
-175.3315
-177.8785
-152.6720
-162.6663
-191.3889
(Weighted) Mean shadow value of SO2 = -239.8081
shadvalu_n =
-171.5198
-41.9904
-132.4752
-0.0001
-21.2863
-244.4683
-222.0436
-404.0580
-76.7204
0.0000
-0.2719
-91.5850
-28.5291
0.0000
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-3.5339
-99.4042
-364.1996
-118.0401
0.0000
-3.2566
-80.9173
-95.5107
-738.8975
-818.4535
-314.7445
-38.6021
-96.0017
-142.3552
-141.0343
-91.9798
-38.7635
-360.4200
-310.7473
-92.9553
-261.1896
-1.8281
-82.5511
-261.6131
-722.8690
-112.9262
-217.4178
-29.3929
-46.1360
-85.9796
-79.7438
-47.8055
-41.9478
-167.3346
-472.7396
-108.9175
-310.3645
-2.9715
-74.0388
-253.6319
-673.7813
-161.3606
-151.5079
-48.0302
-52.4009
-175.5782
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-106.9279
-21.4382
0.0000
-125.2780
-239.5784
-106.0272
-138.6755
-27.0872
-54.8464
-233.7174
-315.8573
-116.2149
-155.0048
-24.4160
-29.6150
-176.1763
-76.1025
-58.3869
-39.5045
-240.6815
(Weighted) Mean shadow value of NOx = -168.9050
shadvalu_c =
-4.3744
-1.4458
-3.0632
-0.0237
-0.8760
-5.2633
-5.2777
-10.4311
-1.3564
0.0000
-0.0003
-1.9722
-0.0001
0.0000
-0.2955
-1.9977
-8.6254
-3.2505
0.0000
-0.0853
-2.2105
-1.6201
-16.1026
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-20.5380
-5.3572
-0.3997
-1.6137
-3.0119
-0.8522
-1.3024
-0.7802
-6.3271
-7.5715
-2.6281
-5.4538
-0.0298
-2.3310
-5.7477
-15.9160
-3.0560
-3.5972
-0.3718
-0.6515
-1.6384
-0.1422
-0.4127
-0.9868
-2.9589
-10.7583
-3.0229
-6.5992
-0.0013
-2.0932
-5.6057
-14.6777
-4.0906
-2.1624
-0.7266
-0.7775
-3.7264
-0.7542
-0.2738
-0.0001
-1.8491
-5.4953
-2.6138
-2.9688
-0.4718
-1.4024
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-5.1317
-6.8046
-2.6503
-2.6617
-0.2970
-0.3734
-3.6432
-0.3552
-0.7897
-0.6454
-4.0286
(Weighted) Mean shadow value of CO2 = -3.8435
(Weighted) 1995 SO2 Mean shadow value = -119.1774
(Weighted) 1996 SO2 Mean shadow value = -261.0716
(Weighted) 1997 SO2 Mean shadow value = -297.7651
(Weighted) 1998 SO2 Mean shadow value = -303.6555
(Weighted) 1999 SO2 Mean shadow value = -204.5988
(Weighted) 1995 NOx Mean shadow value =
(Weighted) 1996 NOx Mean shadow value =
(Weighted) 1997 NOx Mean shadow value =
(Weighted) 1998 NOx Mean shadow value =
(Weighted) 1999 NOx Mean shadow value =

-110.0616
-227.8685
-145.0575
-184.1006
-125.7189

(Weighted) 1995 CO2 Mean shadow value =
(Weighted) 1996 CO2 Mean shadow value =
(Weighted) 1997 CO2 Mean shadow value =
(Weighted) 1998 CO2 Mean shadow value =
(Weighted) 1999 CO2 Mean shadow value =

-2.5537
-4.7460
-3.4717
-4.2562
-2.7230

(Weighted) Mean Shadow Value of SO2 by plant=
-355.2610
-418.3837
-154.1900
-4.4970
-337.8402
-233.9734
-587.7049
-78.6605
-55.3504
-39.8802
-5058.7743
-154.0984
-217.4666
-83.0717

-168-

-139.4197
-142.7393
(Weighted) Mean Shadow Value of NOx by plant=
-362.3555
-389.0123
-168.5641
-4.4957
-319.0190
-249.7415
-586.5454
-159.0770
-70.7321
-38.5699
-4563.1263
-146.4980
-199.9502
-83.0717
-131.7954
-154.1244
(Weighted) Mean Shadow Value of CO2 by plant=
-7.3700
-2.5935
-3.6207
-0.1222
-1.7885
-4.6763
-11.7722
-8.1474
-3.0258
-0.3595
-0.6838
-2.7991
-0.4209
-0.5539
-0.5420
-3.4364
(Weighted) Mean Distance Function by plant =
0.8914
0.8885
0.7011
0.8539
0.8275
0.9598

-169-

0.9417
0.8070
0.6756
0.5819
0.7184
0.9079
0.5224
0.8171
0.7465
0.9624
1995-1999 Mean so2 emission by plant =
1.2972
1.1931
1.6146
5.5073
1.2696
1.3173
1.0847
2.2717
2.4382
2.4289
0.1280
1.9581
1.0792
1.5779
1.9934
1.4881

-170-

